Navigating State Lines:
The Story of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Social Welfare System Under Hosni Mubarak

Banan Abdelrahman
An Honors Thesis submitted to the History Department
Written under the supervision of Professor Toby Jones
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey New Brunswick, New Jersey
To *Umm El Dunya* Egypt, and its beautiful people.
Figure 1: Muslim Brotherhood Logo
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 5  
Background ......................................................................................................................... 7  
State’s Welfare System: ........................................................................................................ 15  
  * Education .......................................................................................................................... 18  
  * Public Health ................................................................................................................... 21  
  * Micro-Organizations ....................................................................................................... 23  
Muslim Brotherhood in Gharbia ......................................................................................... 25  
  * Education: ....................................................................................................................... 25  
    * School Structures: ....................................................................................................... 26  
    * Pre-Revolution State Policies ....................................................................................... 30  
  * Public Health .................................................................................................................. 33  
    * Pre-Revolution State Policies ....................................................................................... 34  
  * Micro-Organizations ....................................................................................................... 39  
    * Women’s Organization ................................................................................................. 39  
    * Micro-Village Organization ......................................................................................... 41  
Welfare After the Revolution ............................................................................................. 44  
  * Revolutions Impact in Gharbia ....................................................................................... 44  
  * AlNahda (The Renaissance) ........................................................................................... 46  
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 48  
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 52
Acknowledgements

My research experience, which took me from the relative comfort of New Jersey’s suburbia to the rural farms of Egypt, could not have been complete without the support of many people. First, I must thank Professor Toby Jones for not just being my advisor on my thesis, but also for serving as my mentor throughout my college career. His classes were amongst the most enriching I took at Rutgers, and helped me solidify my majors and career path. His guidance, kind words, and unique experiences have guided me successfully, and for that I am eternally grateful. Professor Mark Wasserman, the department chair, provided me with insightful comments throughout the process, and I thank him for his humor that calmed me when I was nervous. I would like to also thank Professor Sandy Russell-Jones, who served as my second reader.

I would also like to thank the Ronald E. McNair Post-baccalaureate Achievement Program for providing me with research skills and funding to successfully complete my trip to Egypt. Particularly, I would like to thank Crystal Bedley, who has served as my advisor for the program and whose help I could not have survived without. Her support served as a bedrock for the times when I felt overwhelmed, and just speaking to her about my concerns made them lighter, and for that I am extremely indebted.

My research would not have been complete if it was not for the many gracious people in Egypt. I would first like to thank my family for hosting me and putting up with my rants against Egyptian bureaucracy when research seemed slow. Secondly, I would like to thank Mr. Mohamed Elbenni and Dr. Gamal Al-Fiqhy for serving as my guides in Gharbia district and connecting me with all of the interviews pertaining to the Brotherhood. On that note, I would like
to also thank all of the participants in my research, who put up with my attempts at colloquial Egyptian and probing ways.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my friends and family. My friends, for putting up with my stress rants, for accompanying me to Egypt, and for telling me, in the spirit of true friendship, that I will amount to nothing so why bother with this thesis anyway. I will always be thankful for their humor and encouragement. To my parents and siblings, thank you for being patient and supportive throughout the entire process. I will finally have time to do the chores again.
Background

2011. The year the world stood stunned as Hosni Mubarak’s regime, which had maintained control for almost thirty years, was toppled by a people’s revolution in a mere month. Egyptians took to the street chanting “Al-shaab yorred iskat al-nizam (The people want the fall of the regime)” and more fervently, “aish, horreya, adalah igtmahia (Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice)”. The premise of a state that is founded on social equality, with food and freedom for all, was what the Muslim Brotherhood capitalized on for their campaign, and was the motto of their new political party, the Freedom and Justice Party. The elections that ensued after the revolution were very critical, as new and old parties struggled to gain power in the gap left by the old regime. The Muslim Brotherhood won majority seats in the parliamentary elections; as well as campaigned in the vehement presidential elections between Mohamed Morsi, the candidate for the Brotherhood and Ahmad Shafiq, the candidate for the old regime’s party, the National Democratic Party. While the race was close in the major metropolitan cities such as Cairo and Alexandria, the rural areas were what helped Morsi win the presidential elections.

Morsi’s victory reflects the relationship cultivated between the Muslim Brotherhood and the local rural districts throughout Egypt. It speaks of a long history, one that is grounded in the many tanzim, or branches, that were established with the founding of the Brotherhood. It also speaks of the rocky relationship between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly under Hosni Mubarak, where Brotherhood members faced years of persecution yet managed, nevertheless, to conduct their social welfare services. The Brotherhood was able to organize its social welfare services in Egypt because the state lacked the desire to combat them wholeheartedly. The reasoning behind that is because the Brotherhood’s services fulfilled duties the government could not. Rural districts are the best example to showcase how the
Brotherhood’s expanding branches delved right into the country’s most neglected areas, and strengthened the social welfare apparatus. Over 50% of Egypt’s population lives in rural areas, where poverty, illiteracy and government negligence have made these areas fertile ground for the Brotherhood’s welfare activities. Gharbia District, the tenth largest district in Egypt, is one such example. Housing eight provinces and eight cities, the largest being AlMahllah Al Kobra and Tanta, and 317 villages\(^1\), Gharbia district is the best example for a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare apparatus under Hosni Mubarak.

The first Brotherhood branch was established in Tanta, the capital of Gharbia district, in the early 1940’s. The focus of the Brotherhood in Gharbia, headed by Mohamad Al-Jaar, was mainly about welfare, as the conditions in Gharbia at that time were extremely rural and lacked adequate facilities for all services.\(^2\) In the sixth congressional meeting of the Brotherhood, in 1941, the Brotherhood members from Gharbia requested from the organization more funding focused on worker’s rights, and finding ways in which to convince wealthy elites to sponsor these poor rural workers.\(^3\) They also requested a focus on restructuring the education system, to assure more quality as well as a focus on Quran and Islamic studies. They also emphasized that children of rural workers should have the right to a free education, since their parents cannot afford to send them to schools on their own.\(^4\) These requests set precedence regarding the role the Brotherhood will play in Gharbia district.

By looking at the social histories of the members and entities in Gharbia district, this research aims to answer questions regarding the Brotherhood’s interaction with the state. How did members of the welfare organizations navigate the state’s placement of limitations? How did

---

\(^1\) Gharbia District Website. http://www.gharbia.gov.eg
\(^4\) (Transcript, Accessed 2/2013)
the limitations shape the practical practices of the individual entities? Did the state combat them unequivocally, or did research prove that they served the state’s needs, and thus were not completely persecuted? These questions will be answered by reconstructing the social histories of the Muslim Brotherhood’s members navigating the education and public health systems, women organization, and micro-village organizations in Gharbia district. The Brotherhood’s approach to education not only focuses on the curriculum but also on the instilment of proper discipline. By implementing a vigorous teacher selection process, the administration attempted to ensure that the distributers of knowledge could also maintain the disciplinary standards that the Brotherhood’s schools aspire to uphold. There are six Muslim Brotherhood schools in Gharbia district, with Tanta, being the second largest city, housing three main Brotherhood schools. 

*Madrasat AlGala Al Muslim* is a boys’ school that starts from nursery to high school, whereas *Madrasat AlRidwan* is an all girls’ school. Both schools house thousands of students and have faced significant governmental intrusion under Hosni Mubarak’s regime, thus making them crucial in understanding the ways in which the Brotherhood navigated, or couldn’t navigate, state lines.

Public health was also a crucial game pawn between the State and the Brotherhood, as it is the most contentious and the most important to the citizens. It is in public health, more than any other sector, that the combative relationship is exemplified. The Brotherhood has distinguished itself from similar organizations due to its navigation practices of state policies. They have been able to successfully do so, mainly because the state did not combat them wholeheartedly. Rather, the state recognized the Brotherhood was necessary to fill in the gaps it could not. In Gharbia, Mostashfa Teeba is the only hospital run by the Brotherhood in Tanta and is also one of the busiest. The story of its establishment provides insight on how different routes,
such as creating new organizations so they would not appear to be part of the Brotherhood, were used to ensure its survival. Similarly, micro-organizations headed either by women or separate villages used the same tactics to remain under the radar and not provoke the State’s interface.

The volatile relationship of the state with the Brotherhood began since its founding in March 1928 in the Ismailia district. Hassan Al-Banna founded it on the principles of collective brotherhood working towards a common goal. The roots of its principles stem from Islamic thought, where Al-Banna hoped to “produce a new generation of believers that act upon correct Islamic teachings, consequently instilling these values in the Islamic nation. The notion of an Islamic nation rose out as an antidote to the westernizing Egypt, an ill Al-Banna linked to colonialism. Thus, with the Brotherhood’s founding, a fervently anti-British stance was taken, and Al-Banna refused to negotiate with the colonialists he saw as destroying the Islamic basis of Egyptian society. Al-Banna also wanted to create an organization where peasants and working class Egyptians can be included, as the political structure of that time was very elitist. The Royal Palace and the Wafd Party were the two main political contenders in Egypt and both included the educated and the wealthy and did not address the falah (farmer) or a’amel (worker). Thus, El-Banna capitalized on this exclusion by catering to these strata in society and made sure to target them for membership. In an effort to create a large base, El-Banna began recruiting members in and around Ismailia. Social welfare base building mechanisms was first used in Ismailia, and continued in every branch he built. A pattern emerged where “the establishment of a school was followed by the creation of some project or another- a mosque, a school, a club, or a small house

industry- which came to serve as a focus for the interest or activities of the community”\(^8\). This led to a surge in membership numbers and branch establishments, so that by 1937, a survey on Islamic associations reported that the Muslim Brotherhood had more than 20,000 registered members.\(^9\)

Eventually, these members increased to 450,000 by 1943, and became politically active in Egypt’s struggle for independence from the British colonists. At the same time, the rising tensions between Egypt’s main political factions, the Wafd Party and the Royal Palace, led to the assassination of Hassan Al-Banna in 1949. When the Free Officer’s movement led the coup in 1952, they did so with the strategic partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, tensions soon emerged when the Brotherhood attempted to align with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the charismatic second president of Egypt, and failed. The conflicts boiled down to confrontations and accusations of assassination attempts on Abdel Nasser’s life, which led to the Brotherhood being officially prohibited, and its members either imprisoned or exiled.\(^10\)

When Anwar Al-Sadat took over in 1970, after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Al-Sadat attempted to distance himself from the authoritarian practices that the previous administration became known for. He granted amnesty to all Brotherhood members, freed those in prison, and opened the doors for the Brotherhood’s undertaking of a massive and highly efficient services infrastructure. This undertaking began because of the failures of Al-Sadat’s economic liberalism reforms that negatively impacted the regime’s ability to deliver social services to the masses.\(^11\) In time, Al-Sadat turned against the Brotherhood, because he saw it as an intrusion to the state’s legitimacy as well as a breeding ground for extremism. The cycle of

\(^8\) (Richard 1969 9)
\(^9\) Brynjar 1998
\(^11\) (Osman 2010, 84)
arrests and exile that began under Abdel Nasser was resurrected and the Brotherhood faced the same amount of persecution under Al-Sadat. Eventually, a militant Islamic group assassinated Al-Sadat in 1981, citing his repression and Camp David as justification.

When Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency, he attempted to espouse a democratic facade; allowing the Brotherhood to gain more infrastructural ground\(^\text{12}\) in terms of attaining physical visibility through their clinics, hospitals, mosque presence, etc. They joined professional syndicates, gained ground in universities, and began to expand their social welfare apparatus. The decision to expand took place at a time Egypt was going through changes in a post Sadat world. The Infitah, explained in depth in the next chapter, meant to increase development in the country; but due to corruption, overshooting and elitism, it left a huge gap between the government and the people, making the time fertile for the Brotherhood to monopolize and begin setting up an infrastructure. Also, Hosni Mubarak’s early years were marked with lax laws and an accepting of the Brotherhood, as he attempted to distance himself from his autocratic predecessors. That notion of democratic goodwill was short-lived, however, and freedoms were again disrupted at the turn of the 1990’s, because the regime saw that the Brotherhood was beginning to “politicize their achievements (or social legitimacy) in society, and to mobilize their lower middle class supporters (or beneficiaries) against the regime’s strategic policies”\(^\text{13}\). This manifested in 1992, when the Brotherhood members were the fastest respondents to the earthquake that killed 378 and injured 3,300. Their presence was felt by the people on the ground and international news agencies and led not only to the continued official clampdown on the Brotherhood, but also the regime’s realization that the Brotherhood’s organization far surpasses


\(^{13}\) Awadi 2004 140
the government and that their social welfare apparatus was there to stay. However, government repression still took place, as was seen in the clampdown on Mostashfa AlMarkazy in Madient Nasr, a multi-million dollar charity hospital project that was occupied and destroyed by the government. Mostashfa AlMarkazy gained state permits to build a three-story clinic in 1996 but the government backtracked in 2000, and revoked the permits. The Muslim Brotherhood claims it is because of election disputes, but the state maintained that it was due to improper documentation. In 2006, the courts granted the Brotherhood permits to begin constructing its seven-story hospital only for the building to be halted in 2009 and the destruction of two floors. However, that did not stop the Brotherhood from continuing their social welfare programs as well as focus on building up the group’s membership and expanding its presence.

---

14 Awadi 2004 150
16 Ghuzlan 2013
Figure 2- Map Of Gharbia District
State’s Welfare System:

Under Anwar Al-Sadat, Egypt went through a period of Infitah, economic liberalism, and a break from Abdel Nasser’s socialist policies. The Infitah brought sweeping changes to the economic landscape in Egypt, and included positives such as relaxation of political control, increase in financial flows in terms of aid and investments, and improvement in infrastructure; however, the lasting consequences saw the deterioration of the public sector and of domestic industry, an increase in corruption especially in terms of Al-Sadat favoring his allies in key business privatization deals, a decline in work ethics, and an increase in the gap between the rich and poor.17

The Infitah, or open door policy, was formally adopted in 1974 as the country’s main developmental strategy, and it focuses on the continuation of three main aspects: the domestic, regional, and international. Domestically, it was a continuation of expanding Abdel Nasser’s development plan, with a focus on the managers and technocrats of the private sector as opposed to the poor egalitarians of the public sector. Regionally, Egypt hoped to benefit from the economic success of its Arab neighbors, who gave Egypt loans to alleviate its condition as well as employed many Egyptians who sent back revenues. Internationally, Egypt was gaining geopolitical prominence in the Cold War era, with its position making it a prime target for western influence and aid. These factors reflect what the Infitah aspired to combine: Egyptian human resources, Arab money, and Western knowledge in its pursuit for development.18

When the 1973 war ended, Al Sadat wanted it to be the final war Egypt fought with Israel, in hopes that they can now focus on the economy to implement the Infitah utilizing the three factors. He hoped that these economic changes would usher in a democratic system in

18 (Ayubi 1991, 2-4)
Egypt, stating, “Nasser and I are the last pharaohs in Egypt”. However, the system he implemented led to an increase in the gap between the rich and poor, and the monopolization of the economy by the increasing private sector led by his close allies and friends. This gap and monopolization were mainly linked to the privatization process. Under Abdel Nasser, the bureaucratic sector of government greatly expanded, and redefined socioeconomic definitions. Before, landownership measured which class one pertained to; however, with the expansion of the public sector and the land seizures that Abdel Nasser forced upon the elites, the middle class increased greatly as the nature of one’s job indicated their class. However, this increase came to a stagnant halt under Sadat, since decisive issues of development and economic building went to the private sector that was controlled by his allies and close friends. As the private sector elite was gaining power, and trading laws were becoming lax to accommodate their bulging wealth, everyday Egyptian workers saw the short end of the stick. The corruption that ensued at the macro and micro levels, from the top echelons of society to the public sector, also led to the further defragmentation of the middle class, and laid the groundwork for the gap between the rich and poor to continue increasing steadily under Hosni Mubarak. When he assumed presidency, he faced a crippling system that needed immediate infrastructural and bureaucratic reform.

This system, constructed by Abdel Nasser, Al-Sadat, and eventually continued by Mubarak was a well-oiled machine that placed much emphasis on presidential powers. The President is the “dominant political and governmental authority in Egypt… any important policy or project must receive the ‘blessing’ of the President before it can proceed”. Mubarak enjoyed tremendous powers under the emergency law that was enacted immediately after Al-Sadat’s
assassination. Although Mubarak initially attempted to paint himself as a reformer against corruption and for democracy, he made no effort to change the law. He also chose to go with the established status quo and did not try to change the cosmopolitan elite, or discover his own niche of polices that might correlate with Nasser’s peace or Al-Sadat’s Infitah, choosing instead to parrot the policies taglines and rely on the same political party to control the power.\textsuperscript{22} He chose expediency over drastic change, and was content on continuing the policies of his predecessors.

This changed when Egypt was rapidly slipping into debt and the brunt of the economic failures continued to be felt by the lower classes. This was linked to not only the Infitah, but was also prompted by a decline in sources of revenue- namely remittances, oil, and tourism. The return of thousands of Egyptian workers from the Gulf after the 1991 war put even more pressure on the crumbling economy, which eventually needed to look outside for funds.\textsuperscript{23} The subsequent investments of funds from the International Monetary Fund led to the establishment of the Social Funds Development (SFD) Fund\textsuperscript{24} that focuses on development and job creation. The SFD, coupled with the system of subsidies of basic foodstuffs were the two main safety net programs for social welfare in Egypt under Hosni Mubarak.\textsuperscript{25} Food subsidies takes up a significant amount of the state’s budget, and it is the dissemination of cooking oil, flour, bread and sugar to the needy. However, it too falls under corruption and false targeting, with people receiving food subsides they do not need or qualify for.\textsuperscript{26} The SFD began as a temporary independent institution to test the feasibility of building a civil society-state relationship focused on development of the financial district as well as sustainable projects. For the first few years of its implementation,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ayubi 1991, 103
\item \textsuperscript{23} El-Mahdi, Rabab. 2011. Empowered participation or political manipulation? : State, civil society and social funds in egypt and bolivia. (Boston: Brill) 98
\item \textsuperscript{24} Presidential Decree 40 1991
\item \textsuperscript{25} El Mahdi 2011 98
\item \textsuperscript{26} El Mahdi 2011, 98
\end{itemize}
Egypt experienced an increase in its GDP, the government deficit fell, and foreign investment flowed in. However, by the end of the 1990’s, Egypt’s standard of living decreased exponentially, with poverty reaching 48% by 1996, unemployment rates skyrocketing, and privatization continuing.27 The SFD, along with the rest of the social welfare mechanisms the State provided, fell under the same corrupt practices “that need[ed] to preserve the status quo and not societal needs or even economic efficiency”28, thus leading to the defragmentation of the education, public health and welfare sector due to lack of efficient funding and a checks and balances system.

**Education**

Education in Egypt has a long history tied to the 1952 Nasserist revolution itself. Under the monarchy that ruled Egypt for three centuries, education was accessible only to foreigners and wealthy elites, thus investing the limited resources available to generate higher quality educational achievements. “During the time of 1952 revolution, nearly seventy-five percent of the population over the age of ten were illiterate, ninety percent of whom were female”.29 Thus, the goal of education became to eliminate illiteracy by making education accessible to all classes, regardless of the fact that there was no institutional structural system to support it. The government adopted a highly centralized public school system, with its regulation federally mandated and funded. Thus, while Abdel Nasser’s regime invested in building schools, they did not maintain them, nor did they build enough schools to adequately accommodate the rising number of students, correlating with the skyrocketing national population. The system was not repaired under Al-Sadat and Mubarak’s regimes, and suffered from a poor overall quality, with

---

27 El Mahdi 2011, 99
28 El Mahdi 2011 100
29 Kandil, Radwa. The Egyptian education system and public participation. Social Policy Summer 2011 59
its chief problems being deteriorating infrastructure, increase in corporal punishments, increasing dropout rate, and unemployment amongst school graduates.\textsuperscript{30}

The Egyptian educational system consists of kindergarten, primary, secondary, and university. Law 90 in 1950 established that pre-university education as a right and therefore should be free of charge, with the Minister of Education, Taha Hussien, stating “education is a right for people as is their right for air and water”.\textsuperscript{31} Primary and preparatory education covers nine years, and it is mandatory in Egypt for all students to go through at least these two stages. Secondary school, however, is optional and split into two types: general secondary education and technical secondary education. General secondary education qualifies students to enter university whereas technical secondary education mainly trains students to enter the labor market. General Secondary education is the principal channel through which students have access to university education, and has increasingly been the subject of reforms focused on meshing the university preparation to practical preparation, with the introduction of computer classes, applied sciences, and various other technology classes reflecting developments in various fields.\textsuperscript{32} Technical schools, on the other hand, specialize in three major fields: agricultural, commercial, and industrial. Depending on the program, students’ study from three to five years, and each field branches off to different specializations, with the Ministry of Education partnering up with other ministries in establishing schools that serve certain needed specialties.\textsuperscript{33}

However, when one looks into the educational practices and the implementation of the system, they realize the huge gap between the ideal and what is actually going on in the ground. With a population of eighty-four million as of February 2013, Egypt has one of the largest

\textsuperscript{30} Kandil 2011, 60
\textsuperscript{31} UNDP Egypt Development Report, 1998/99 31
\textsuperscript{32} UNDP Dev. Rep. 98/99 32
\textsuperscript{33} UNDP Dev. Rep. 98/99 34
education systems in the region, encompassing more than 43,000 schools, some 1.6 million personnel (teachers, administrators and others) and over 16 million students.\textsuperscript{34} When looking at the numbers, it is very obvious that Egypt lacks a strong physical infrastructure to support these massive numbers. Additionally, the Ministry of Education allocates eighty-five percent of the budget for teacher salaries, leaving a very small percentage for maintaining and developing new teaching material.\textsuperscript{35}

These demographic and monetary strains on the budget leads to physical disrepair of schools, overcrowding in schools, and poor teacher morale due to low salaries. According to a UNICEF Egypt report, in 2003, “one in five school buildings are not fit for use and lack functional water and sanitation facilities”.\textsuperscript{36} Also, “less then ten percent of the total number of schools meets national standards for quality education”.\textsuperscript{37} Overcrowding in classrooms is exemplified in instances where some administrators are being forced to assign one hundred students to attend at certain times so that classes can be held in twice. Additionally, teachers are underpaid and under qualified, with the average teacher making about $460 annually, thus attracting only low-caliber instructors, which contributes to the poorer quality in education.\textsuperscript{38}

Teacher’s low salaries, coupled with the fact that they cannot negotiate, and the one teacher union that exists was monopolized by the government led them to seek other avenues for revenue, particularly in the private tutoring sector. This leads to many teachers, especially those working in public schools, to withhold information in class to force students to sign up to their tutoring classes. Parents pay anywhere between $5 to $30 per hour depending on the teacher’s ability and reputation, forcing parents from lower socio-economic classes to take their children

\textsuperscript{34} UNDP Egypt Human Development Report, 2011 45
\textsuperscript{35} Kandil 2011 61
\textsuperscript{36} UNICEF EGYPT 2003
\textsuperscript{37} UNICEF Egypt 2012
\textsuperscript{38} Kandil 2011 61
out of schools because of their inability to pay.\textsuperscript{39} These factors made the educational system in Egypt inefficient led to the development of a significant private school sector, where they make up about 10.8 percent of preparatory schools in 1998/99, whereas in secondary schools, private schools contributed to 21.6 percent of schools.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Public Health}

Egypt’s public health system is rooted in its colonial history, and its basis for establishment in its anti-colonial struggle. When the Free Officers established their system after the coup, Abdel Nasser wanted to invest as much as possible in the public health sector that had been destroyed by the British. When the British occupied Egypt, they cut back on funding for medical schools in an attempt to reduce Egyptian debt and reduce government spending. By doing this, they reduced both the quality and quantity of doctors, which in turn lead to a decrease in the quality of services provided to the Egyptian public. Thus, when the 1952 Revolution took place, building health infrastructures became an important priority, with an emphasis on expanding university facilities as well as expanding the existing physical infrastructure to provide more assistance. Abdel Nasser had hoped to establish one of the most integrated health infrastructures in the Third World, with ambitions that a rural health care unit at a maximum distance of three kilometers from each village.\textsuperscript{41} In reality, however, the system that Al-Sadat, and subsequently Mubarak, inherited did not meet this goal, and was inadequately supplied and staffed.\textsuperscript{42}

When Mubarak came into power, more emphasis was placed on health care with regards to the budget. By the mid-1990’s, the Ministry of Health offered three levels of health services:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Kandil 2011 61 62
  \item \textsuperscript{40} UNDP Egypt Human Developments Report 1998/99 34
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Stork 1989 5
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Clark 2004 46
\end{itemize}
1) A network of rural and urban units offering basic health services, including preventive health care and orientation; 2) 211 general and central hospitals, 188 specialized hospitals, and 582 rural units (with beds) offering government medical services; 3) twenty five university hospitals administered by the Ministry of Education and eight teaching hospitals and 8 specialized institutions run by the ministry of health. In 1994, there were 66,931 hospital beds in Egypt, 59.2 percent provided by level two hospitals and 19.3 percent by level three hospitals... In total, the Ministry of Health had 3,700 primary secondary, and tertiary health services.\textsuperscript{43}

However, quantity did not mean quality, as public facilities suffer from old and used equipment, poor hygiene, a shortage of medicine, and a lack of an adequate staff. Doctors and nurses do not provide the best service due to their low salaries and “frustrating bureaucratic red tape that they must deal with on a regular basis”.\textsuperscript{44} The fact that 49.7 percent of Egyptians who are seeking outpatient health care opt to go to private facilities\textsuperscript{45} is a consequence of the lack of proper investment in the healthcare sector by the state.

In 1991, around the same time the Social Developments Fund was established, Egypt also established the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) to fight off the massive inflation rates that devastated the economy and forced Egypt to accumulate more external debts.

The goals of ERSAP were: stabilisation of the economy in order to restore macroeconomic balance and reduce inflation; structural adjustment to stimulate medium and long term growth; and modification of social policies to minimise the adverse effects of economic reform on the poor and vulnerable groups. The structural adjustment policies were aimed at reforming public enterprises and liberalising all prices, including interest rates. The underlying assumption was that the introduction of market prices as a basis of resource allocation would gradually pave the way for the emergence of a virile private sector.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{43} Clark 2004 46-47  
\textsuperscript{44} Clark 2004 47  
\textsuperscript{45} A.K. Nandakumar, Mukesh Chawla, Maryam Khan, Utilization of Outpatient Care in Egypt and its Implications for the Role of Government in Health Care Provision, World Development, Volume 28, Issue 1, January 2000, Pages 187-196  
\textsuperscript{46} African Development Bank Group. Egypt: Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme: Project
Consequently, while significant changes took place in the macro-economic levels, the micro level suffered. Wages and salaries have fallen; prices on food, transportation, rents, gasoline, and electricity have skyrocketed, while malnutrition has risen. ERSA privatization program impact forced Egyptians to go to private clinics, as the Ministry of Health allocated its funds elsewhere. This lead to the expansion of a large social welfare sector funded by private organizations, one of which was the Muslim Brotherhood.

*Micro-O rganizations*

The lack of state infrastructure in the most localized levels lead to an increase in non-governmental organizations. (NGOs) However, NGOs faced opposition from the state, as the state wanted to maintain its hegemony. Law 32, passed in 1964, restricted the ability of NGOs to mobilize and “allowed for state monopoly of NGOs, requiring citizens wishing to form voluntary organization of any type to obtain permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs”. This requirement severely impacted the performance of many of the NGOs, because even if the Ministry of Social Affairs approved an NGO, it would require it to inform of all its activities, notify three government officials of the location and issues that will be discussed in the meetings, and inform them of all the members in the organization.

**Conclusion:**

The economic changes brought upon by Anwar Al-Sadat’s Infitah era greatly impacted all aspects of the social welfare apparatus in Egypt. Education, public health, and non-governmental organizations all fell under the wrath of a bureaucracy that was too large to handle.

---

Performance Evaluation Report (PPER)

47 Clark 2004 47

the infrastructure yet too invested in its desire to maintain hegemony to allow for there to be independence in the creation of an groundwork to meet the demands of Egypt’s ever growing population and ever growing gap between the rich and the poor. It is in this era, and through the failure of the State, that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to build and maintain a shadow system and legitimize themselves in the eyes of the people they are servicing.
The Muslim Brotherhood in Gharbia was established to focus on welfare, as Gharbia was a rural district that lacked many essential necessities. Thus, although its focus was initially on the felahaeen’s worker rights, they expanded to include education, public health and micro-organizations. The time lapse between the first branch’s establishment and the official establishment of welfare systems is parallel to the state’s relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood over the years. The first branch in Gharbia was established in the early 1940’s, but the first school, for example, was established in 1984. However, in the decades between, the Brotherhood established its network of members in the area, holding weekly religious meetings and Quran classes, as well as conducting illiteracy classes in the local mosques of the villages. The Brotherhood’s story in Gharbia district is important to help understand the ways in which its relationship with the state changed, as well give an understanding of how it can be applied to other rural districts in Egypt.

**Education:**

The Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in education in Gharbia district has largely been shaped by the lack of governmental care in investing in the infrastructure of schools, the maintenance of teachers, and the overall performance of students. The Establishment of AlGamiya Altarbawiya al Islamiya, or the Islamic Educational Society in 1980, under the leadership of Ahmad ElBess, one of the original members of the Muslim Brotherhood, led to the focus of the Brotherhood administration to establishing schools throughout Egypt. This focus came out of a need for quality schools to be established in a post- Sadat era, as well as the need to
take advantage of Mubarak’s early years of accommodation. The Brotherhood also hoped to count on Egypt’s growing conservative and religious tide to create a support system and establish a base. It is in these societal and organizational changes that Madrasat al Gala for Boys, and Madrasat al Ridwan for Girls were established in 1984 in an attempt to exemplify the Brotherhood’s stance on education, where its seen as an essential tool to raise a strong Muslim generation.

These schools were established based on the ideology that desires to “nurture a generation with a disciplined upbringing, in pace with the developments of our age under the umbrella of our values, our Arabic and Islamic civilization, and to contribute in bringing up a generation capable in reforming and leading the community”. The message of both schools is focused on developing “a generation that is excellent academically, unique in their good discipline and behavior, physically healthy, and active members in nation, and that is through: a distinct administration that works in the spirit of collective brainstorming; a selection of teachers; an environment that fosters creativity and innovation using modern technological means”. The Brotherhood members are able to apply these messages through diligent planning and concrete organized school structures.

**School Structures:**

The schools fall under the umbrella of the AlGamiya Altarbawiya al Islamiya, which means the schools’ administrators appointment falls under the Gamiya’s jurisdiction. They are made up of the principals, the vice principals, and various other administrative officials. They are appointed based on qualifications, or at times, depending on the political atmosphere. If there was a qualified member, but the Egyptian Secret Services marked him as a threat, then a safer

---

49 School Poster. Picture taken by Banan Abdelrahman on January 14, 2013
50 School Poster. Picture taken by Banan Abdelrahman on January 14, 2013
option was appointed and the Gamiya’s board would lead from behind.\textsuperscript{51} The principals of all schools in Gharbia district meet once a month to check the progress in their schools.

The makeup of the student body is interesting, as most students come from middle to upper middle class families, many of who are from those opposing the Brotherhood and sometimes persecuted its members.\textsuperscript{52} Many of these students are children of 	extit{Amn Al Dawla}, the Egyptian Secret Services, and many of their fathers have arrested the very Brotherhood members they trust their children with. When a Brotherhood member asked one father, who is in the Secret Services, why do they persecute them yet still send their children to them, the father respond with “we persecute you because our jobs require us to, but when we want our children to get good, disciplined education, we send them to your schools”\textsuperscript{53}. The makeup exemplifies the state’s relationship with the Brotherhood. The state’s infrastructure was so large and inefficient, and could not provide quality education to those who can afford it, namely the middle class and the upper middle class. This is where the Muslim Brotherhood stepped in, and provided them with the quality education the state could not, thus taking over the state’s role and legitimizing it in the eyes of the parents, regardless of their political opinions.

	extit{Madrsat Al Geel}, the boys’ school, hails about 2500 students of all ages. They pay two thousand five hundred Egyptian pounds annually, which is inexpensive when compared to their private school counterparts that offer similar services.\textsuperscript{54} These services include English classes, Quran classes, Islamic Studies, outdoor trips, and charitable activities. Extracurricular activities,

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{52} Bassuouni, Mohammad. Interview by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Principal of Al Galaa School. January 14, 2013
\textsuperscript{53} Bassuouni 2013
such as private tutoring and enhanced Quranic studies are also placed to help the student’s fulfill the school’s ideological mission.

The curriculum of the school mirrors that of the State’s, with exceptions to English, Quranic, and Islamic Studies, where there is extra emphasis on its importance. It is within the Quran and Islamic Studies that the Brotherhood’s influence truly shows, as the student’s are taught to emulate the ideology in terms of maintaining Islamic discipline, and devoting time to memorizing the Quran. Unlike the State, a student who fails in Quran does not proceed onto the next grade level unless he passes the subject.55

This is maintained through a vigorous teacher selection process. When a teacher applies for a position, he must go through a background check as well as an investigation to make sure that he is not a smoker (a prevalent problem in Egyptian society), does not have any women liaisons, has good character and a good reputation. The Brotherhood believes that students learn the most when they have role models they can lookup to and emulate, thus picking the right teacher is the crucial key in fulfilling the mission of shaping the generation’s mindset.56 The girls’ school, Madrsat Hassan AlRidwan, uses many of the same tactics as the boys’ school when selecting teachers and when planning activities.

Madrsat Hassan AlRidwan boasts about 1158 students, with each class housing forty students. The girls have the same academic curriculum as the boys; with noted differences only in the activities and electives they take. Some of the girls’ activities include home economics, drawing, arts, and sewing classes, all designed to prepare them for their role as successful professionals as well as successful homemakers.57 Due to the importance placed on the students

56 Bassuouni 2013
57 Siyam 2013
to excel in their education, Madrsat Hassan AlRidwan has produced students who have placed in the top ten students nationally based on their exam scores. The teachers play a crucial role in ensuring they succeed through their rigorous teaching techniques and by implementing the school’s strict rules regarding discipline and academic advancement.

A teacher in Madrsat Hassan AlRidwan, goes through the same rigorous background check that her counterpart in the boys school goes through. Her values are gauged based on her reputation, her education, curriculum vitae, as well as overall intellectualism. She must wear the hijab, the Islamic headscarf, and must be known to act islamically in order for her to be hired as a teacher. The process in which one is evaluated is unclear, since all the factors besides educational qualifications can be gauged subjectively. What determines a good reputation, and what ensures the administration whether or not a teacher wears hijab? The emphasis on the appearance of religiosity excludes teachers that are qualified simply because they do not fit the criteria the Brotherhood sets up, thus limiting the ideological exposure students experience.

When one approaches the teacher’s lounge in Madrsat Hassan AlRidwan, they are welcomed with a huge poster, detailing to the teacher what her role is in schools. The message of the posters, however, pertains to all teachers in the Brotherhood’s schools. Interestingly, the poster is written in the masculine form of Arabic, even though the audience is completely female.

Your message and your virtue is great, ‘A teacher is the closest thing to a Prophet’. Be an honest advisor to your students; and interactive for your children, the students, for you are a sea of knowledge and commanding of your specialization. Be eager in understanding the personalities of your students, and their developmental needs and watch their behaviors for you are the closest to their minds and hearts. Praise your students with kind words the show your respect, and create an environment in the classroom that is nurturing. Give them advice, don’t be cheap with your help, and never demean them and their abilities. Be for your students the crutch in times of hardships,

58 Siyam 2013
hope in times of despair, and just in times of injustice… Make sure to be the good role model for students by watching what your dress, character, words, and action. Master the subject you will teach, how you will present it… be creative in your presentation of your subject, in order to overcome boredom in students, and grab their attention in class. Ask about the absent student, and care about the one that is sick, praise those that do well and forgive their transgressions. Our children are our hope, so let’s nurture and protect them form all evil. 

This emphasis on teachers is pivotal in the Brotherhood’s ideology to improve generations, and thus was one of the first things the State combated when it took over and reconstructed the school in 2000.

While both schools cater to a middle and upper middle class target audience, they have many community outreach programs as well as a financial aid system that allows excellent student from lower income homes to join their schools through scholarships. Also, families with more children in the school get discounts, with second and third siblings getting discounts. Families going through harsh monetary conditions get either their entire tuition forgiven or are allowed a reduced payment plan where as orphans get discounts. Other programs include the “twinning project”, where the schools are twinned with a public school and sponsor the needs of poor students through providing visits to their schools, giving poor student school supplies, financial aid, and pocket money. The schools also provide the community with sports programs, as well as allow them to use their playgrounds after school and during the summer.

Pre-Revolution State Policies

Right before the 2000- 2001 school year was about to take off, Fathi Saad, the head of Gharbia district, took the decision that the State would take over Brotherhood schools in the

---

60 Ghuzalan 2013
61 Bassuouni 2013
62 Bassuouni 2013
district.\textsuperscript{63} They dissolved the board of the Islamic Education Organization, changed the administration, appointing state workers to replace those they felt may be aligned to the Brotherhood as well as hired a slew of new teachers that do not fit the categorizations the Brotherhood holds for its own teachers.\textsuperscript{64} They did this because they feared that the Brotherhood administration was trying to indoctrinate the students into the party, a claim the administration ardently denies,\textsuperscript{65,66} pointing to the fact that, in their opinion, most students, once they leave, go into universities with liberal leanings, thus influencing their decision to not join the Brotherhood. However, there has not been any quantifiable data to back their claims, and does not correlate with the political activities of university student who claim to be part of the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{67}

Another fear, the administrators claimed, dealt with the fact that the state did not want the youth to develop strong personalities that might question the State’s authority and trigger a revolution. When juxtaposed with the Brotherhood’s own stance on following the Morshed (the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood), this sentiment of freethinking students does not seem to ring true. The notion that the ultimate decision falls to the Morshed Mohamed Badie, and whose final word cannot be questioned, seems as though the Brotherhood found it convenient to question the state’s fear of free-thinking students without turning the mirror to themselves. During the ten years they controlled the schools, the state had a complete disregard for the schools, including the school’s property. The follow up on students, which had been a staple of the old administration, was reduced which lead to the student’s Islamic character and academic performance to diminish significantly\textsuperscript{68} according to the administrators.

\textsuperscript{63} Bassuouni 2/17/2013
\textsuperscript{64} Bassuouni 1/15/2013
\textsuperscript{65} Bassuouni 1/15/2013
\textsuperscript{66} Siyam 2013
\textsuperscript{67} Observation of former student who accompanied Banan in Tanta on 1/15/2013
\textsuperscript{68} Bassuouni 2/17/2013
Another important way to see how the state interfered in the organization of the school is their constant crackdown on their events. *Amn Al Dawlah* ambushed a camping trip for the boys in *Madrsat Al Geel* to Marsa Matrouh, a resort, in the nineties with a surprise ambush, where the students and teachers were arrested. Also, whenever any political event or protest takes place, they always arrest the teachers and the principals of the various Brotherhood schools, simply to prevent any attempt at political meetings.\(^{69}\) They also regulated who was hired, as all names had to go through the Amn Al Dawlah, where they rejected many qualified teachers simply because the State thought they were with the Brotherhood. Nonetheless, the state did not hinder the school progress in the long run, as it continues to thrive in a Post-Revolution Egypt.\(^{70}\)

\(^{69}\) Bassuouni1/15/213

The Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in public health in Gharbia stemmed from the lack of qualified services for the people in this largely rural area. Prompted by the lack of basic healthcare services, the Brotherhood established Al-Gamiya Al-Tibya Al-Islamiya, the Islamic Medical Organization, in 1973 in an attempt to fill the gap through various free clinics, check ups, and traveling clinics that cater to Gharbia’s 317 villages.71 These clinics culminated into the establishment of Tiba Charitable hospital in the early 1980’s in Tanta.

Out of the five hospitals in Tanta, the most famous and second largest city in Gharbia city, the Muslim Brotherhood runs only one: Tiba Hospital. It’s gained a reputable reputation due to its good quality treatment, competent doctors, low prices, and various services. The hospital brochure boasts that its services include:

Separate clinics for all specializations everyday of the week; an intensive care unit with the newest and most modern equipment; a complete dentistry unit; a complete x-ray unit that detects problems through the computer; a unit that detects heart describes through the latest technology of “echo”; a pediatrics and maternity ward; a surgical wing that contains four fully-equipped rooms; surgical microscope for the eyes, ear, and nose and very delicate and complicated surgeries.72

These services are enhanced by the fact that prices at the hospital are less than the national hospitals. That is due to the fact that the doctors are volunteers who come from very high positions; many are professors at the local medical school in Tanta. The price difference is vast, for example, Dr. Khalid Issa, a doctor who specializes in bones, usually charges sixty-five pounds in his normal clinic, but for the hospital, he charges a mere twelve pounds.73 The same can be said about blood analysis, where the normal hospitals charges twenty pounds, the Muslim

71 AlTabakh, Hassan. Interview by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Doctor at Tiba Hospital, Tanta. January 15th, 2013
73 AlTabakh 1/15/2013
Brotherhood’s hospital charges six pounds. Also, once a month, on a Friday, the hospital runs a program where anyone who comes in can get a free check up, sometimes these free programs are specialized to certain ailments, such as anemia, something people in Gharbia district suffer from chronically.\textsuperscript{74} The success of these services is seen in the amount of patients seen all day, with the minimum around a thousand a day.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Pre-Revolution State Policies}

The hospital’s building is a quaint, almost discrete, three story building in a busy street, adjacent to a mosque also run by the Brotherhood. Under Hosni Mubarak’s regime, the hospital attempted to expand and buy the entire apartment building in which they operated from, as well as the rest of the building that houses their mosque. However, the state forbid them from buying the building and attempted to close down the facilities because of its Brotherhood ties.\textsuperscript{76}

Nonetheless, the hospital administration created a new pseudo-organization, that eventually became permanent, \textit{Gamiyat Ibn AlNafes Al-Tibya Al-Khaiyriah}, Ibn Al Nafees Medical Charitable Organization.\textsuperscript{77,78} They still received funding from the Brotherhood; however, this was seen as an independent organization by the state.

Also, members of the Brotherhood that ran the hospital were constantly harassed and brought in by Security Services for questioning regarding their involvement with the Brotherhood.\textsuperscript{79} They used these tactics in an attempt to hinder any ideas the Brotherhood might have in terms of building a political base that might put the State’s interests in danger. In terms of recruiting doctors, the hospital had a hard time convincing many people to work for them,

\textsuperscript{74} AlTabakh 1/15/2013  
\textsuperscript{75} AlTabakh 1/15/2013  
\textsuperscript{76} AlTabakh 1/15/2013  
\textsuperscript{77} AlTabakh 1/15/2013  
\textsuperscript{78} Tiba and Freedom and Justice Party Event Flyer. December 2012  
\textsuperscript{79} AlTabakh 1/15/2013
even though many of them were not from the Brotherhood, because these doctors feared the consequence of being affiliated with anything related to the opposition group.

The irony of the Amn AlDawlah’s constant crack down on the hospital is the same irony found in the schools, the very same officers that persecute them come to use their services when they need it. Many a child of an officer was born in the hospital, and many officers themselves come in for checkups and consultations. This, to the hospital’s management, exemplifies their belief that the State, while it persecuted them, cannot do without the Brotherhood, as the quality services they provide can also be attested by the state’s own security forces.®

---

® AlTabakh 1/15/2013
Figure 4: Courtyard of Madrsat Al Geel

Figure 5: Madrsat Al Geel

Figure 6: Teacher’s Room of Madrsat Al Geel
Figure 7: Classroom in Madrsat Al Geel for Boys

Figure 8: Tiba Hospital and Shaheed Mosque

Figure 9: Waiting Room in Tiba Hospital
Figure 10: Village between Tanta and Al Santanta

Figure 11: Farmer in village between Tanta and Santa

Figure 12: Lack of proper infrastructure in many villages
Micro-O rganizations

The Muslim Brotherhood’s micro-organizations serve as the backbone to its social welfare apparatus. It is in these extremely localized organizations the Brotherhood’s activities are directly felt by the people. These organizations ensure the day-to-day needs of the people are met, and families in the villages have food on their tables and their basic necessities met. Women play a pivotal role in implementing the services in this micro level of organizing and navigating the state policies under Hosni Mubarak’s era. These micro-organizations were in every village throughout Egypt, not just the main centers such as Tanta and Santa.\(^{81}\)

Women’s Organization

The role of women in the organization is crucial for its day-to-day operations. Due to the privilege granted to them by their gender, it is much easier for women to access family homes, they have a better understanding of the situation on the ground, and can go on fact-finding missions with much more mobility that is allowed to a man in a conservative country such as Egypt\(^{82}\), but more so, a conservative rural district such as Gharbia.

Al-Santa, a province in Gharbia, has an intricate women’s organization that has been functioning secretly for years. Their services are quite straightforward, they go into homes, assess the situation, and estimate their monthly salaries. Their goals are to ensure that orphans, widows, divorcees, and the sick are well taken care of. They conducted site visits to hospitals and orphanages.\(^{83}\) They sponsored care packages during the holidays, particularly Ramadan, where demand for food and basic necessities were high. They also function semi-autonomously, and only go the Brotherhood officials for funding, conferences, and permission for major

\(^{81}\) AlFiqhy 1/15/13
\(^{82}\) Ghuzalan 2013.
decisions.\textsuperscript{84} Another important role these women have deals with the families of the political prisoners that are members of the Muslim Brotherhood. They compile lists of these families, seek out their needs, and pay them a monthly salary equivalent to the amount the arrested member would have made.\textsuperscript{85}

\textit{Navigating the State}

The influence of the state’s anti-Brotherhood policies is felt the most by the women organizations. All Muslim Brotherhood grassroots organizations were banned under Hosni Mubarak, therefore the women organizations needed to function secretly. Women would work discreetly; they would visit the homes alone, never together as to not get the attention of State Security. On paper, if they needed anything to go through state security, they would put a male’s name to ensure their safety and not bring the wrath of State Security. Therefore, no women got arrested; because Security forces did not know they existed.\textsuperscript{86}

However, many the women’s careers have been impacted because of their activities that render them guilty of being part of the Brotherhood. The head of the organization in Santa, Um Asmaa, recounted how she lost her teaching position and was placed in an administrative post simply because they thought she was part of the Brotherhood. This greatly impacted the way people dealt with her in her workplace, as many feared that they might suffer the same consequences as she did if they were seen as part of the brotherhood. She sued the state for defamation in 2000, and only won the case in 2011, and was compensated three thousand pounds.

\textsuperscript{84} Um Ahmad. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Board Member. Masjid in Santa. January 15, 2013
\textsuperscript{85} Um Ahmad II. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Board Member. Masjid in Santa. January 15, 2013
\textsuperscript{86} Um Al Zahraa. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Host and member. Masjid in Santa. January 15, 2013
for her troubles.\textsuperscript{87} While her case succeeded, many women who feel under the wrath of the State Security were not so lucky. Many lost jobs, as another woman, Um Muhammad retells, or they were blacklisted by State Security services and were not able to get jobs at all. Um Muhammad’s sister, an active activist in her college years and a community organizer, was not able to find a job upon graduation because State Security must approve assignments of teachers before they get the job.\textsuperscript{88}

\textit{Micro-Village Organization}

Every village in Gharbia, all 319 of them, has a small village organization funded by the Brotherhood that provides basic needs to the village\textsuperscript{89}. Al-Ragabyea, a village that’s a subsidiary of Al-Santa province, has a charity center that is run by the Brotherhood. Al-Ragabeya has about 1,500 families, and the charity center care for two hundred fifty poor families. They sponsor fifty orphans, paying thirty pounds per orphan as well as give two payments a year of six hundred pounds to families that have a large amount of children going to schools\textsuperscript{90}. The two-story house that houses the charity organization has a clinic, a maternity room, and a dentist room. This organization is very involved in the lives of the villagers, as they offer services to orphans, poor villagers including but not limited to school fees, arranging orphan marriages, school tutoring, free clinics, hosting specialized doctors that deal with dentistry, pediatrics, heart analysis lab, and kidney checkups.\textsuperscript{91} However, the charities services do not end in the medical sector.

During Ramadan, the center organizes Iftars (dinners to break the fast) for the poor, as well as provides them with food packages consisting of flour, rice, meat, beans, oil, sugar, butter,

\textsuperscript{87} Um Asmaa 2013
\textsuperscript{88} Um Muhammad. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. . Board Member. Masjid in Santa. January 15, 2013
\textsuperscript{89} AlFiqhy 1/16/13
\textsuperscript{90} Mahfouth, Al Hag. Interview by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. AlRagbiya Cultural Center, Ragbiya. 1/16/2013
\textsuperscript{91} Mahfouth 2013
and pasta. When Eid Ul Adha, the holiday in which Muslims offer an animal sacrifice, the center provide people who cannot afford the sacrifice meat for the holidays. The center’s administrators also go clothes shopping for uniforms and Eid clothes for orphans and children from poverty stricken homes. They also sponsored small business projects, like operating a small groceries kiosk, or giving a needy family a cow so that they can get fresh milk daily.

The charity center also helps in the maintenance of the villagers’ homes, and the renovating of them. When a house is made of straw, they offer to build a sturdier structure using concrete and wood. When homes fall, or an animal that produces revenue dies, the charity is ready to reimburse them for their losses. They also pay the electricity bills and other outstanding bills for poor villagers. Also, the center organizes social activities for the community in general, but the poor villagers specifically, with activities such as trips, “fun days”, and social events.

Navigating the State

The failure of the state in hindering the work of the Brotherhood is best seen in the micro-organizations like the one in Ragabiya. While the State did give the center a hard time to register as an official organization, they could do nothing about the organization itself. So while they returned a list of the center’s employees with all Brotherhood members name crossed off, they could not shut down the organization itself. The Brotherhood simply put the names of people who weren’t part of the Brotherhood and succeeded in putting one member because his

---

92 Mahfouth 2013
93 Mahfouth 2013
94 Mahfouth 2013
95 Mahfouth 2013
alias is different than his official name, thus, they couldn’t discern whether or not he was in the Muslim Brotherhood.96

The state failed in stopping them for a very simple reason: they needed them.97 The State had no presence in the village, and the Brotherhood was the only source for services. While the charity center’s public administrates were not from the Brotherhood, villagers knew that it was the Brotherhood behind this, they were he ones leading from behind. As the director stated, “we shared with the people their happiness and sadness, we were there for them when they were going through their toughest times, how can the State stop that”?98

96 Mahfouth 2013
97 Ghuzalan 2013.
98 Mahfouth 2013
Welfare After the Revolution

The Egyptian Revolution will go down in history as one of the most riveting moments in the 21st century. Starting where Tunisia finished, Egyptians, particularly civil society, took to the street in protest an increasing police state, harsh living conditions, and oppression towards underrepresented labor groups. The early leadership of the Revolution was made of a conglomeration of leaders, women, like Asmaa Mahfouz and Amal Sharaf, as well as “Coptic activists and youthful members of the Muslim Brotherhood”.

The Brotherhood’s emergence as leaders of the state after the revolution was significant, as they were not the initial faction that started the revolution or even took to the streets in the beginning. However, as the revolution continued, the Brotherhood came in and secured Tahrir Square. This is no coincidence, as the Brotherhood has utilized its experience organizing and mobilizing power from its tanzim (branch building) past. Therefore, when it came time for people to choose the new leaders to run Egypt, many of them, especially those from rural areas, came out in droves to vote for the Muslim Brotherhood. Many have linked this political success to the years spent by the Brotherhood in building a social welfare apparatus that addresses, at least to the average citizen in the micro-level, the immediate needs of a neglected State.

Revolutions Impact in Gharbia

When the Brotherhood took power, it was immediately felt by the small organizations throughout the country, and the organizations in Gharbia were no different. The judicial system

100 McCaffery, xii
101 AlFiqhy1/13/13
102 Numerous Eyewitness reports and experiences
103 Rady, Ismail. Interviewed by Banan Abdelrhman. Informal Interview. Microbus Tahrir, Cairo. 12/15/2012
in Gharbia district returned the schools to the jurisdiction of the Brotherhood, under the stipulation that they cannot fire any of the new teachers simply because they do not fit their “ideal religious category”. Nevertheless, the power now lies in the hands of the administrators who are appreciating their newfound freedom and are working publically with the community, with no fear of repercussions. The administrators at Tiba Hospital can also breathe a sigh of relief now, as they can operate their hospital openly with no fear of State Security coming in and taking them in for questioning and they no longer have to deal with bureaucratic harassment. As Dr. Hamid Al Tabakh, the head doctor in Tiba Hospital, noted, the administration’s goals shifted after the revolution; before, it was a matter of survival and navigating the regime, now, they can focus their energies on matters of expansion, as the state can accommodate their needs and approve their licenses with deterrents. Tiba Hospital also partnered with the Freedom and Justice party to dispense free clinical treatment at the headquarters party, instead of the hospital, bringing into question the intent behind such an action, and the consequences of the newly found power the Brotherhood has gained.

The freedoms and ease of mobility granted to women after the Revolution has led to their increased visibility in the community. They can now host their events publically and in the mosques without fear of blackmailing or losing their jobs. It is equally important to note that now they can receive official recognition from the Brotherhood for their works, and they no longer need to remain anonymous for fear of detainment or harassment.

Although AlRagabiya Charity Center had functioned semi-autonomously and did not face as much interference from the state beyond the official bureaucratic level, it also enjoyed

\[\text{104 Bassuouni/15/2013} \]
\[\text{105 Al Tabakh/15/2013} \]
\[\text{106 Al Tabakh/15/2013} \]
\[\text{107 Um Asmaa 1/15/2013} \]
freedoms of mobility and visibility. It can now officially publish the names of the Brotherhood members who administer the center, and assist more people in a more observable manner. However, it is at this micro-level that the villagers feel change the least, since to them, the Brotherhood is simply continuing a tradition long felt by the villagers.

*AlNahda (The Renaissance)*

With the Muslim Brotherhood in power, one expects dramatic changes to take place with regards to how the state will approach social welfare. Prior to the Revolution, Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership tasked Khairat AlShater, one of its top officials and most successful businessmen, with the job to design a program that can be applied in Egypt to improve its economic conditions. Al –Nahda (the Renaissance or Rise) was the comprehensive guide that was produced, and Brotherhood scholars from all over the world contributed to its research.

Al-Shater’s Nahda focuses on development projects, as he hopes to move away from the micro-organizations that have long been the tradition to macro-organizations that have an impact on the continuance of development and sustainability, not simply immediate solution to the problem. He stated that “Egyptians have some experience only in charity work: a project on supporting orphans, Ramadan [charity] kit, winter clothes or blankets. But now we are talking about efforts for development, about efforts for Nahda, and the topic is much larger than the issue of [social] solidarity. Our thinking needs to be on a wider scale than this”.  

The first projects of the Nahda will be focusing on education, and will attempt to provide structural reform to a system that sorely needs it. Al-Shater believes that by changing the teaching methods, and developing a sound infrastructure, Egypt’s education crisis will be solved.
He sees the developments in the revolution as the key to success, and the changes in status, from the persecuted to the powerful, an ideal opportunity to implement Brotherhood goals in Egypt.

The entire Ummah participates in developing its Nahda because the responsibility falls on the shoulder of the Ummah as a whole; cooperation with the entire Ummah in all shades of its spectrum so that we contribute to developing this project however long it takes. This is the first and primary mission, and we said from the beginning that we learned in the Muslim Brotherhood that our mission is to develop the Ummah on the basis of Islamic Reference. [With regards to] this mission, we’ve passed a historical stage; we were establishing the Gama’a, and when we came to focus on it, we were greatly obstructed. Now, the obstacles have been removed, and so we return to the origin; to our natural objective; to our main mission.111

The fact that Khairat Al-Shater has emerged as the Nahda’s advocate may be telling of the system remaining the same despite revolutionary changes. Al-Shater is a successful businessman whose money is purportedly the main source of revenue for the Brotherhood. He gained the reputation as the enforcer in the Muslim Brotherhood and his relationship with Mubarak’s regime was shaky to say the least. He was arrested in 1995 for attempting to “revive the Brotherhood” and again in 2007 on terrorism charges and money laundering.112 Al-Shater, along with other wealthy Muslim Brotherhood members, is now emerging as the face of the wealthy elite, and questions of economic monopolization are now being discussed.113

---

111 AShater 2012
113 Gamal, Wael. The Brotherhood’s One Percent. www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6483/the-brotherhoods-one-percent
Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood built a shadow social welfare system to fill the gaps the State failed to do. The economic hardships that emerged from Al-Sadat’s *Infitah* period, along with the corruption that ensued under the Social Development Program and various other national projects, made room for private organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood, to monopolize on the State’s failures and build a complete welfare system. An understanding of how the individual members of the Muslim Brotherhood navigated the state and its restrictions was contextualized by analyzing Gharbia districts various social welfare mechanisms, such as education, public health, and micro-organizations like Al-Santa’s women organization and Ragabiya’s Charity Center. These case studies reconstructed how the Muslim Brotherhood relationship with the state, how the members interacted with state officials, and devised mechanisms to maneuver the government’s attempt to block their movements.

Madrast Al Geel and Hassan Al-Ridwan Schools were taken over by State Security the last ten years of the Mubarak administration, where the Ann AlDawlah regulated who was hired as a teacher, dissolved administrative boards, and let the school’s academic quality fall into shambles. Also, they hindered any activities the administration planned for its students, like the incident in Marsa Matrouh. Additionally, they constantly cracked down and arrested teachers and administrators that they deemed were partaking in political activities. However, even though they faced multiple hardships, when the administrators regained control after the Revolution, the schools returned to meet the Brotherhood’s standards placed for their schools, a standard based on quality education administered by religious teachers.

Tiba Hospital administrators danced a fine line with the state, as they provided much needed services to the community, thus making a complete invasion like the schools impossible.
However, they were still able to monopolize the discourse by prohibiting the hospital from expanding and harassing the administrators and doctors who worked there. State Security created a stigma around the hospital, and hindered the participation of more doctors, who avoided helping due to the fears of being targeted by Amn Aldawlah. After the Revolution, however, the hospitals administrators cannot be any happier, and they have partnered up with the Muslim’s Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party to provide services such as free traveling clinics to more villages and main centers like Tanta and Mahla Al Kobrra.

Al-Santa’s women organizations felt the difference of the Revolution, because they can now operate in a much more visible scale. Their services, similar to Ragabiya’s Charity Center, dealt with the grassroots issues and had a direct impact on the people benefitting from their services. It is in this sector that the Brotherhood received the most recognition from the people, and it is in this sector that the state had no power in hindering the activities. Whereas Al-Santa’s women functioned secretly, Ragabiya’s Charity Center depicted where the state failed the most. The micro-villages in Gharbia district, like the rest of Egypt, lacked any developmental projects from the government, who essential relied on organizations, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, to provide services.

The changes felt by those in Gharbia district after the revolution echoes the national sentiments of Brotherhood members. With Brotherhood members in executive and legislative power positions, many people feel that now is the ripe time to implement reforms through structural changes to the State’s failed welfare apparatus. A reform of education, health care, and rural development are all main themes under the Nahda project that is headed by Khairat AlShater. He hopes to move from micro-organization systems to a more national approach to these problems, thus eliminating the infrastructure problems that Egypt is suffering from.
Gharbia district was a case study of a larger well-oiled coordinated system run by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Almost all villages in the country have an organization like Ragabiya’s Charity Center, all districts have a hospital like Mostashfa Tiba run by Brotherhood administrators, and schools that compete on a national level. Hosni Mubarak’s regimes attempt at monopolizing all aspects of society shows the fallacies of thinking that it is an achievable feat. The state could not control the Brotherhood, and in reality, needed them to administer a system they could not develop. Thus, when the time came for leadership after Revolution, and when the country was scrambling for a new system, it is no surprise that Brotherhood found overwhelming support, especially from rural areas. Egypt is on the brink of change, and the Muslim Brotherhood is using its past involvement in social welfare as a platform to further its goals in developing Egypt according to the Nahda’s principles.

The Brotherhood was able to navigate the state’s policies because the state did not combat them wholeheartedly. The state recognized the Brotherhood’s existence was important because it fulfilled duties the state could not. This impact of this is best seen after the Revolution. While the Brotherhood does face opposition from a growing number of Egyptians, its members comfortably arrived to power, and much to the chagrin of many political activists, have gotten cozy with the military elites of the old regime. This new alliance is startling, since many of the Brotherhood’s elite members, including President Morsi, were arrested and persecuted under the old regime. This gives the Brotherhood the playing card; do they break away from the old security apparatus and begin true democratic reform, or do they simply chose the convenient alliance and control the state’s power without any systematic change? It seems as though they are choosing the latter, which will have devastating results on the social welfare apparatus in Egypt. If the Brotherhood aligns itself with the old regime, true systematic will not take place, as
the state will fall under the same patterns of inefficiency as before. One may say that the 
Brotherhood’s pseudo-system of the past will remain intact, however, with the Nahda project, it
is evident that they want the state to take up the developmental projects in Egypt. Thus, if there
isn’t transparency and true democratic change, the social welfare system will continue to
function at the slow, archaic rate that it always has, until it collapses due to its unmaintainable
size, and those that will truly suffer are the everyday Egyptians that need these basic services to
survive.
Bibliography

Primary Sources:


Bassouuni, Mohammad. Interview by Banan Abdelrahman. Phone Interview. South Brunswick, NJ. February 17, 2013


Mahfouth, Al Hag. Interview by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. AlRagbiya Cultural Center, Ragbiya. 1/6/2013


Rady, Ismail. Interviewed by Banan Abdelrahman. Informal Interview. Microbus Tahrir, Cairo. 12/15/2012

School Poster. Picture taken by Banan Abdelrahman on January 15, 2013


Um Ahmad II. Board Member. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview. Masjid in Santa. January 15,2013

Um Al Zahraa. Member. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview.
Um Asmaa. Board Member. Interview conducted by Banan Abdelrahman. Personal Interview.

Secondary Sources:

AlNagar, Mostafa. “Why does the Muslim Brotherhood Succeed...Working with the Community.” Al-Shorouk. 9/28/2012.
El-Mahdi, Rabab. 2011. Empowered participation or political manipulation? : State, civil society and social funds in egypt and bolivia. International studies in sociology and social anthropology,ISSN0074-8684 ; v. 120. Leiden; Boston: Brill. pages 97-123
UNDP Egypt Human Development Report, 2011
UNCIEF EGYPT Report 2003
UNCIEF EGYPT Report 2012