Pakistan: the Emergence of a Newborn Nation, the Struggle to Remain a Sovereign Nation, and the Relationship with the United States during the Cold War Era, 1947-1965

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By Zahra Mian

Advised by Professor Sumit Guha
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مظن ، داحیتا ، نامیا

Faith, Unity, Discipline
INTRODUCTION

Pakistan achieved independence in 1947 under extremely unfavorable circumstances which would have indicated to most that this infant nation would not be able to survive on its own. Fast forward 66 years and Pakistan, though absolutely riddled with massive internal problems, has survived as an independent nation. However, despite how astonishing her path to overcoming the low odds of survival might have been, the problems that Pakistan faced as a new nation were grave enough to require her to seek foreign assistance. As early as December 8, 1947 Time Magazine was reporting that “there [had] been hints that Pakistan might turn to Russia for financial help. And such hints, in turn, might be connected with reports that Pakistan would be asking Washington for a loan.”¹ Pakistani leaders and officials were well aware that they needed to appeal to multiple foreign powers in order to survive the trauma of partition. First hand accounts with people such as Margaret Bourke-White, partition photographer and journalist, indicate that Pakistan’s leaders were fully prepared to play the two leading world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, against each other for arms and economic aid. Doing so would essentially make them a Cold War pawn.²

While partition burned through the subcontinent in a blaze, destroying homes and families, due to the shameful and rushed way in which the British fled the scene of the crime in August of 1947, the main world powers at that time were immersed in a battle of ideologies. The United States, which would later go on to become Pakistan’s main source of economic and military assistance, was embroiled in the initial phase of the Cold War when Pakistan suddenly found herself at independence. Due to her close proximity to the Soviet Union, Iran, and China, 

¹ Time Magazine, December 8, 1947 PAKISTAN: Sick http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,934132,00.html
² Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 93
Pakistan was viewed as a vital location to defend against Communist expansion. The context in which the United States viewed the subcontinent was solely through the scope of the Cold War and fear of Soviet expansion. The new state of Pakistan possessed several geographical benefits, which piqued American interest in the state, again, due to its closeness to both the Soviet Union and China. A nation strategically located at the crossroads of east and west Asia was seen to be a potential tool for Soviet surveillance, containment, and also an extremely dangerous weapon if permeated by Communist forces. In an interview with Mohammad Ali Jinnah in September of 1947, Margaret Bourke-White recalls, “In Jinnah’s mind this brave new nation had no other claim on American friendship than this—that across a wild tumble of roadless mountain ranges lay the land of the Bolsheviks.”3 From it’s conception, Pakistani leaders knew that its geographical inheritance would be their saving grace, in terms of having something which would be of value to the major world powers. These geographical benefits and Pakistan’s weak economic position, which could open the door for Soviet intervention in the mind of the United States, were two factors that brought together the United States and Pakistan. They came together in a relationship, which only strengthened and grew throughout the 1950s until the first schism in their relationship in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965.

It is important to examine and assess the American-Pakistani relationship during its early formative years in order to fully comprehend why the first major conflict of interests arose in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Furthermore, this period is crucial to investigate because it is when the United States became fully entangled in Pakistani politics. It cannot be understood as to why Pakistan came away from the end of the 1965 War feeling extremely jilted and disenchanted towards the United States unless one can see the way in which the two nations embraced one

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3 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 93
another in a fully established alliance. The 1950s and early 1960s were an era in which democracy in Pakistan was stalled for the first time and the might of the Pakistani military was established; a force which remains heavily entrenched in Pakistani politics even still today. Despite the United States waving the banner for democracy internationally, especially amongst the newly independent post-colonial nations of that era, they supported the military dictator Ayub Khan heavily throughout his political career, ranging from 1958-1969. This support of military dictatorship, while surely beneficial to American interests, only served to cripple democracy and social justice in the Pakistani sphere, which would prove to have long lasting side affects, such as total public disenchantment with Ayub Khan by the end of the 1965 War and a lack of development of East Pakistan. However, it must be mentioned that the stagnation of Pakistani democracy and social development was a result of many factors, both domestic and foreign in nature, such as foreign military funding, inept political leaders, and lack of an established infrastructure, similar to the one India inherited from the British Raj.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 put Pakistan and the United States at crossroads for the first time. Pakistan, completely aligned to the United States and their aims, had failed to see how the Indo-American relationship would affect the Pakistani ability to militarily serve her own interests. Such a lack of understanding led to economic cuts and tension between the two nations, to the point where oddly enough the United States wasn’t the main arbitrator for peace in the Tashkent Declaration of 1966 due to their desire to stay out of the mess made between two nations they wanted to remain on positive terms with. The fact that the United States actually did maintain this stance of neutrality in the 1965 War further supports the idea that they should have been more involved in the peace talks. As a nation that advocated for stability and peace in the region, it seems odd that they would not want to be involved in the negotiation of an
agreement aimed to bring peace, stability, and status quo back to the region. Rather than letting the Soviet Union handle the negotiation alone, the United States could have prevented Pakistani disillusionment by getting involved at Tashkent because a major issue was that at Tashkent the Pakistanis felt completely abandoned in the proceedings because they had previously put all their eggs in the American basket and did not really have a relationship with the Soviet Union, quite unlike India. This perceived betrayal by the Americans to Pakistani interests is a wound that never entirely healed from Pakistani politics and was dug up in several of the ups and downs that the two nations have faced together in their 66 years of union.

Chapter 1 of this thesis will focus mainly on the establishment of the Pakistani state and the struggles it faced as Pakistan navigated through her early years, straight through the Kashmir crisis of 1947-1949 through the use of several primary source documents from the time period. I aim to discuss the poor economic state Pakistan inherited at partition, which put her in the position to rely on foreign powers for economic aid. Additionally, I will probe the topic of Pakistan’s constant perception of being in threat of attack from India; another factor which pushed the young nation into the arms of a foreign power which could assist it in remaining independent from it’s massive neighboring enemy. The Kashmir dispute of 1947-1949, an issue which is still unresolved today, is vital in understanding why the enmity between Pakistan and India has remained more or less stagnated throughout it’s history, as well as will explain why Pakistani leaders were so fearful of tragic economic situations that could arise possibly due to being cut off from vital water sources in Kashmir, should India have control of the region.

Chapter 2 will explore the developmental years of Pakistan as a nation, as well as the Pakistani-American relationship. I will begin by addressing the strategic geographical position that Pakistan was bestowed with from her conception. This position put Pakistan in a place
where she could wrangle economic and military aid from the United States, while also attempting to receive them from the Soviet Union at points, as well. This game is something that could have actually harmed the chances of democracy taking root in Pakistan in the long run because it essentially put Pakistan in the position of always being economically dependent, and subsequently politically and militarily dependent in certain ways, on foreign powers. The way in which Pakistan came about her decision over which leading power she wished to ally with is a topic that this chapter will examine in detail, as well. 1950-1964 are the key years in which Pakistan becomes directly aligned in the United States efforts to curb Communism. By joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and by signing the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (which later became the Central Treaty Organization), Pakistan directly placed herself in the American bloc in regards to the Cold War.

Chapter 3 will discuss how Pakistan and the Pakistani military flourished economically due the heavy American aid Pakistan was receiving from the late 1950’s through the early 1960s. At this time democracy was successfully crushed, slowly causing social unrest, which would eventually lead to the break up of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how Pakistan became a heavily militarized state during these years, but essentially found herself unable to protect herself militarily during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, due to prior stipulations implemented by the United States; Pakistan’s greatest ally. Chapter 3 will also focus on the Indo-Pakistani War, which caused the first major rift between Pakistani-American relations. In this chapter I will discuss how Pakistan felt abandoned by the United States during a time in which they were begging for pressure to be applied to India in order to make gains from the war. Pakistan essentially felt as though the Tashkent Declaration was unfair to Pakistani interests and left them at the same position in regards to Kashmir that
they were at before the skirmish of 1965. I also will examine the Soviet role in the Tashkent Declaration proceedings as instigators against the United States, as well as their odd role as sole negotiators for peace, despite the fact that the United States was the greatest ally to Pakistan. Lastly, I will analyze how the Soviet Union’s role in the Tashkent Declaration proceedings could have been a direct effort to oust Ayub Khan, the staunchly pro-American military dictator, from power.
CHAPTER I: ESTABLISHMENT OF A PAKISTANI STATE

August 1947 was a moment in time in which two new nations were born in the South Asian subcontinent. With the battle for ideological dominance between the capitalist Western world and the Communist eastern powers waging on heavily, the emergence of new and vulnerable nations piqued a secondary degree of interest in the leading world powers. The struggle for independence from the British and religious independence from the Hindu majority in India is one which many leading Muslim political figures of the subcontinent devoted their entire careers and lives to. In regards to the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Professor Stanley Wolpert so eloquently has stated, “Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three.”

While attaining an independent nation for the Muslims of India proved to be a rigorous and momentous task, suited only for the sharpest and quickest of minds, deciphering what the relationship between the infant nation of Pakistan and their former colonizers would be would prove to be just as important of an issue to cater to.

Historically, the British and the Muslims of India never had a platonic relationship. Considering it was the British who finally ended the centuries long era of Muslim empires and dynasties in India, the Muslims always felt as though their culture and practices were being stamped out, which naturally bred resentment towards the British. Be it through the shift of the official language of the land from Persian to English or the introduction of Western legal institutions, such as the Indian Penal Code or the Indian Civil and Criminal Codes of Procedure, the Muslim population of India essentially decided to ignore the changes of their new masters,

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4 Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, viii
5 Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 6
rather than embrace them as the Hindus did. The Hindus soared both socially and economically at this time due to their ability to adapt to a new change in leader—considering they had been subjected to conquests for centuries, they seemed to be more adept to the occurring changes than their Muslim peers. The unwillingness of the Muslims to adapt to the British changes ultimately resulted in the degradation of the Muslim upper and middle class, the ruination of education amongst Muslim youth, and in the long run, discontentment at being left behind in squalor while the Hindu majority advanced ahead.\textsuperscript{6,7}

On the other hand, the British were always suspicious of any Muslim attempts to regain power, which is why The Great Mutiny of 1857 did great damage to the relationship between the Muslims of India and the British Raj. The Great Mutiny, or the first Struggle for Independence as many refer to it as, was an instance in which Indian sepoys attempted to stage a rebellion against the British Raj under the banner of the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar; the last remaining symbol of Islam in India. However, considering the British Empire was at its peak at that time, they managed to crush the rebellion swiftly with a fist of force and made sure to duly punish the Muslims of India, whom they viewed to be responsible for the uprising.\textsuperscript{8} This negativity only served to further the gap between the Muslims and both the Hindus and British. Because of this long history of resentment, bitterness, and suspicion, it never did seem probable that the British would ever have had a strong political presence or authority in the political, legal, or social spheres of the new land of the Muslims of India: Pakistan. Given that Pakistan was a young and fledgling nation at its inception, it was a common question on the lips of many as to whom Pakistan would ally with even in the days leading up to independence. In an interview

\textsuperscript{6} Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 7
\textsuperscript{7} Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, 54
\textsuperscript{8} Ahmad, Liaquat Ali Khan, 23
with Reuters Correspondent Doon Campbell on May 21, 1947, when questioned as to who the new nation would lean on at independence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah answered, “The one that will be in our best interests. It will not be a case of leaning to any power, but we shall certainly establish friendship and alliances which will be for the benefit of all those who may enter into such an alliance.”

Considering the Muslim perception of favoritism toward the Hindu majority and Muslim discrimination by the British Raj, it seems quite unlikely that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or Jinnah himself would view a relationship with Britain to be in the best interests of Pakistan. In a discussion with Viceroy Louis Mountbatten on May 2, 1947, Muslim League Vice President Liaquat Ali Khan expressed concerns about possible perception that the League was “under British orders and that Mr. Jinnah counted for nothing.” His refusal to undertake any actions, which would allow for such thinking, indicates that the Muslim League was strong enough a few months before partition to need or desire any substantial connection to the British Raj. This discussion exemplifies the important symbol that Mohammad Ali Jinnah embodied in Pakistan and represents how a British presence or input was not the primary option for Muslim League leaders. Additionally, despite the fact that most Muslim League members were constitutionalists who chose to battle the British without violating their laws of the land, as opposed to the Congress Party who embraced satyagraha or civil disobedience, many British officials of the early 20th century clearly did not like Mr. Jinnah as a person or approved of his demand for two states, such as Lord Louis Mountbatten. Lord Mountbatten, a man personally in charge for undertaking the partition of India, personally opposed the entire notion of partition considering that he felt that if it occurred Mr. Jinnah would be “breaking up a great sub-continent of

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9 Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1, 844
10 Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 673
numerous nations, which could live together in peace and harmony; who could, united play a
great role in the world; but who, divided, would not even rank as a second-class Power,” which
indicates that the Muslim League and high ranking British officials were never in the same
mindset as one another.\footnote{Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 644}

The way in which partition was brought about did not do much to strengthen British and
Pakistani relations. Clearly Muslim League members were well aware that there would be a
massive vacuum in Pakistan come independence, in the months prior to August of 1947. In
April of 1947, Mr. Jinnah expressed his views to Lord Mountbatten that come independence,
Pakistan would have to rely on a foreign power to survive. While he stated that the only two
nations with whom it would be logical to consider would be England and America, he made sure
to wittingly comment that “apart from anything else, the devil you know is better than the devil
you don’t,” in regards to England.\footnote{Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 648} However, the rapid pace at which partition was thrown at
the subcontinent, the perceived unfairness of the Radcliffe line, and the 1948 conflict in Kashmir
all were issues which not only drove a wedge between England and Pakistan, but put Pakistan in
a position where she was forced to seek aid from other leading world powers; America and the
Soviet Union.

As the feeling of discontent spread through the first half of the 20th century amongst
educated Indian nationalists, the British were immersed in much greater conflicts in Europe as
opposed to the issues in India. Concessions were made in order to deliver a sliver of self-rule
and appeasement to the Indians, such as the 1919 Government of India Act, the Simon
Commission, and the 1935 Government of India Act, however by the end of World War II, the
British were too submerged in rebuilding their war torn country and trying to recover the
economic losses of the war to deal with the might of the entire Indian population demanding not just one, but two independent states.\textsuperscript{13} The partition of the Indian subcontinent was one that was strife with communal violence, mass suffering, and political games. However, the British were determined to part with the subcontinent on their own terms and Pakistan suffered as a result of that. That suffering and desperate need to survive, after all of the sacrifices and fighting the Muslim League and their supporters had been doing for years is what propelled Pakistani leaders to appeal to other nations to fill the vacuum the British had left in Pakistan and be a strong, supporting force.

While it was an unbelievably amazing accomplishment for Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League to form a new country, which was not only the largest Islamic nation in the world, but the fifth largest nation in the world as well, in the span of a single man’s lifetime, the country which they received at independence and the circumstances in which they received them were far from ideal or even of an acceptable standard.\textsuperscript{14} As Mr. Jinnah constantly lamented throughout 1947, he was receiving a “moth-eaten Pakistan”. Ideally the vision that the Muslim League had for Pakistan was to be composed of 5 provinces: Punjab, Bengal, Assam, North West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan.\textsuperscript{15} \textsuperscript{16} However, ironically, the man who quite vocally opposed partition in the subcontinent, Lord Mountbatten, advocated for the partition of Bengal and Punjab, as a means of forcing the Muslim League to remain within the Indian Union. As he stated himself on April 8, 1947, any argument that Mr. Jinnah used to argue for a united Bengal and Punjab, he simply turned around to counter argue that the subcontinent should simply stay

\textsuperscript{13} Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 14; 21
\textsuperscript{14} Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 91
\textsuperscript{15} Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 643; 649
\textsuperscript{16} Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, 149
united instead by the same logic.\textsuperscript{17} His notion was that according to Mr. Jinnah’s own case for the state of Pakistan, he could not force any unwilling minority populations to join Pakistan either. However, on April 30, 1947 Sir E. Mieville wrote to Lord Mountbatten to discuss a meeting he had with Mr. Jinnah in which Jinnah explained that “whilst the justification for Pakistan was that it was impossible to ask two peoples with different religions, habits, etc.—in face two entirely foreign nations—to live together, this did not apply to the Provinces, because the minority communities could move to their homelands if they wished to do so—i.e. Hindus to Hindustan and Muslims to Pakistan”.\textsuperscript{18}

Due to this logic it does seem senseless to apply multiple standards for the provinces, considering the presence of Lord Mountbatten was so that the partition proceedings could be conducted smoothly, swiftly, and most importantly fairly. However, Lord Mountbatten’s plans indicate that he felt as though by appealing to the Congress by applying pressure to Muslim League by ripping apart at the Muslim majority provinces, the Muslim League would back down and settle for a united India. Lord Mountbatten’s argument essentially was that either the provinces could stay united under an Indian Union, or if the Muslim League succeeded in attaining Pakistan, it would only be under terms in which survival would be extremely difficult and bleak.\textsuperscript{19} Lord Mountbatten’s reminder to Mr. Jinnah in April of 1947 that “he was ruining the position of India as a great Power, and forever pulling her down to something below as a second class power” illustrates the kind of concern and passion which he had for India, but lacked for Pakistan. Unfortunately such a biased and careless attitude is what pushed Pakistan into the arms of other foreign powers because it weakened her to the point where she could not

\textsuperscript{17} Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 643
\textsuperscript{18} Moon, The Transfer of Power v. 10, 488
\textsuperscript{19} Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p. 2, 651
stand on her own two feet. Instead of dealing with the Bengal and Punjab provinces the way all of the other provinces were being handled, Lord Mountbatten made them a special case which only served to give India more land and weaken the future state of Pakistan due to the loss of important areas, one of many being Calcutta. Also, it facilitated the largest mass migration known to man, in which up to possibly up to 17 million people were forced to leave their ancestral homes and land in order to take up life on the side of the border which they chose to begin a new life.\textsuperscript{20}

Along with the fact that the Muslim League was being forced to accept a “truncated” Pakistan, in order to weaken their cause, Lord Mountbatten also rushed the process of partition very suddenly. The fact of the matter is that Lord Mountbatten arrived in India on March 22, 1947 and returned to London by May 18, 1947 with an extremely hasty plan to move the date of independence up. The British were initially scheduled to leave India by June 1948, but Lord Mountbatten had the date tragically moved up to August 15, 1947 with the Indian Independence Act on July 15, 1947. The new dominions of India and Pakistan were only given a mere two months to mobilize and prepare for independence.\textsuperscript{21} There was absolutely no time to properly determine the best way in which the mass migration that Lord Mountbatten was forcing upon people due to the partition of Punjab and Bengal should be done, how to properly divide the assets of India, and how to divide the army amongst India and Pakistan because of the hasty exit. This sudden change of date, though decided upon due to specific reasons, seems extraordinary considering that as early as April 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan conveyed to Lord Mountbatten that “in his opinion India would not be able to stand on her own two legs by June 1948, whether united

\textsuperscript{20} Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, 162

\textsuperscript{21} Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan, 160
or divided.” Additionally, considering the fact that Mr. Jinnah stressed the need for a proper army to be established for Pakistan’s survival in the April 1947 Mountbatten-Jinnah Negotiations, it does not seem indicative of good intentions on Lord Mountbatten’s part to move the date of independence up by nearly a year without a proper military and government set up in both of the two new nations. However, it must be noted that Lord Mountbatten did cite several reasons for wanting to move the date of partition up so drastically. In a telegram to the Earl of Listowel on June 24, 1947 he did explains that he understood the apprehension towards leaving the subcontinent too early, especially because the safety and interests of British nationals in India had to be considered, however he felt as though staying any longer than the 15th of August would require a constant British presence due to the fact that the British government would demand safeguards. However, he was well aware of the fact that the British government wished for complete autonomy directly from independence, therefore staying on longer would defeat the purpose of such an action. However, meetings between Liaquat Ali Khan and Mountbatten in April 1947 would indicate that Muslim League leaders wanted a British presence in the subcontinent for approximately five years and then eventually “transfer, as liquidator, the Central subjects to the successor authorities,” because at that point the newly formed governments would be able to withstand the pressure of the shift in power. Clearly the wishes and opinions of prominent Muslim League leaders at this time were not given the significant weight needed to maintain the original date that was set for partition.

While two months was clearly not enough time to pass on power to the new dominions efficiently, the Muslim League knew that despite that Pakistan was “moth-eaten,” they had to be

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22 Moon, Transfer of Power v. 10, 357  
23 Zaidi, Jinnah Papers v. 1 p.2, 645  
24 Moon, Transfer of Power v. 11, 614  
25 Moon, Transfer of Power v. 10, 357
extremely grateful for what they were receiving and take what they could while it was being offered. As Winston Churchill had feared it would be, the British exit from the subcontinent was a “shameful flight” and the Pakistani leaders were left in the fray to make what they could of this gift, which they could not believe they had received.\textsuperscript{26} As Margaret Bourke-White recalls of an encounter with Fatima Jinnah, “‘we never expected to get it so soon,’ Miss Fatima said when I called. ‘We never expected to get it in our lifetimes.’”\textsuperscript{27} The fact that Pakistan actually was an independent, sovereign nation by August by 1947 was unfathomable to most, and her survival was probably even more unfathomable. While supporters of Pakistan might rejoice at the unimaginable way in which the country managed to survive the test of time and remain a sovereign nation for over 60 years, the situation of the nation was morbidly bleak in the beginning years.

When August 14, 1947 rolled around, Pakistani leaders and people of the land were in complete disarray as they attempted to properly settle into their new nation. As Pakistan attempted to create a government from where nothing existed before it, unlike India who already had existing institutions, they were plagued by the massive influx of refugees into the new nation. Being smaller than India, receiving 1.7 million more refugees, and dealing with the issue of massive communal violence, the new state of Pakistan was gripped with utter confusion.\textsuperscript{28}

The new capital, Karachi, was previously a small fishing village and an important port for the British army forces of India. Over a course of two months this little village, which obviously did not have the structure, history, or buildings that Lahore did, was required to be able to welcome an entire government to set up stay there, due to the fact that Lahore was far too close to the

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\textsuperscript{26} Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 118  
\textsuperscript{27} Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 91  
\textsuperscript{28} Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis, 9
\end{flushright}
India-Pakistan Wagah Borderline for comfort. However, setting up a government was not quite so simple when historically the Indian Civil Service was comprised of Hindus, rather than Muslims. Due to the degradation of the Muslim upper and middle class throughout the British rule in India, Pakistan did not have enough already trained civil servants, bookkeepers, stenographers, or clerks to facilitate the new government. Horrifyingly, many of the few trained officials who were available to work on the new government were stranded in India for some time due to the suspension of trains during the communal massacres of partition. The fact that the leaders of Pakistan were given only two months to plan their transition crippled them greatly, as they had no time to train their officials or secure the resources needed to operate a government efficiently. Eleanor Roosevelt describes how during her 1952 visit to Pakistan, Pakistani officials recanted stories to her about how they “found themselves living and working in practically bare buildings and hastily erected hutments, with completely inadequate equipment. They had no desks, no pencils, no typewriters, no paper, few telephones. They sat on packing boxes, wrote on packing boxes, and occasionally made them into beds at night. There were no files, no statistics...there simply were not enough houses, apartments or even rooms to go around.”

In terms of economy, Pakistan was hit very hard as well. Due to the fact that most shopkeepers and bank clerks were Hindu, almost all banks and streets full of shops were virtually empty in Pakistan, considering that the Hindus left to pursue life in the Hindu majority state of India. Shockingly, out of the 300 cotton brokers who worked at the Karachi Cotton Exchange, a huge source of revenue, only 10 remained in Pakistan because it was another job that was

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29 Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, 60
30 Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, 61
31 Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, 61
32 Roosevelt, India and the Awakening East, 61
predominantly held by Hindus prior to independence.\textsuperscript{33} Also, Pakistan found herself with no industry to fall back on. Pakistan was blessed with ample resources, but was crippled by the lack of mills required to turn any of her natural resources into profit. At independence Pakistan was producing 80\% of the world’s jute and about 200,000 tons of cotton a year, but all of the jute and cotton mills fell on the Indian side of the border. Pakistan also lacked steel mills, match factories, woolen mills, and tanneries.\textsuperscript{34, 35} This bad hand of cards that Pakistan was dealt by the British put it at a great disadvantage upon entering the world scene. As Margaret Bourke-White saw it, Pakistan was dealt “calamities great enough to rock a stronger nation to its foundations, [yet] Pakistan came through its first year better than expected, with a balanced budget, a favorable trade balance, and a bright program for industrial development.”\textsuperscript{36} Luckily for the sake of Pakistan, she had leaders who were constantly surveying the world scene for friends who they could engage in a relationship of mutual interest. As the British left in a “hurried scuffle,” as Winston Churchill phrased it, they left the door to the subcontinent wide open for America and the Soviet Union to have their pickings.\textsuperscript{37}

While the economic safety of Pakistan at her birth is extremely vital to delve into, Pakistan’s close proximity to India is something that has shaped Pakistani politics since its inception. This apprehension towards neighbors was echoed in the Indian sphere, as well. Prominent politician N.V. Gadgil of India states in his book \textit{Government From Inside}, “Defense is as much dependent on a country’s neighbours and their attitudes as it is on its own size and population. We have Pakistan to our East and West. And from its inception Pakistan raised the

\textsuperscript{33} Bourke-White, \textit{Halfway to Freedom}, 11
\textsuperscript{34} Roosevelt, \textit{India and the Awakening East}, 51
\textsuperscript{35} Bourke-White, \textit{Halfway to Freedom}, 11
\textsuperscript{36} Bourke-White, \textit{Halfway to Freedom}, 103
\textsuperscript{37} Ali, \textit{The Emergence of Pakistan}, 118
slogan, ‘We have won Pakistan in effortless ease, now we will win India in war.’”

Such thought processes is what propelled the rivalry forward and created unnecessary military conflicts from the onset of the relationship between these two newly founded nations. Riddled with economic troubles, this young state of Pakistan also had to deal with a military confrontation with a massively bigger neighbor from the very beginning of her journey.

However, the near war of 1947-1949 over Kashmir is not surprising to most, considering the violent and painful way in which Pakistan was born. The deep animosity and suspicion that Pakistan viewed India with from August of 1947 onwards is evident enough simply in the manner in which the capital of Pakistan was chosen. The historical and geographical significances of Lahore, the obvious contender for the capital of Pakistan, were ultimately disregarded due to Lahore’s close proximity to the Indian border, which indicates that Pakistan viewed India as a threat from independence. Despite the fact that Lahore was centrally located, Pakistan’s largest city with a population of one million, it was institutionally advanced, and historically linked with every Islamic empire of the subcontinent, the mere 17 miles from which the Indian border sat did not prove to be enough of a buffer for the peace of mind of Muslim League officials.

Even though Karachi was founded a mere one hundred years prior to partition by the British, therefore was less prepared for the responsibilities of running a nation, and was developed predominantly by Hindu and Parsi traders, it still proved to be a more comfortable choice for Pakistani leaders, due to its distance from India.

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38 Gadgil, Government From Inside, 81
39 Tayyeb, Pakistan: a Political Geography, 175
40 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 104
41 Tayyeb, Pakistan: a Political Geography, 175
42 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 104
This initial discontent and fear of India, was further amplified by the Kashmir conflict of 1948. Kashmir is such an issue that has remained a bone of contention between Pakistan and India throughout their entire history thus far. The dispute over such a small area of land, yet so beneficial to whomever controls it, was the first major point in which Pakistani-Indian hostility was ignited and further implanted the notion in minds of Pakistanis that India was consistently trying to usurp Pakistan’s position in the subcontinent.

The Kashmir issue is another problem created by the British before they abandoned the subcontinent in their time of need and left the two newly formed dominions of India and Pakistan abruptly in 1947. By the entire end of British rule in India there were exactly 562 princely states in the subcontinent; cumulatively covering about one third of the total land of India.\textsuperscript{43} Though these princely states were clearly subordinates of the British crown, they were still independent entities that could function as they pleased, as long as they were not conflicting with British interests.\textsuperscript{44} Due to a lack of British preparation for this massive partition, at independence the rulers of these princely states were given the freedom to choose which new nation it would join from 1947 on, without any sort of democratic process. The fate of all subjects of these princely states laid solely in the hands of their ruler, no matter how disliked, incompetent, or unaffected by religious differences this ruler was. By putting such a massive decision entirely in the hands of individual men, the British effectively ensured that the next 66 years would be rife with conflict between India and Pakistan. Before delving into the fierce battle for Kashmir between these two nations, it is important to identify why exactly Kashmir, a land the size of Minnesota (84,471 miles), has been given so much importance.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Lamb, The Kashmir Problem, 3
\textsuperscript{44} Lamb, The Kashmir Problem, 4
\textsuperscript{45} Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 6
Besides its rich land and agricultural profits, Kashmir is a region that reaps many geographical benefits. Kashmir’s monstrous mountains have acted as a defense against all outside forces for all time, allowing for pure isolation from foreign forces due to nature’s gifts. India, Tibet, and Sinkiang are definitively cut off from Kashmir by the Himalayas, and what was the Soviet Union and Afghanistan are blocked off from Kashmir by the Pamir Mountains. This natural defense system makes Kashmir strong enough to withstand pressure from outside agents looking to come in and take her resources. Additionally, Kashmir is strategically important to the defense of the entire subcontinent. Lying extremely close to both the Soviet Union and China, should Communist forces have penetrated Kashmir, they would have access to the entire subcontinent. Furthermore, various passes and roads of the region make the subcontinent accessible through Kashmir, as well. Northern passes between Central Asia and Kashmir, as well as passes from Persia, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan all lead to the subcontinent, which further amplifies the strategic importance of Kashmir to the subcontinent. More important than strategic importance, the three main rivers of West Pakistan (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) all run through Kashmir, which was greatly important to Pakistan because it is upon these rivers that the agricultural livelihood of the majority of West Pakistanis depended. Pakistani leaders were well aware that Indian control of the flow of water could be detrimental to Pakistani and Kashmiri survival should any problems arise between the nations of the subcontinent. According to former Indian freedom fighter and politician N.V. Gadgil, certain powerful groups of landlords in Punjab, Pakistan, such as Khizr Hayat were opposed to the partition of Kashmir for the sole reason that they feared “that if Kashmir became independent or joined India, future Pakistan would be denied full use of the waters of the Sind, Jhelum and Chenab rivers all flowing from

46 Korbel, Danger In Kashmir, 8
Kashmir, because Kashmir itself, or India, would utilize their waters for herself." Clearly this issue of water control was common discourse and maintaining control of the rivers must have been on the minds of both India and Pakistan.

In terms of Kashmir, their livelihood was dependent upon their timber being exported down their rivers into Pakistan, seeing as how timber was Kashmir’s largest source of revenue. However, despite Kashmir’s resources, manpower, and strategic position, Dr. Josef Korbel, member of the Commission (UNCIP) who visited India, Pakistan, and Kashmir during the Kashmir Conflict of 1948, maintained that the issue of Kashmir runs deeper between India and Pakistan than what meets the eye. Dr. Korbel’s personal assessment seems to indicate that the ideological clash of the one nation theory and the two-nation theory that represents the reason why India and Pakistan exist as separate entities in the first place is the underlying issue in the Kashmir conflict.

According to the Pakistan scope, Hindus and Muslims exist as separate social orders, with distinct customs and ways of life; therefore an independent, sovereign Muslim state was absolutely necessary for the development and survival of Islamic culture in the subcontinent. However, the Indian point of view is one that reiterates the need for a federation of all people of the subcontinent under the banner of the Congress Party. The struggle for Kashmir, while definitely related to geographical importance and beneficial resources, was connected to the need for Pakistan to prove that Pakistan should be the home for all Muslims of the subcontinent. Margaret Bourke-White explains, “Pakistan needed Kashmir urgently for reasons of economics and—even more—of prestige. To lose the largest Muslim state would be a bitter blow, when

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47 Gadgil, Government From Inside, 60s
48 Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations, 86
49 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 25
Pakistan had been created to be a refuge for Muslims.” For India it was more so to prove that they could represent such a significant Muslim population as well. More so than a struggle for power, “Kashmir has become both symbol and battleground.”

The battle for Kashmir sparked up at independence due to the lack of appropriate means to determine the fate of the princely states. As early as July 25, 1947 Lord Mountbatten met with the Chamber of Princes, urged the Maharajas and Nawabs to carefully determine which Central Government they would choose to join at independence, and generally impressed the idea that the Hindu majority states would go to India, while the Muslim majority states would go to Pakistan. Despite this, at independence the accession of three states was left unresolved—Kashmir, Junagadh, and Hyderabad. Before proceeding, it is important to note that the relationship between the Kashmiri people and the Hindu Maharaja Sir Hari Singh Bahadur of the Dogra family was extremely negative. While it is evident throughout Maharaja Hari Singh’s entire rule that the public was extremely disenchanted with him due to his oppression of the Muslim people, such as only allowing political representation for non-Muslims despite the fact that Muslims consisted of the majority of the province, this oppressive treatment of the Muslims of Kashmir by the Dogra family existed from the very beginning of their rule in the late 1800s. As evidenced by Dr. Korbel, “by the terms of the Treaty of Amritsar, the Hindu Dogras possessed the territory; they immediately set out upon a policy of unlimited cruelty that seemed to vent upon the hapless Kashmiris all the pent-up hatred of the Hindus for the five centuries of Muslim rule.” Observations which support the idea that the leaders of the Kashmiri people

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50 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 203
51 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 25
52 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 49
53 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 17
54 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 13
were inherently against their own subjects on the basis of religion would allow one to conclude that such rulers did not have the sound judgment necessary for making decisions of such enormous proportions. Clearly when determining the fate of over 3 million Muslims, Maharaja Hari Singh’s actions do not seem indicative of sound judgment or selfless intentions because he quite openly exhibited biases against his own people on a regular basis. Additionally, the former editor of *The Statesman* Ian Stephens reflects in his account of his journey through Pakistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan that from 1937-1943 the Prime Minister of Kashmir actually was Mr. Gopalaswamy Ayyengar, who was a Madrasi Brahmin with a strong reputation for being “anti-Muslim.” Given the overwhelming majority of Muslims in Kashmir, this would indicate that typically Kashmiris were used to being subjected to rulers who did not have their best interests at heart. Interestingly enough, Ayyengar was made a minister without Portfolio in the Indian Cabinet after partition, which Stephens seemed to see as an indication that India was going to attempt to meddle in Kashmir.

Of the 3 undecided states at independence, Kashmir was a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler and borders with both India and Pakistan. Contrastingly, Junagadh was a Hindu majority state with Muslim ruler and no boundary with Pakistan. Lastly, Hyderabad was a state with a Muslim dynasty that attempted to remain independent and accede to neither nation. Interestingly enough, while the situations of Kashmir and Junagadh mirror each other in many major ways, the procedure by which the accession was determined for these states was not balanced equally. Similar to the situation in which Maharaja Hari Singh chose to join India, despite his Kashmir’s overwhelming Muslim population, the Nawab of Junagadh, though not

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55 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 6  
56 Stephens, Horned Moon, 107  
57 Stephens, Horned Moon, 107  
58 Lamb, The Kashmir Problem, 15
sharing a boundary with Pakistan but able to access Pakistan through the sea, initially chose to accede to Pakistan. However, the Indian army was quick to sweep into the area, reassure the people of the state that they had a right to self-determination, a plebiscite was held, and the Hindu population of 700,000 chose to accede to India. 

Interesting enough, India had no qualms about accepting Kashmir into the Indian state without the consultation of the Kashmiri population. When working with Hari Singh and finalizing his accession to India, Indians cited the Pakistani acceptance of accession of Junagadh as a means of legitimizing their acceptance of Kashmir. Still, one must observe that although Mr. Jinnah did accept the accession of Junagadh, he only did so after India had already had put the state under economic and military blockade, as well had made it clear it would forcibly seize Junagadh regardless of the Nawab’s choice to accede to Pakistan. 

However, in terms of Hyderabad, the most important state with a population of roughly 17 million and nearly the size of Germany, the Indian army swiftly moved in and took control in September of 1948 after a period in which the Muslim Nizam attempted to postpone any decisions and remain independent. In *The Kashmir Problem*, Alastair Lamb discusses how the determination of where these three states would go after independence was based entirely on Indian interests. As discussed, there was no uniform policy on deciding how exactly these three troublesome states would choose their way, but rather they were dealt with however Indian policy dictated it. In Junagadh, it was in India’s best interests to utilize a plebiscite so such a tactic was applied. However, in Kashmir a plebiscite would not have suited Indian policy, therefore the region is strife with conflict to day this day. Additionally, in Hyderabad military force was deemed necessary in order to attain this rich state for India,

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59 Korbel, Danger In Kashmir, 49  
60 Stephens, Horned Moon, 110-111  
61 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 46
therefore such an action was completed. However, Pakistani military force and involvement in Kashmir was consistently condemned and the United Nations was forced to intervene in this massive conflict.

In the fall of 1947 prior to Kashmiri accession to India, Margaret Bourke-White describes how she viewed Pakistani tribesman, not incited by government policy, but rather religious zeal, as streaming into Kashmir with the hopes of liberating their Muslim brothers. She explains that “in Pakistan towns close to the border, arms were handed out before daylight to tribesmen directly from the front steps of the Muslim League headquarters,” which technically was not direct government involvement but considering the Muslim League was Pakistan’s sole political party, she assumed this was suspect behavior. Throughout her work, Bourke-White’s deep friendship with Mohandas K. Gandhi, strong admiration for Congress leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, and seemingly inability to understand the true motives of Mohammad Ali Jinnah would allow one to assume that her perception of the motives of the tribesmen was perhaps a bit skewed. While religious zeal could possibly be one motive for the tribesmen invading Kashmir, it could also be their first major act of nationalism, post-partition. Considering Kashmir was always generally considered to be vital to Pakistan’s survival, the tribesmen could possibly have been acting in defense of their country that they viewed as being in an emergency state of danger. Bourke-White goes on to explain how according to Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistan was committing acts of aggression because soldiers and officers, out of uniform, were participating in the struggle for Kashmir, which somehow constituted Indian military action in the region “as a necessary defense of the helpless population against the invaders.” However, this logic does not follow because the move of Pakistani tribesmen into Kashmir, independent of their official

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62 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 208
63 Bourke-White, Halfway to Freedom, 209
government, did not warrant direct military involvement by the Indian government. Additionally, it portrays the Indian government as being hypocritical, considering that they rejected the Junagadh accession to Pakistan and directly established a plebiscite there in order to acquire that state. Moreover, Pakistan was not even in a position to control the might of the North-West Frontier Province fighters at the time in which they were invading.\textsuperscript{64} According to official United States documents from 1950, the Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs discusses how by 1950 the situation was such that, “should substantial numbers of tribesmen decide to invade Kashmir again, the GOP might conceivably use regular troops in the tribal areas to prevent such a movement, but such action would be so unpopular in Pakistan that it seems unlikely that the Government would make any effort to keep the tribes out of Kashmir.”\textsuperscript{65} This would allow one to infer that perhaps in 1947 the Pakistani Government turned a blind eye to the tribesmen intentionally due to fear of public disenchantment with this newly formed and quite unstable government. In addition to the lack of motivation to counter the tribesmen, according to a letter from British Ambassador Franks to the United States Secretary of State on April 1, 1949 Pakistan was definitely not in a position to be making large military moves in Kashmir at the time due to defense deficits, especially in the North-West Frontier Province. Ambassador Franks explains how Pakistan was meant to inherit 1/3 of the stocks of 75 mm. ammunition of India at partition but due to political, labor, and transport issues the transfer of the ammunition from India was never actually completed. This lack of ammunition and subsequent issues with defense combined to create “considerable military commitments in the defense of the north-west

\textsuperscript{64} Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 74
\textsuperscript{65} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 v. 5, 1447
frontier and the control of the tribes in that area.”66 A region that historically was relatively autonomous, under the eye of the British, these fighters had enough strength to direct their raids in whichever manner they saw fit for the early years of Pakistan’s independence. Clearly the direction they aimed to fight was in Kashmir due to the cries of Islam being in danger floating around and their belief that the Quran was a law higher than the law of the land, which made it absolutely necessary to adhere to.67 However, while religion does play a huge role in politics in the South Asian subcontinent, there are definitely other possible reasons for the Pathan raiders to make their move into Kashmir. For example, on October 30 1947 Alan Campbell-Johnson made note of a statement Nehru made in regards to the raiders in which he stated, “there was…conclusive evidence that Kashmiri troops were used first to attack Moslems in the State and even to attack Moslem villages in Pakistan near the border. All this had provoked the Pathan raiders.”68 According to the Indian scope, the Pakistani government was underhandedly creating trouble in the Kashmir region in order to give the tribesmen an excuse to invade and do their dirty work for them, considering Pakistan knew better than to violate international law and invade a neutral state.

The entire manner in which the Kashmir Conflict of 1948 was handled was extremely detrimental to Pakistani-Indian relations for it’s entire subsequent history. When news reached the Defense Committee of the Indian government on October 25, 1947, that Pakistani tribesmen had invaded Kashmir, the committee spearheaded by Lord Mountbatten, considered many options. They felt as though arms and ammunitions must be sent in to Srinagar to assist the locals against raiders and also considered sending in the Indian military but ultimately felt as

66 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 1697
67 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 75
68 Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, 228
though that would be foolhardy, considering that Kashmir was neutral at that point. Ultimately Lord Mountbatten decided that Kashmir must accede to India first and then once peace was attained, which implies that he was well aware that such a move would result in violence and war, a plebiscite would be reached.\textsuperscript{69} According to an account with Alan Campbell-Johnson, Lord Mountbatten’s press secretary, “[Mountbatten] argued that if indeed they were determined to send in troops, the essential prerequisite was accession, and unless it was made clear that this accession was not just an act of acquisition, this in itself might touch off a war.”\textsuperscript{70} This would allow one to infer that Mountbatten knew these actions were muddling in dangerous territory, but he felt as though the risk-benefit was too high in his favor to pass up this chance. Though Lord Mountbatten was Governor-General of India at the time, he was still a representative of the Commonwealth, which both Pakistan and India belonged to. Therefore when N.V. Gadgil discusses how “the Kashmir campaign was planned with [Mountbatten’s] advice and consent. It was he who had accepted the Instrument of Accession from the Maharaja of Kashmir. It was because he felt that the Indian side was just and correct that he had agreed and actively helped send [the Indian Army] into Kashmir to repel the invaders,” one might find his actions perplexing because as a representative of the Commonwealth he should not have taken such an active stance against Pakistani interests, considering they were another nation that was supposed to be looked protected under the banner of the Commonwealth, not viewed as an enemy.\textsuperscript{71} The choices of Lord Mountbatten at this time cannot be looked at as logical or legitimate in an international sense due to his confusing mindset at the time. Ian Stephens reflects upon a meeting with Lord Mountbatten on October 26, 1947 and states how he was “‘startled by their

\textsuperscript{69} Korbel, Danger In Kashmir, 78
\textsuperscript{70} Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 225
\textsuperscript{71} Gadgil, Government From the Inside, 66
one-sided verdicts on affairs.’ They seemed to have ‘become wholly pro-Hindu.’ The atmosphere at Government House that night was almost one of war. Pakistan, the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah were the enemy.”

Such a mindset definitely was not warranted for someone who a mere months prior was advocating for the position of Governor-General of both Pakistan and India, which these selected testimonials would indicate would have been disastrous for the state of affairs of South Asia because clearly Mountbatten was more aligned to the interests of India than being neutral. Dr. Korbel further discusses in *Danger in Kashmir*, how perplexing the choices of the Lord Mountbatten were at this moment in time. He explains how considering that Kashmir technically was an independent nation, either Delhi or Kashmiri officials should have made an appeal to the UN for assistance immediately. Additionally, Delhi should have contacted Karachi the minute news reached India, but for some reason these solutions were never thought of in the Indian camp. What proceeded to happen is an event that effectively damned Kashmir to 66 years of suffering and conflict.

On October 26, 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh wrote to Lord Mountbatten and gave his formal accession to the subcontinent because he desperately wanted aid against the Pakistani tribesmen, but knew that he would not receive it without acceding to India first. By the next morning, not only did India accept Hari Singh’s accession, but also 330 men of the First Sikh Battalion were flown into Srinagar to block an impending attempt at the tribesmen to seize the capital; a move that immediately sparked up a reaction by the Pakistani government. By midnight of October 27, 1947, Governor-General Jinnah of Pakistan ordered his acting commander-in-chief, General Sir Douglas D. Gracey to move Pakistani troops into Kashmir.

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72 Stephens, Horned Moon, 108
73 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 80
74 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 85
However, in a crucial move that would definitively create the long lasting conflict of Kashmir, General Gracey defied Jinnah’s orders at this decisive time and maintained that he answered primarily to Marshal Sir Claude Auchincleck, supreme commander in charge of administering partition of the Indian army.\textsuperscript{75} Interestingly enough, the Indian army did not need clearance from Marshal Auchincleck before their rapid invasion of Kashmir, which goes back to maintain the notion that the British always considered the interests of India above the interests of Pakistan. The Indian army moved into Kashmir under the consultation of Prime Minister Nehru and Lord Mountbatten, yet when Mr. Jinnah decided military action was necessary, Auchincleck informed him that “an act of invasion would involve automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every British Officer serving with the newly formed Pakistan Army.”\textsuperscript{76} Considering Lord Mountbatten, Governor-General of India, had the power to send troops into Kashmir, it only seems logical that Governor-General Jinnah of Pakistan would have that same authority. However, in what seems to be either General Gracey’s desire to avoid full-on war or his desire to allow India to seize the upper hand in this grossly important contest, Pakistan was not able counter India’s direct military involvement in Kashmir, thus beginning a series of failed negotiations on this conflict throughout 1948.”\textsuperscript{77} It is interesting to note that both Lord Mountbatten and Mr. Jinnah felt that their state’s military action was warranted as a result of violence from the opposing side, but their definition of when the violence occurred differed. Lord Mountbatten felt that the violence that legitimized Indian military action in Kashmir occurred when the Pathan tribes attempted to make moves into the region, yet Mr. Jinnah

\textsuperscript{75} Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 87
\textsuperscript{76} Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, 226
\textsuperscript{77} Campbell-Johnson, Mission With Mountbatten, 226
concluded that since the Pathan tribes were not under the jurisdiction of the Pakistani Army, the first state sponsored act of violence was the Indian military involvement in Kashmir.

Once Jinnah’s orders were not carried through on October 27, 1947, Jinnah and Mountbatten met to negotiate the issue, however found no mutual agreement ultimately. Jinnah proposed 3 points to Mountbatten: cease-fire within 48 hours and India-Pakistan joint force against tribesmen in order to ensure ceasefire, complete withdrawal of Indian forces and the tribesmen from the region, and the organization of a plebiscite in Kashmir by the two Governor-Generals of India and Pakistan. However, Mountbatten wished the plebiscite to be established under the authority of the United Nations, therefore he rejected all three points. Such a careless attitude, quite characteristic of Mountbatten’s attitude towards Pakistani well being, is what eventually led to the issue being taken on by the United Nations and dealt with through the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNCIP) for the remainder of 1948. Dr. Korbel discusses in his work how, while Mountbatten originally stated that by accepting Kashmiri accession India would eventually administer a plebiscite, it is possible that he did not want to allow Pakistan to co-supervise the plebiscite because it would somehow imply that the accession to India was not as valid. This effectively displays the greater symbolism and issue of pride in between India and Pakistan, in regards to Kashmir.

The UNCIP was faced with many difficulties throughout 1948 as they attempted to broker peace for Kashmir. The biggest problem in negotiation was that India and Pakistan had completely conflicting demands. For example, India refused to discuss the fate of the Kashmiri people until the tribesmen and the Pakistani forces were removed. However, Pakistan refused to stop fighting until an agreement on the plebiscite was reached because they did not have faith in

78 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 88-89
79 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 89
the system that a plebiscite would actually occur if they stopped fighting without a guarantee.\textsuperscript{80} While India did entertain talk of a plebiscite, a conversation between the American Ambassador to India Loy Henderson and Indian Foreign Minister Bajpai reveals the notion certain individuals such as Bajpai himself, felt as though the partition of Kashmir would be more in their interests, yet did not dare to propose such a stance in fear of coming off as being afraid of losing the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{81} Then again given the overwhelming majority of Muslim population, this desire for the partition of Kashmir very well could have been born from the assessment that a plebiscite would lead to Kashmiri accession to Pakistan. However despite these many different proposals, eventually through many failed negotiations and disappointing attempts at peace on January 5, 1949 a ceasefire was finally reached between India and Pakistan—signaling the end to this quasi-war. The terms of this ceasefire were characterized by an agreement to allow the Kashmiri people to democratically determine their accession to either India or Pakistan through an impartial plebiscite and the plebiscite administrator would be appointed through the United Nations.\textsuperscript{82} However, while this resolution was passed, 66 years later the plebiscite has still not occurred, Kashmir continues to be a pawn in the hands of India and Pakistan, and Kashmir is still fractioned between the two largest nations of the subcontinent.

Throughout the entire Kashmir conflict the UNCIP met with Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri officials and frustratingly found that “on both sides there was an absence of that which is the paramount prerequisite for negotiation among any group of countries: a semblance of good

\textsuperscript{80} Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 105
\textsuperscript{81} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 1708
\textsuperscript{82} UN Resolution: January 5, 1949 http://www.kashmirlibrary.org/kashmir_timeline/kashmir_files/uncip_1949.htm
will.” This extremely negative manner in which both Pakistan and India viewed one another throughout the entire Kashmir conflict set the tone for their relationship from that point on. This “deep-seated mistrust of any move coming from India” and the “pronounced and uncensored contempt towards Pakistan, the very existence of which Nehru found difficult to accept” from the Indian side is what created massive tension within the subcontinent and subsequently allowed for foreign powers to get involved in their sphere. The antagonistic way in which both countries viewed each other is exactly why the issue of Kashmiri accession or independence has still not been determined today. Pakistan’s refusal to give up the land she so needed in order for economic survival and India’s insistence that Pakistan be condemned for aggressive behavior, coupled up to begin the first of several military standoffs between these two nations.

What is interesting to note at this point is that while many Pakistanis would have preferred a more involved American presence in the Kashmir dispute of 1948, Pakistan was still able to establish a strong relationship with the United States after this point due to the way the United States handled the fragile situation. While advocates for Pakistani interests definitely would argue that the United States could have expressed a more pro-Pakistani stance and explicit condemnation of India after their lack of compromise in the UNCIP negotiations, due to their lack of commitment in South Asia at the time and other international crises, it only makes sense that the United States chose to remain neutral at this point. According to Acting United States Representative at the United Nations Phillip C. Jessup, to Secretary of State George Marshall on August 11, 1948, India’s attitude in regards to the Kashmir and Hyderabad issue was “intemperate and intransigent” and the United States could not express any support for India due

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83 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 132
84 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 132
to fear of offending the Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, despite the fact that the United States wanted to
remain neutral and not get involved with the Kashmir conflict, they still clearly had some sort of
pro-Pakistan sentiments. Such an attitude is what encouraged Pakistanis to embark upon this
relationship with the United States and spread positive sentiments regarding the United States. It
is because of this notion and the United States foreign policy of neutrality in South Asia, which
is what led to problems later down the road in 1965. However it must be noted that certain
United States documents bring to light the very same desire for a strong relationship with India
that seemed to rub Pakistan in the wrong way in the days leading up to the 1965 War. It is
interesting to analyze how the United States definitely played an even hand in the subcontinent at
this time, but still had a definite underlying intention of forging a relationship with India, which
is something that Pakistani officials truly did not see immediately, did not expect, and did not
understand. On May 29, 1949 the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India quite
explicitly stated how, “From beginning Dept has been deeply concerned re two aspects Kashmir
dispute: its threat to stability and progress in South Asia and its affect upon US-Indian relations.
Throughout 1948 Kashmir dispute was a serious obstacle to development US-Ind coop in various
fields.”\textsuperscript{86} One must take note of how in this entire correspondence there was no mention of how
the Kashmir dispute would affect the US-Pakistani relationship, but only the US-Indian
relationship. Regardless, it is more important to keep in mind that at this time the United States
balanced themselves evenly in this South Asian sphere, which ultimately did allow for a
relatively strong relationship with Pakistan to burgeon over time.

\textsuperscript{85} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1948 v. 1 p. 1, 107
\textsuperscript{86} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1949 v. 6, 1713
However, the Kashmir conflict is but one issue that created major cause for concern for Pakistani leaders in the first few years of independence. The tension with India, economic failures, horrible inheritance from partition, and the death of founding father, President of Pakistan, Muslim League President, and Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah on September 11, 1948 marked this era as one of constant worry and troubles for Pakistan. The death of such an ideological giant in Pakistan left a massive vacuum, which was ultimately filled, quite aptly, by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar remembers, “the sudden death of the Quaid-i-Azam closely followed by India’s attack on the state of Hyderabad Deccan had spread gloom and despondency over the country. It was the towering personality of Liaquat Ali Khan that steadied the people.” Liaquat Ali Khan was a leading statesman and was able to effectively usher Pakistan onto the world scene until his tragic assassination in 1951. However, before his premature passing he was able to steady a nation that was quite consistently being rocked by massive blows to the state and feelings of national Pakistani spirit.

87 Ahmad, Liaquat Ali Khan, 71
CHAPTER II: CHOOSING A COLD WAR PARTNER

Due to the obvious economic shortcomings of the new state of Pakistan, as well as the clear suspicion with which Pakistan viewed both India and England (especially after the Kashmir conflict of 1947) Pakistani leaders knew that foreign assistance was absolutely necessary in order for the new state to survive. According to an American memorandum on the basic United States security interests in the Near East and South Asia on October 11, 1948, as early as late 1947 the Pakistani government informally requested a U.S. Government loan of 2,000,000,000 [2,000,000,000?], which the U.S. actually saw as reasonable due to Pakistan’s lack of basic industry, primarily agrarian production, and large military requirements.88 Pakistani officials were keen since the beginning of statehood to play the two major Cold War parties, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, against one another in order to secure benefits for themselves. The era of 1950-1965 is one in which Pakistan worked tirelessly to establish relations with these foreign superpowers, democracy was halted in the nation, and the economy steadily boomed. However, in terms of Pakistan’s establishment on the world scene, one would naturally question why these two major superpowers would even express any interest in the state of Pakistan when they had such major dealings to handle in other regions of the world. The simplest answer to this question would be strategic importance.

Before delving into the nature of Pakistan’s geographical significance, it must be noted that the United States, despite how preoccupied they were with other international relations at the onset of partition, was quite aware of the possible Soviet threat to the subcontinent and the subsequent repercussions due to Pakistan’s location. As early as 1949 American documents indicate a distinct interest in the competition with the Soviet Union for South Asia due to it’s raw

88 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 18
materials, production capacity, manpower, and military bases that could be used for a variety of reasons—including Communist spying.\(^8^9\) Pakistan’s geographical location on the world map was extremely unique and known to no other nation in the world. When Pakistan was created, it was created on the premise that Pakistan would be the home for all Muslims of the subcontinent. However, one major stitch to this plan was that the two largest populations of Muslims flanked India on her east and west border; a feature which would prove to be both a blessing and a nuisance eventually. The West Pakistan and East Pakistan wings were separated by 1,500 miles of land and 2,500 miles of sea; a division which allowed Pakistan to keep India in a constant state of discomfort at being surrounded by her enemy on two fronts.\(^9^0\) However, it was also a huge economic cost for the broke nation to maintain a military presence on the borders because they too feared the intentions of their neighbor. With five borders to protect, the huge military expenditure was often cited as the cause of every ailment of the new state.\(^9^1\) As a nation that felt extremely ripped off in comparison to her Indian counterpart at partition, this strange but unique aspect of the nation actually gave Pakistani politicians a decent hand to play in the international field, in terms of securing aid and military procurements. Because of this distinctive feature of having two wings, Pakistan was in an extremely strategic position because she was able to interact with the Middle East, the Islamic world, and Central Asia through her Western borders, and be involved in the politics of the South-East Asia through the Eastern borders.\(^9^2\) West Pakistan, sharing a border with 4 very important nations, was always seen as lying at the crossroads of Asia. A boundary with Iran, Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, and the Arabian Sea

\(^8^9\) Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 16
\(^9^0\) Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, 1
\(^9^2\) Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, 2
allowed for interaction and influence in all of these different regional spheres.\textsuperscript{93} Such a feature is extremely beneficial to a nation when the regions in question are either rich in oil, as the Middle East is very well known for, or rich in agricultural and mineral resources, like South-East Asia is known for. However more importantly, the very close proximity to both the Soviet Turkestan, through the extremely narrow Afghani arm, Wakhan, and the Chinese territories of Sinkiang and Tibet, through Kashmir made Pakistan extremely viable in the eyes of any nation, such as the United States, looking to keep a check on these nations.\textsuperscript{94} In terms of East Pakistan, it bordered India on three sides, however the southern border is shared with the Bay of Bengal and the south-east Chittagong Hill Tracts shared a border with Burma. The Bay of Bengal was extremely vital to communication between the east and west wings of Pakistan because India was a hostile land to Pakistan in the early formative years after independence, therefore in the off chance of war with India, the only access West Pakistani aid would have to East Pakistan would be through the sea.\textsuperscript{95} The access to the sea on both the Western and Eastern wings of Pakistan was also a benefit to the new nation because it allowed for trade to develop through its busy ports in Karachi, Chittagong, and eventually Chalna, as well.\textsuperscript{96} While in the early years trade was primarily inter-zonal between East and West Pakistan, it slowly did develop on an international level as well.\textsuperscript{97}

These geographical benefits put Pakistan in a position in which she was a young, vulnerable, and very centrally located nation with no support. Considering the era in which Pakistan was attempting to establish an independent, sovereign state was the early 1950s, it is not

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{93} Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, 6
\textsuperscript{94} Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, 2
\textsuperscript{95} Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, 6
\textsuperscript{96} Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, 138
\textsuperscript{97} Ahmad, A Geography of Pakistan, 139
\end{footnotesize}
surprising that Pakistan was swept up into the Cold War spirit that was moving across the entire world. The 1950s was a time in which the United States and the Soviet Union were both aggressively attempting to broaden their influence on the world as many formerly colonized areas were achieving statehood. The objective of a Department of State Policy Statement from April 3, 1950 clearly states the intentions of the United States towards Pakistan with a succinct, “Our principle objective in our relations with Pakistan is the orientation of its government and people towards the US and other western democracies and away from the USSR.”

This document goes on to discuss how in return for military aid, the United States would be prepared to expect the use of bases and other facility in the event of war, though interesting enough the document did not explicitly say war with whom. However, it can be inferred that given Pakistan’s close proximity to the Soviet Union, these bases could have been of an interest to the United States for surveillance purposes.

In terms of the Middle East, the early 1950s was when the United States and Great Britain were both grappling with an increasingly nationalistic and Communist Tudeh Party-backed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh of Iran. This fear of Mossadegh’s socialist leanings, his massive support from the Tudeh Party, and Iran’s close proximity to Iran is what motivated the United States, great defender of democracy, to organize an overthrow of the democratically elected Mossadegh to make room for Shah Reza Pahlavi. Considering Pakistan’s border with Iran, it’s minute distance from the Soviet Union, and it’s centrally located position, the United States naturally was just as concerned with staving off Communist expansion in Pakistan, as it was in Iran. According to Robert J. McMahon, as early as 1951 “American policy makers viewed the oil-rich Middle East as strategically and economically indispensable to the

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98 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 v. 5, 1490
West and yet highly vulnerable to Soviet military power. Defense of the area against Soviet aggression ranked as an essential goal of American diplomacy. 99 Prior to the 1950s, the United States did not have a major initial interest in Pakistan in its first few years because not only did it assume that Britain would maintain a large influence in the region, but also because they assumed India would eventually absorb Pakistan due to Pakistan’s low chances of survival and because their attention was fixated elsewhere. With high tensions and major requests for resources from the United States, the ranking of American priorities ranged from primarily Europe, to the Middle East, then the Far East, and lastly South Asia. 100 For example, in 1948 the United States did not play a major role in the Kashmir crisis and definitely did not favor either India or Pakistan definitively, because other world events such as the Czechoslovakian coup, the Berlin crisis, the Chinese Civil War, the Arab-Israeli conflict all demanded the attention of President Truman more than Kashmir did. 101 However, United States official documents would indicate that the Pakistanis felt as though the United States did take sides during the Kashmir Conflict because of the fact that India possessed a majority of the military stores from pre-partition, including the ones that were supposed to be allotted to Pakistan. They maintained that this put India in a position of advantage because they were producing arms to use in the conflict and Pakistan was completely dependent on foreign military supplies, which the United States refused to provide to either country in 1948 and early 1949. 102 This inability to maintain a clear

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99 McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 813
100 McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 819
101 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, Chapter 1 para. 54
102 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 v. 5, 1497-1498
line of discourse has consistently proved to be a thorn in the relations between the United States and Pakistan throughout their entire history.

While the United States did not have major plans for Pakistan at this time, American government documents from 1949 explicitly establish a certain fear of what could become of the South Asian subcontinent if this region strife with political turmoil and economic instability was infiltrated by Communist propaganda. An entire section devoted to strategic importance of South Asia in the Foreign Relations of the United States series of 1949 analyzes the possible uses of South Asia against Communism. Mainly the United States foresaw Pakistan’s geographical location as a valuable tool to “dominate the region of the Indian Ocean and exert a strong influence also on the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Far East,” through the use of sea ports, rail and air transport system, and “air bases at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar [which] might prove equally important in conducting air operations against the industrial areas of the Soviet Heartland, or in defending Middle East soil.”

Clearly the United States saw that the position of Pakistan at the crossroads of Asia was going to be of great importance in terms of advancing in the East, as well as ensuring that their Soviet enemies did not spread their influence in the region quite early on in the history of Pakistan’s existence.

The United States was not prepared to get involved in South Asia until the mid-1950s, but their interest in Pakistan was definitely spawned by Pakistan’s strategic geographical position. By mid-1949 Stephen J. Spingarn, White House staff assistant, had made many convincing arguments in favor of alignment with Pakistan. His analysis, amongst other government documents of the time, describes how Pakistan’s strategic location and close proximity to the USSR would allow for the establishment of air bases and facilities for the

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103 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 17
purpose of spying on the Soviet Union, the close proximity to the Persian Gulf would allow for the United States to protect it’s interests in the Middle Eastern oil fields, Pakistan’s potential importance in the defense of the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean through the use of her impeccable military, as well as the symbolic importance of Pakistan in the region as the largest Islamic nation in the world.\textsuperscript{104} For example, in a memorandum on March 24, 1949 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff quite clearly explained how “from the military point of view, the countries of South Asia excepting Pakistan have, under present and prospective conditions, little value to the United States. The Karachi-Lahore area in Pakistan may, under certain conditions, become of strategic importance. In spite of tremendous logistic difficulties, this area might be required as a base for air operations against central U.S.S.R. and as a staging area for forces engaged in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas.”\textsuperscript{105} This American interest in the Middle East could have definitely struck a cord with Pakistani leaders considering the fact that American documents from 1950 indicate that Pakistan was interested in balancing the power that India held in the South Asian subcontinent by maintaining a similar leadership position amongst the Muslim nations of the Middle East.\textsuperscript{106} Therefore there would have been an added motivation for the Pakistani leaders to agree to become a part of the American bloc. There can definitely be no doubt that Pakistan was seen as a very valuable pawn to be used and fought for during the Cold War by the competing Western nations, something which Pakistani politicians were aware of and would go on to manipulate in order to attain some sort of protection and feeling of security due

\textsuperscript{104} McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 818
\textsuperscript{105} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 v. 6, 41
\textsuperscript{106} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 v. 5, 1499
to the fact that the nation was essentially in the arms of her enemy and literally had no munitions industry and barely any military equipment from Indian stores at independence.\textsuperscript{107}

This well developed consciousness of Pakistani importance is what remained in the back of the minds of American policy makers as the 1950s rolled around, the Kashmir conflict settled down to a certain extent, and both India and Pakistan attempted to establish what exactly their relationship would be with the United States and the Soviet Union. While work by KGB spy Vasili Mitrokhin would indicate that the Soviet Union had an interest in the Pakistani sphere initially, Pakistan seemingly was set on alignment with the United States from her beginning. Mitrokhin describes how prominent Soviet statesman Andrei Gromyko “complained of ‘the insidious [Western] web into which Pakistan fell almost at the outset of her existence as an independent state.’\textsuperscript{108} Pakistani leaders truly did feel an affinity for the United States even before partition. As early as April 10, 1947 Lord Mountbatten questioned Liaquat Ali Khan on whether he would ever be “prepared to join hands with Russia and all that that implied, and he shook his head and said ‘No, never.’”\textsuperscript{109} This definitive manner in which Liaquat Ali Khan handled the issue of Western or Soviet influence is very indicative of the Pakistani thought. It has been theorized that part of the reason why the United States and Pakistan formed initially has to do with the very circumstances which brought Pakistan into existence: religion. In \textit{Liaquat Ali Khan} by Ziauddin Ahmad, H.H. the Aga Khan III reminisces upon his relationship with Liaquat Ali Khan and touches upon his religious tolerance with a distinct message, “For the people of Pakistan (Muslim, Hindu, Christian or Parsi) this great leader’s life and patriotism, his catholic

\textsuperscript{107} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States 1949} v. 6, 25
\textsuperscript{108} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{The World Was Going Our Way}, 341
\textsuperscript{109} Zaidi, \textit{Jinnah Papers} v.1 p. 2, 654
sympathies and comprehensions I hope and pray would be an example to be followed.” What is most important to note is the distinct mentioning of Catholic sympathies by a dear friend of Liaquat Ali Khan, who clearly knew the nature of this man. This ability of Liaquat Ali Khan to relate Islam to Catholicism and/or Christianity to American leaders and the American public is what struck a cord with them and began the leaning towards Pakistan. Unlike Hindus, who believe in polytheism, do not share the link of the Abrahamic religions, and believe in a caste system, Liaquat Ali Khan was able to convey to the United States that the Islamic Republic, though still a Muslim state, shared many important core beliefs with the United States, such as monotheism. A Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on February 19, 1954 also touches upon how the fact that Pakistan’s position as a religious state affected its standing as a partner in the fight against Communism. The document reads, “the combination of the strength of religious belief and the martial spirit of the people make Pakistan a country that can be relied upon as one of the great bulwarks in that area against communism.” Clearly this bond of monotheism was seen as a banner that could be used to unite, and essentially entice one another to partner together against the Soviet Union for their own interests. A comprehensive study of religion and the US-South Asian experience describes how in 1952 the State Department’s Office of South Asian Affairs published a study explicitly stating, “Like our American forefathers, Pakistan’s founders were schooled in the democratic philosophy and were willing to labor for their independence. Pledged to created a state in harmony with the principles of Islam, they are opposed to the godless ideology of communism.

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110 Ahmad, Liaquat Ali Khan, 160
112 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1114
and they are alert to efforts by subversive elements within their country to undermine the bases of orderly government.”\textsuperscript{113} The idea that Hindus were more susceptible to communist infiltration due to their belief in multiple deities is a notion that was definitely not helped by the Indian stance towards the United States. From independence, India definitely conveyed the message that it was going to stay nonaligned in the Cold War. However, the United States held out hope that India would prove to be a great force in the fight against communism in the subcontinent until Jawaharlal Nehru’s first visit to the United States in October of 1949. His visit, characterized by an extremely independent tone and firm refusal to drift away from non-alignment sharply contrasted Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the United States in 1950.\textsuperscript{114}

However, Liaquat Ali Khan’s invitation to the United States was definitely born out of American concern that they were pushing Pakistan into Soviet arms due to their neglect of the nation in favor of India; another indication of Pakistan being grappled over as a Cold War pawn. Concern over the issue of invitations to the United States was discussed in April 3, 1950 in a Department of State Policy Statement which reads as, “The announcement of the President’s invitation to Prime Minister Nehru to visit the US, and our failure at the time to respond more enthusiastically to suggestions by Pakistani officials that a similar invitation to the Pakistan Prime Minister would be welcomed, probably contributed to the belief in Pakistan that our policy is pro-Indian. This undoubtedly had some bearing on Liaquat Ali Khan’s acceptance of Moscow’s invitation.”\textsuperscript{115} Given Pakistan’s established previous enthusiasm for American support, the American assessment of the Pakistanis feeling spurned by their actions seems

\textsuperscript{113} Rotter, Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and US-South Asian Relations 1947-1954, 608
\textsuperscript{114} McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 820
\textsuperscript{115} Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950 v. 5, 1498
accurate. However, Liaquat Ali Khan’s subsequent acceptance of an American invitation to visit
the United States, coupled with the abandonment of his planned Moscow visit further illuminates
the deep loyalty that Pakistan felt towards the United States. This loyalty contributes to the
consistent narrative between these two nations in which Pakistan constantly felt as though the
United States was not returning the same sentiments that Pakistan was sending out to them, while
the United States felt as though they were doing everything they could do for their ally without
jeopardizing their relationship with other nations.

However, Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the United States in 1950 was a turning point for
Pakistani and American relations, as he took captured the attention and hearts of the American
people and showed them a that Pakistanis were a relatable people. Abdul Qadir remembers how
upon landing on American soil Liaquat Ali Khan said, “I have come here, not to discover
America, but to help America discover Pakistan.”

Due to his amazing oration, Western
tendencies, and Pakistani flavor, he was able to leave a lasting impression upon the American
people that his country was definitely eager to align with the United States and could be relied
upon to fight against communism. Although in 1949 it seemed as though Pakistan and the
Soviet Union were attempting to embark on relations together due to the fact that Moscow sent
an invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan, the visit ultimately never happened, despite the fact that the
invitation was accepted. However, because Pakistan was sensitive over their perception that
India was given an unfair amount of importance in the Commonwealth, a Soviet trade
commission was received in Karachi around this time. However, after 1949, there was not much
talk of Pakistani-Soviet interactions. A Time Magazine article from 1950 describes how
despite dabbling in communication with the Soviet Union in 1949, after the American invitation

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116 Ahmad, Liaquat Ali Khan, 212
117 Birdwood, India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides, 146
to visit, “there has been little talk of Russia or the Moscow trip, and Liaquat insists that Pakistanis are the world's most unbending anticommunists.”\textsuperscript{118} Liaquat Ali Khan used his visit to the United States as a means to educate Americans on why exactly Pakistan needed to exist for the sake of the Muslims of India, but also to ensure American military aid because “such assistance would serve the interests of the entire free world.” He used his relatable personality to take the facts that Pakistan was strategically located and an Islamic state opposed to the atheist ways of communism to spin an anti-Soviet rhetoric that Americans were willing to listen to. While this visit with President Harry S. Truman was very successful in the sense that Liaquat Ali Khan was accepted, Pakistan’s sovereignty was recognized, and in the long run the United States did eventually decide to aid Pakistan militarily, the United States did continue to hope for an eventual Indian stance of alignment with the US bloc.\textsuperscript{119}

As the Soviet Union became more aggressive in Middle Eastern politics by 1951, Americans feared a loss of influence in the Middle East, Pakistani leaders consistently made it explicitly clear they were willing to align with the United States in exchange for military aid, realization began to dawn upon America that if they did not help Pakistan militarily in some regards soon they would most probably lose Pakistani support. Thus, the United States began to figure out how exactly to secure Pakistan as defensive partner in the Middle East, provide them with military benefits, and still not offend India.\textsuperscript{120} A United States policy evaluation dated April 3, 1950 discusses how in order to maintain a strong relationship with both nations of the subcontinent, the United States would have to remain impartial in all disputes, while still

\textsuperscript{118} Time Magazine, May 8, 1950 Pakistan: The Glory of the Moghuls http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,812405-1,00.html
\textsuperscript{119} Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis: 124-125
\textsuperscript{120} McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 827-829
economically assisting in the increase of “production to maintain living standards in both
countries.”¹²¹ This shift in thought was definitely brought upon by events such as the March
1951 attempt at overthrowing Liaquat Ali Khan’s government by the pro-communist Azad
Pakistan Party.¹²² The possibility of a pro-communist dictatorship awoke the United States to
what the potential consequences of Soviet influence in Pakistan could mean, which definitely
sparked a new era in which the United States was more inclined to get involved in the Pakistani
sphere. Considering that the United States always had the notion that Pakistani bases and
facilities could be used to combat the Soviet Union, a possible pro-Communist government in
Pakistan most likely would have shaken the United States up because such an outcome would
have put American interests in danger.

The period of 1951-1955 can be characterized as a time in which the United States finally
began its courtship with Pakistan. While definitely still not ready to drop it’s stance of
evenhandedness in South Asia, it was in this period that the United States began to actually
supply Pakistan with military aid in exchange for a confirmation of an anti-Communist Pakistani
agenda. Upon examination of an official American document on June 30, 1953, this policy of
assisting with military aid for Pakistan can be attributed to growing realization by the United
States that the entire subcontinent was not in a position to defend themselves from an attack by
Communist forces. The document states explicitly, “Without major outside support, India and
Pakistan would probably be unable to defend themselves successfully, even in cooperation,

¹²¹ Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1950 v. 5, 1496
¹²² Time Magazine, March 19, 1951 Pakistan: Conspiracy Nipped
http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,857978,00.html
against determined attack by Communist China or the USSR.”

This idea that even in joint cooperation India and Pakistan would not be able to stave off Communist expansion sheds some light on why exactly the United States played such an even hand between these two nations, a stance that Pakistan was never able to fully swallow. The belief that peace and cooperation was necessary for the stability of the region can be attributed to the constant fear of Soviet influence in the area.

The aforementioned shift in explicit dedication to the United States can be attributed to the death of Liaquat Ali Khan at the hand of an Afghani assassin on October 16, 1951. While Liaquat Ali Khan did work tirelessly to attain military procurements from the United States during his years as Prime Minister, he did maintain the stance that Pakistan would only help directly in anti-Communist efforts if they United States were to assist the Pakistanis in Kashmir. For example, the State Department requested Pakistani military troops to assist the UN military forces during the North Korean Invasion of 1950, but Liaquat Ali Khan ultimately decided against it because the United States was not willing to change their stance on Kashmir in favor of Pakistan. While still dedicated to anti-communism, Liaquat Ali Khan was not willing to become a puppet to the United States and he “politely but firmly declined the American request for a Pakistani military presence in Korea.”

Even by the summer of 1953 official American government documents reveal the peculiar relationship that Pakistan had with the United States by this point and discuss how “Pakistan’s neutralism lacks the doctrinaire quality of India’s. Pakistan’s sympathies are definitely with the US and its allies. Its failure to align itself with the Western camp [in the East-West conflict] can be attributed in part to its preoccupation with the

123 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1083
124 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, Chapter 4, para. 7
Kashmir problem…but results mainly from the lack of any sufficiently attractive Western offer in return for its support.”

This excerpt sheds some light on why the United States, aside from the fact that they were already an established superpower at the time, was always perceived as being less invested in their relationship with Pakistan. This could be due to the fact that the Pakistanis essentially laid their cards on the table too early, hence the United States felt as though they could make deals however they seemed fit because they had the reassurance that the Pakistanis would always be eager to have talks and communication with the United States. However, after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, the relationship between these two nations actually began to burgeon as the United States began to realize the importance of Pakistan in anti-communist security of the Middle East and South Asia. Additionally, the appointment of Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister in 1953 greatly changed the game because he considered the backing of a giant superpower vital to Pakistan’s security.

Various forms of economic aid, including technical assistance and economic aid, were poured into Pakistan in the first half of the 1950s, which is what led to this direct stance of pro-Western behavior in Pakistani politics. In 1952 Pakistan was granted 10 million dollars, in 1953 Pakistan was allotted 12 million dollars, and by 1954 the Technical Cooperation program (TCA) was proposing the large lump sum of 42 million dollars which they hoped could be divided by allotting 16 million dollars to technical assistance and 26 million to supplemental economic aid. While some people in congress, such as Mr. Roosevelt, found such a large request to be

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125 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1087

126 Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and It’s Origins, 100

127 House of Representatives Committee On Foreign Affairs, Verbal Report From Members of Special Study Mission to the Far East, April 23, 1953, 265
absurd, the very fact that such a large amount was being proposed, a huge jump up from 12 million dollars, indicates that the importance of bolstering Pakistan in order to allow her to become strong enough to defend South Asia and the Middle East against communist influence was increasing.128

The US move towards Pakistani interests can be characterized by a House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs meeting on April 23, 1953, in which U.S. Representative Clement J. Zablocki noted that “[Pakistan] will take wheat from wherever they can get it, including the Soviets, but they prefer to get it from the United States. They are truly pro-Western and pro-United States and are happy to have it from us.”129 This statement is important because it followed a discussion of the Pakistani wheat shortage in which it was implied that Pakistan truly was in a grave situation and that dire help was needed—yet the United States clearly was aware that even in desperation the Pakistanis would prefer to associate with the United States. Furthermore, a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Secretary of State reveal the deep concern the United States had towards not jeopardizing their position in Pakistan over the wheat issue.

Considering the excess amount of wheat the United States possessed and the fact that the United States very willingly provided India with a $190 million wheat loan when they were in crisis, this document discusses how if the United States denied a wheat loan to Pakistan it “would oblige Pakistan to exert great effort to obtain wheat from Russia with resulting serious loss of US prestige in the whole area. The risk involved in our not acting to assist Pakistan in its food

128 House of Representatives Committee On Foreign Affairs, Verbal Report From Members of Special Study Mission to the Far East, April 23, 1953, 266
129 House of Representatives Committee On Foreign Affairs, Verbal Report From Members of Special Study Mission to the Far East, April 23, 1953, 269
emergency is too great for us to accept.” These excerpts indicate a definite concern for Pakistani interests because a complete disregard of those interests would endanger American interests in the region. More important than the wheat issue, two months later in June 5, 1953 the United States Senate was quite openly discussing the means by which Pakistan would have to be given military assistance should the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) come into existence, a group similar to NATO, yet less militarized. Military assistance, though definitely clarified that it was in regards to communist containment, is something that Pakistan had been attempting to secure since independence, for constant fear of India. While the United States wanted security and stability in the subcontinent without offending either Pakistan or India, they did not like feeling bullied by Jawaharlal Nehru who explicitly voiced his concerns over American aid to Pakistan. Throughout 1953 the United States grappled with whether or not they should go through with military assistance but they began to realize that not only would it sour relations with Pakistan if they did not assist them, not only would the Middle East still remain susceptible to communist infiltration, but they did not want Nehru to think that he had such a major say in U.S. foreign policy in the South Asian subcontinent. A discussion on the probable repercussions of a US decision not to extend military aid to Pakistan in a Top Secret American document dated January 15, 1954 touches upon the many outcomes of refusing to supply the Government of Pakistan with the military aid that they were expecting to receive. However, one point in particular discusses in detail how “US denial of military aid to Pakistan would be looked on in India as a reluctant concession to India pressure…In fact, India would

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130 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1821-1825
131 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Security Act Cont., June 5, 1953, 505
132 McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 837

probably be encouraged to use similar pressure tactics against the US on other occasions.”

Clearly while the United States aimed to establish an understanding with India that they did not wish to “make Pakistan the dominant state of South Asia,” which implies they supported the stance that India should be the most dominant state of the subcontinent, they still wanted it to be clear that despite how strong India became in the subcontinent, the United States would not cater to their interests above their own.

These previously discussed factors are what prompted the move towards the 1954 mutual support and defense agreement, which was not a military alliance, but did officially signal the launching of American sale of arms to Pakistan, as well as an officer-training project. This alliance was further strengthened months later in September of 1954 with the signing of the Manila Pact, a document which eventually brought Pakistan into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); an organization which completely aligned Pakistan with the aims of the United States in regards to communism. Additionally, in 1955 Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact, which joined it with other Muslim counties of the Middle East who explicitly were against Soviet expansion into the region and surrounding sea water. Although the United States was not a member of this group, which was called Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) by 1958 after Iraq left it, it was still the force behind the project. Therefore by joining SEATO and CENTO in the mid-1950s the government of Pakistan directly aligned themselves with the United States and dedicated themselves to the interests of the western world. Although they never received such explicit assurances from the United States that they were completely aligned with Pakistan,

133 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1844-1845
134 Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54 v. 11 p. 2, 1144
135 Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and It’s Origins, 100
they always felt as though a deep bond between the United States and Pakistan was there. For example on December 23, 1953 Vice President Nixon spoke to the National Security Council and stated, “If we do not give aid to Pakistan, we’ve got to find a way to do it without giving Nehru the victory. Pakistan is a country I’d like to do everything for. The people have less complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go through.”\footnote{McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 837} It is in the revelation of such instances that Pakistanis always maintained hope that perhaps the United States would provide the same unconditional support to them, should it be necessary, if Pakistan were ever to go to war with India again.

The relationship Pakistan and the United States established was hard worked for and came through despite many odds. Pakistani leaders strived to make their relationship burgeon with the United States, quite often ignoring other states that showed a slight interest in Pakistan in favor of the Western power. Despite the fact that the United States played a very fair game in the subcontinent, it was this increased interest in Pakistan by the United States throughout the first half of the 1950s that pushed India further into the arms of the Soviet Union. The establishment of the Pakistani-American relationship took years to come about, but it wasn’t until the second half of the 1950s in which Pakistan was started to grow stronger and truly flourish with the help of American economic aid.

\textbf{CHAPTER III: MARTIAL LAW AND WAR}

\footnote{McMahon, United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947-1954, 837}
The period from the mid-1950’s onwards is a time in Pakistan in which the last hopes for democracy were dashed and military influence deepened over time. The sudden and early deaths of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and then Liaquat Ali Khan by 1951 left a vacuum in the Pakistani political sphere, which wasn’t consistently filled until the administration of Ayub Khan in 1958. Given the lack of strong willed leaders in the subcontinent, it only makes sense that the military, historically a major force in the Punjab and North West Frontier Provinces, strengthened over time. In his memoir, President Ayub Khan discusses how the period from Liaquat Ali Khan’s death up until his own 1958 martial law takeover was strife with inadequate men simply looking to further their own careers. He explains, “Not only was the central government at loggerheads with the provinces, but a great deal of intrigue and dog-fighting was going on within the central government itself. A civil servant who had become Finance Minister at the time of Independence elevated himself to the position of Governor-General. Another turned himself overnight from Secretary to Government (a civil service post) to Minister for Finance. All it required was rewriting the designation on the name-plates outside their offices.”137 This massive lack of visionaries is what led to the usurpation of power by military men, such as Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan. They were able to point at all of the glaring mistakes of these men who rotated in and out of office and use that to consolidate power for themselves.

Pakistan, a parliamentary democracy until 1958, constantly strived to fulfill the vision of its ideological mastermind: Mohammad Ali Jinnah. By 1956, a lengthy 9 years after independence, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan adopted a constitution declaring Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic and elected Iskander Mirza as President of Pakistan. The presidency of Mirza was marked with constant changes in government, instability, and severe problems.

137 Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 49
between the East and West wings of Pakistan, all of which contributed to the 1958 imposition of martial law in Pakistan, along with the discarding of the 1956 constitution.\textsuperscript{138} However, a mere two weeks after Iskander Mirza declared martial law in Pakistan, essentially killing any hope for democracy until present day, Ayub Khan had Mirza exiled, took control of the nation with his army, and let the public know that “a new civilian government would have to wait on the passage of events.”\textsuperscript{139}

Interesting enough, although Mirza had the public believe that his new stance of martial law was a sudden development due to his realization that democracy could not work in Pakistan, he actually had been planning such a move since September 1958. In discussions with British High Commissioner to Pakistan Alexander Symon on September 26\textsuperscript{th} and 27\textsuperscript{th} Mirza quite explicitly told him to inform the British government and Prime Minister that “the time has come to recognize that the present constitution must be scrapped and that the administration of the country should be taken over by a group (if they can be found) of ‘good men and true’ who will, interalia, be given the task of producing a new constitution more in keeping with the requirements of the country…He is satisfied that the Army would support him in a change such as he has in mind.”\textsuperscript{140} Considering Mirza imposed martial law in the end of October, 1958, he his plan was clearly premeditated; especially since further correspondence with High Commissioner Symon on September 29, 1958 would indicate that he was seeking advice on how exactly the United Kingdom would react to a coup d’etat.\textsuperscript{141} Obviously Mirza was weighing his options to see how he could pull off this feat. Mirza’s many references to how democracy could not work in Pakistan and the bluntness with which he spoke about scrapping the constitution of

\textsuperscript{138} Ziring, Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History, 80
\textsuperscript{139} Ziring, Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History, 80-81
\textsuperscript{140} Khan, R., The British Papers, 15
\textsuperscript{141} Khan, R., The British Papers, 16
Pakistan signify this era is the beginning of a definitive military presence in Pakistani politics—something that coincided with positive American relations due to the fact that strong relationships could be established with single dictators who could make choices for their nation; independent of the wishes of their people. This viewpoint can be bolstered by a telegram to the Commonwealth Relations Office in which Symon states, “The President has told me that Pakistan will align herself more clearly with the West than heretofore. At the same time I foresee that there is going to be greater pressure on us for further assistance. The President has already started talking about it in general terms.”

Thus it clearly is with Mirza onwards that the practice of Western neighbors essentially buying the loyalty of corrupt dictators began. However, while Mirza thought that his plan of martial law would give him the power to run the country the way he saw fit, Ayub Khan was quick to turn the tables on him. At 10 o’clock p.m. on October 27, 1958 Mirza was received in his dressing-gown by 3 Pakistani generals who informed him that he had to leave Pakistan by morning with his wife for exile in London.

This marked the beginning of the military era in Pakistan—a significant moment because it essentially guaranteed the halting of any sort of true, legitimate democratic form of government.

The Ayub Khan era is looked upon as a time of great economic gains and stability in Pakistan and it is a period in which the United States and Pakistan grew extremely close, right up until the India-Pakistan War of 1965—the first breaking of relations of many between these two countries. The closeness of the relationship under Ayub Khan is interesting to note because initially, though definitely pro-Western, he did not come off as an individual who completely believed in full alignment with the United States, according to the British Public Record Office.

142 Khan, R., The British Papers, 24 & 28
143 Khan, R., The British Papers, 38
144 Talbot, Pakistan: a Modern History, 146-147
In a note on Ayub Khan by Sir Gilbert Laithwaite on October 28th, civil servant and diplomat, he describes how Ayub “has not impressed me in the past as being what one might call ‘strongly pro-American.’ I would have thought myself that his relations were very largely directed by a consideration of the strict interests of his country.” As a man who had a long, illustrious career beginning as a civil servant prior to partition, it is not surprising that he was quite so nationalistic—Pakistan was founded on the passion of men like him. The beginnings of his career as martial law administrator definitely were focused on improving the state of Pakistan, considering there was major ground to make up for due to the poor leadership exhibited after the death of Liaquat Ali Khan. In an interview with an American reporter on February 17, 1960 Ayub Khan describes in detail how his primary objectives as a leader of Pakistan were to foster growth in Pakistan through land, legal, and educational reforms, as well as introduce democracy to every level of Pakistani society by the end of 1960. However, one must take a moment to note that he maintained his position of power until he was forced to resign in 1969. This was interesting because while he most definitely was a military dictator, he stated that should anyone refer to him as one they were “talking bloody rubbish.” While he did maintain open talk of democracy throughout his rule, he never actually attempted to establish such a system in Pakistan. In *Friends Not Masters*, Ayub Khan outlines the major problems he identified and sought to tackle in the early days of the “revolution.” He explains how his main goals in establishing martial law were to support civil authority in order to allow it to gain enough strength to handle future problems, bring about economic stability to Pakistan, deal with food shortages, as well as handle the issue of displaced refugees who left all of their assets behind in

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145 Khan, R., The British Papers, 47
146 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iPtL0jgC0o
Summed up quite simply he stated, “What the country needed was sound administration, a stable economy, and a reasonable standard of living. The new regime was determined to achieve these objectives.” An assessment of Ayub Khan’s personality and statements would indicate that he felt as though the stifling of democracy was a small price to pay for the advancement of Pakistan. As a strong army man with a dominating personality, his willingness to bend to the will of foreign powers would allow one to assume that while he was slowly killing off any chances of Pakistan to ever establish democracy, he honestly felt as though he was doing what was necessary to keep Pakistan as a dominating force, as her looming enemy advanced nearby.

However, while Ayub Khan does come off as a man with the interests of Pakistan at heart in many British declassified documents, his role in militarizing the state must be noted. His belief that the Army was the voice for the people and that somehow made his regime a democracy of some sorts is a notion that was severely detrimental to any Pakistani hopes for a democracy ever. On December 8, 1958, James Mossman of the Sydney Morning Herald had an extensive conversation with General Yahya Khan, Colonel Rashid Khan, and Ayub Khan. He recounted his experience to High Commissioner Alexander Symon later and alleged that he had an alcohol-fueled conversation with Ayub Khan in which the President ranted, “in sweeping away corrupted crooks like these [corrupted politicians], including Mirza, we are expressing 100 per cent democracy—not just your electioneering formalities and dirty little bits of balloting paper. Democracy for our people means a roof over your head and three square meals a day—and, by God, we’re going to see that the people get these things before we back out for the sake

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147 Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 81-82
148 Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 82
of democracy.”¹⁴⁹ The manner in which Ayub Khan redefined the definition of democracy to encompass his own personal policies is quite indicative of a militarized mindset in which orders are followed from the top down—the goings on of the state would be reflective of Ayub Khan’s thought processes alone, and not the nation which he represented. This growing militarization and aggressive attitude was a huge factor in why the Pakistani government grew disenchanted with the United States after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965. Pakistan had steadily worked herself up to become this hard-lining military state, yet when she needed to defend herself from her biggest and most well-known enemy, she was no longer in a position to do so due to the provisions by which the United States granted her military aid. By that point Pakistan had defined herself based on the might of the military, yet the military was not able to perform without foreign aid—something that bred deep resentment in the Pakistani sphere towards the United States. It can be argued that Pakistan put herself in this position of being economically dependent on a foreign power therefore she had no right to bear any grievances to the United States. However, given the fact that due to the economic, political, and social situation that Pakistan inherited Pakistan at independence she had no choice but to enter such a relationship, coupled with the fact that Pakistan had consistently proven herself to be extremely sympathetic to American interests, the Pakistanis took this spurning by the United States very personally.

While Ayub Khan was an established ally to the United States, his position on foreign affairs was slightly skewed, as per his autobiography. Ayub Khan discusses in detail the need to establish at least two out of three friendly neighbors in South Asian subcontinent for the purpose of security and defense. His logical thinking was that since hostility with India was inevitable, Pakistan should work on improving relations with the Soviet Union, who viewed Pakistan as an

¹⁴⁹ Khan, R., The British Papers, 104
American lapdog, and China, another country governed by communists. However, he does take note that economic assistance from the United States could not be compromised, therefore Pakistan had to “convince the United States that our relations with the People’s Republic of China or with the Soviet Union are not directed against American interests in Asia.”

Despite Ayub Khan’s desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it seems as though Moscow never reciprocated that sentiment towards Khan. According to the Mitrokhin archives the KGB extensively attempted to penetrate Ayub Khan’s closest entourage throughout his entire 11-year career as President of Pakistan. However, they were never successful and instead steadily penetrated the Pakistan Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Corps. In addition to the common attempts at spying on Ayub Khan, a practice quite frequent for intelligence services, the Soviet Union spent the entire duration of Ayub Khan’s era, as well as the era after it, trying to create a negative sentiment about the United States in Pakistan.

The KGB was aware of Ayub Khan’s pro-Western stance and how difficult it was proving to be to penetrate Khan’s inner circle, therefore they must have felt as though the only way to have an influence in the area was by deliberately souring American-Pakistani relations. However, this wasn’t even entirely necessary after the rift in relations during the 1965 War because Pakistani officials turned towards the Soviet Union slightly, as they took a dominating role in peace negotiations.

Despite the lack of true democracy throughout Ayub Khan’s regime, it is important to note how successful he was terms of reform and economy. Up until the War of 1965 his popularity was relatively strong, even though the Pakistani people were not keen on martial law. However, his dominant attitude and go-getter tendencies made him an inspirational figure in the eyes of his people until his ultimate failure at Tashkent. On November 2, 1959 Time Magazine

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150 Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 118-119
151 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 343
reported the many gains Ayub Khan had made thus far in his presidency. Some of the more notable achievements of his administration by that point included the firing of 2,000 corrupt bureaucrats, the collection of overdo taxes, the distribution of 3,000,000 acres of land from the hands of large landowners to needy peasants, the removal of 50,000 partition refugees from mud-based huts to newly made camps in Karachi, the doubling of foreign reserves, a 10% jump in industrial production, and the cancellation of a $25 million International Monetary Fund credit because Khan did not feel like Pakistan truly needed it. These major headways reassured the major Western nations, such as Britain, of Ayub Khan’s competency and tight control over the nation. It is because of this that Ayub Khan received Western backing as a military dictator, despite the fact that the Western powers consistently stood for democracy. British documents reflect the Western fear that “if the present regime were overthrown its successor would be likely…to be of an extremist Islamic nature and, in revolt against the experience of the last eleven years, anti-Western in complexion. It is thus of great importance to the United Kingdom, to the Commonwealth generally (not excluding India) and to the Free World that the present regime should succeed in its immediate objectives and that it should create the conditions in which it can transform itself into a more acceptably democratic form.” Essentially, the Western powers viewed Ayub Khan as a tool to complete their own gains in the region, therefore they were willing to provide him with the procurements he desired for Pakistan, despite the fact that he had a consistent chokehold on democracy in Pakistan—an ideology staunchly defended by the Western nations.

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152 Time Magazine, November 2, 1959 PAKISTAN: The Benign Year http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,892813-1,00.html
153 Khan, R., The British Papers, 118-119
By 1961 the relationship between the United States and Ayub Khan had developed greatly. In July of 1961 Ayub Khan was received in the United States with a grand procession of dignitaries waiting for him and his daughter at the airport. A full military honor was presented to him and President John F. Kennedy welcomed the president warmly with, “it is a great pleasure and great honor for me to welcome our distinguished visitor, President of Pakistan. We are glad to have you here because you come as the head of an important and powerful country which is allied with us in SEATO, which is associated with us in CENTO, which represents a powerful force of freedom in your area of the world”. After President Kennedy’s choice words, Khan expressed how honored he was to receive such a warm welcome and made references to the United States-Pakistani friendship.\footnote{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K2cF72JeKtI} Clearly this visit was intended to further the relationship that both countries had established, considering the United States was using Pakistan in their Cold War strategy. In return Pakistan was reaping the benefits in the form of American sponsored programs in the form of rural development, land reclamation, health, education, social welfare, good governance, and last but not least, major amounts of military aid.\footnote{Ziring, Pakistan, 98}

This major support by major Western powers, despite their position as symbols of the Free World and democracy, could also possibly be attributed to the fact that a dictator who was willing to perform the objectives of the Western world was much easier to control than an entire population with self-determination and free thought. This follows common logic because as stated earlier, President Kennedy remarked upon Pakistan’s role as a powerful symbol of freedom, yet it was a military dictatorship that they were endorsing. The United States would not have taken such a hypocritical stance unless it was necessary in fulfilling their primary aims—that being communist containment. Regardless, this support of Ayub Khan is something
that tightened ties between the United States and Pakistan, helped Pakistan prosper from Ayub Khan’s coup up until the Tashkent Declaration, and also is the reason the war even began. This is due to the fact that the United States backed Pakistan militarily, granted only in terms of Communist containment, but it created a highly aggressive and militarized sensation in Pakistan, which resulted in further aggravations between India and Pakistan. As Pakistan and America united in the fight against Communism, India and Pakistan veered towards war over Kashmir, yet again.

The tension with India erupted in 1965, yet it built up over the course of 1960-1965. It was decided in 1949 that Kashmiri’s had the right to self-determination and that the issue of their accession to India or Pakistan would be established through a plebiscite. However, by the early 1960s, the plebiscite had still not taken place, much to the frustrations of the Pakistani government who viewed Kashmir as a constant reminder of Indian aggression. Both the Pakistani and the Indian youth at this time viewed Kashmir as a way to assert their independence in a more aggressive way; a manner in which they were not able to do in 1947 because they did not win independence through military confrontation. The constant Indian rejection of UN resolutions, the polar opposite stance of Pakistan who tried to work within the UN, further goaded Pakistanis who were anxious to prove a point. As Lawrence Ziring explains in *Pakistan,* “the justification for Pakistan’s existence as an Islamic republic was made to hinge on the liberation of India’s only Muslim-dominant state.”156 Additionally, Pakistan-Indian relations soured throughout the first half of the 1960s due to the Sino-Indian War in 1962. As Ambassador to India Chester Bowles points out in *Promises to Keep: My Years in the Public Life 1941-1969,* when China attacked India in 1962, Pakistan did not choose to maintain a stance of

156 Ziring, Pakistan, 100
neutrality, but rather backed China; rigorously heating up the Kashmir issue even further.\textsuperscript{157} However, China has been an ally to Pakistan, therefore it would not have been in her interests to alienate such a powerful and friendly neighbor.

Pakistan began to feel weary towards the United States, a precursor to the full on feeling of suspicion after the War of 1965, beginning around 1962 through 1963. A bone of contention for most Pakistanis would be that Pakistan consistently defined herself in terms of anti-communist stances and alignment with the west in order to form a deep friendship and bolster Pakistani security against Indian aggression. While the United States did maintain that their aid was specifically allotted to be used against communist forces only, Pakistani officials understood that but did not expect that the United States would make India their biggest receiver of American aid.\textsuperscript{158} Also, just as Nehru had misgivings about the use of American aid for the wrong purposes, so did Pakistani leaders. An article published in the New York Times on December 13, 1964 touches upon how deeply Pakistanis were disillusioned by the United States by that point. The article discusses how despite the fact that by 1964 over 400 million dollars would be allotted to Pakistan in American aid, Pakistani politicians such as Wilayat Ali Khan, son of Liaquat Ali Khan stated, “losing American ‘friendship’ is a good riddance. It was suicidal for us to depend on such a dubious friend as the United States.”\textsuperscript{159} Such negative sentiments were indicative of the anti-American wave that was to come by the 1965 War.

By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and India had established a distinct rapport, mainly to counter the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The Soviet Union,

\textsuperscript{157} Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in the Public Life 1941-1969, 502
\textsuperscript{158} Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 132
previously neutral on the Kashmir issue, began to strongly back Indian claims that a plebiscite was not needed in Kashmir due to the fact that Kashmir was integrally a part of India already.\textsuperscript{160} Despite this strong bond with the biggest Communist power in the world, the United States was still willing to provide India with massive amounts of military aid. According to Ayub Khan, what was disturbing to Pakistani the most was that “India also was receiving military aid from the United States—without accepting any of the obligations that devolve on an ally.”\textsuperscript{161} Essentially Pakistan began to feel like a pawn, being used without being appreciated, in favor of India. It seemed as though India could act however she wanted and still enjoy the benefits of an alliance, while Pakistan had to directly align and prove herself in order to reap those rewards.

The War of 1965 began with the in the disputed territory of the Rann of Kutch, an area where Pakistan effectively made more headway because she had control of the dry ground northern to the Rann. The poor military showmanship of India against China in 1962 and in the Rann of Kutch in 1965 is what motivated Pakistan to fight for Kashmir’s right to self-determination even more. In what is known as Operation Gibraltar, a military plan to liberate Kashmir, the Pakistanis assumed that the Kashmiris would rise up to join the fight and also that Delhi would keep the skirmish restricted to the Kashmir region only.\textsuperscript{162} However, Pakistan was wrong on both of these accounts and the massive War of 1965 was set in motion. Despite the fact that both India and Pakistan made gains in this war, ranging from April-September of 1965, what is important is not the war itself, but the role the United States played in it. Pakistan consistently called upon her greatest ally to apply pressure to India in order to prevent a military loss, however the pleas fell upon deaf ears. Additionally, the US suspension of military aid to

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\textsuperscript{160} Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 132  \\
\textsuperscript{161} Khan, A., Friends Not Masters, 133  \\
\textsuperscript{162} Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, 177
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both India and Pakistan is what resulted in Ayub Khan accepting the ceasefire on September 22, 1965. Despite the fact that the increasingly disenchanted Pakistani public felt as though Ayub Khan gave up too easily, without American aid it was not realistic to keep fighting without major detrimental losses. For example, the declining ammunition, supplies, and lack of military shipments for the Pakistani Air Force, which albeit suffered less losses than India, was a big enough blow to force the end of the war, which is exactly what the United States desired. For the United States, all they cared for in the subcontinent was communist containment and stability in order to prevent any Soviet influence. Such a lack of empathy for Pakistani interests, though definitely an understandable stance for any sovereign nation, is why the Pakistanis were so resentful of their American allies after the war. Additionally, an article in the New York Times on September 22, 1965 indicates that when working out the details of a possible cease-fire with India, the Pakistanis simply wanted “some way to get peace with honor. Honor meant an assurance that at long last the Kashmiris, who are overwhelmingly Moslem, would get a chance to vote on their state’s political future.” According to this article, the Pakistanis wanted to push the Western powers, Britain and the United States, to apply pressure to India in order to make headway in Kashmir in Pakistan’s favor. However, since the United States was not willing to use means to force India to chance its stance on Kashmir, a region which they have constantly referred to as an integral part of the Indian republic, the Pakistanis felt strong sentiments of negativity towards the United States. This could be because Pakistani leaders, such as Ayub Khan, were falling out of favor with the public because of the lack of progress on Kashmir, and

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163 Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History, 178  
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10A11FF3C5F137A8EDDAB0A94D1405B858AF1D3
therefore were losing their strength in Pakistan due to a lack of American cooperation in their interests.

The lack of American support or compassion during this entire conflict is exactly why relations broke down for the first time significantly. For example, in an discussion over the Kashmir War by the American Friends Service Committee in 1965, the conclusion of the piece states that while having to choose between Indian and Pakistan would be disastrous to American foreign policy, “because India is struggling to be democratic that if an either/or choice has to be made I believe the United States must choose India.” Such a statement reflects the thought process of Americans at that time and it is confusing that the matter of democracy was mentioned when the United States itself nurtured a military dictatorship in Pakistan for 7 years at that point because he was willing to do the bidding of America. Additionally, such a thought process is alarming because Pakistan by 1965 was explicitly and directly aligned to the United States and the interests of the United States. Unlike India, who played the non-alignment card to her favor by courting both the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan put all of her eggs in the American basket. Because of this, Pakistani perception of the United States began to wane at this point.

Additionally, the Tashkent Declaration was a huge moment in Pakistani history in which the people were in utter and total disbelief. Pakistan felt extremely robbed by the 1949 UN Resolution on Kashmir, which offered no definitive solution since India refused to follow through with a plebiscite, and they felt as though they received even less at Tashkent. The Pakistani public strongly maintained that no headway had been made on Kashmir; an issue which seemed to define Pakistani relations with India. The Pakistani perception at the time was

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165 Khan, R., The American Papers, 89
166 Khan, R., The American Papers, 76
that Ayub Khan was simply bowing to the will of the United States, partly because Foreign
Minister Bhutto agitated public opinion by making it sound as though he personally would have
gone on with the war if he had the choice, even though he backed Ayub Khan’s decision.\textsuperscript{167}

While it is true that once Pakistan settled and accepted cease fire, their relationship with
the United States perked up a bit, the public sentiment towards the United States had never been
lower.\textsuperscript{168} It seems as though Pakistan was disappointed with American involvement in the war
and the Tashkent Agreement in every way possible. For example, in a telegram to the
Department of State on January 6, 1966, American Ambassador to Pakistan Walter McConaughy
reported of a meeting with Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi who complained bitterly of a lack of
“even-handed US treatment of India and Pakistan, citing alleged US indifference to Indian press
attack on President Johnson compared to strong exception taken to critical Pak press.”\textsuperscript{169} At this
point it seems as though Pakistanis viewed every action of the United States with suspicion. An
article published in the New York Times on September 23, 1965 discusses how “one of the most
ticklish aspects of the de-fusing job will be to persuade the Pakistani people that the United
States, which had supplied the planes, tanks, and many of the guns that enabled Pakistan to beat
much larger Indian forces to a standstill, had not been India’s ally in the fighting.”\textsuperscript{170} Despite the
fact that the Pakistani army fought with arms supplied by the United States, the handling of the
Kashmir issue and the economic cutoffs were enough to effectively ruin the Pakistani perception
of the United States as a friend.

\textsuperscript{167} Khan, R., The American Papers, 78
\textsuperscript{168} Khan, R., The American Papers, 98
\textsuperscript{169} Khan, R., The American Papers, 97
\textsuperscript{170} New York Times, September 23, 1965 Pakistan Wary Of U.S. Stand In Conflict With India
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For example, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a great deal about the fact that the United States did not play a leading role in the Tashkent negotiations. During an evening meeting on January 12, 1966 Bhutto questioned Ambassador McConaughy on why the United States would not step in and provide a UN provision for resolution of the Kashmir dispute now that the Soviet Union had laid the groundwork for Tashkent.\textsuperscript{171} Ambassador McConaughy made the claim that while the United States aimed to play a role in the subcontinent, it never agreed to get directly involved in negotiations for Kashmir.\textsuperscript{172} However, it is curious that if the United States was such a great friend to Pakistan and desired stability in the subcontinent, why would she not want to step in and assist in fixing the biggest problem, which threatened the security of the region. It can be inferred that because the Americans did not have a direct interest in Kashmir at the time, they did not feel the need to intervene in favor of Pakistan. This is another reason for feelings of negativity from Pakistan towards the United States after 1965.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War probably would not have come to major blows had both India and Pakistan had known that the United States would cut military aid to the nations. While it is understandable that the United States provided Pakistan with arms and ammunition solely to combat communism, the Pakistanis clearly devoted themselves to serving American interests, hence why they felt utterly betrayed after the American stance of not getting involved in 1965.

\textsuperscript{171} Khan, R., The American Papers, 103
\textsuperscript{172} Khan, R., The American Papers, 104
CONCLUSION

The struggle for Pakistan is one that can be traced ideologically before the turn of the 21st century. The establishment of Muslim Empires across India for thousands of years before independence created a distinct Islamic culture that spread across the Indian subcontinent and eventually formed the basis for Pakistan. Chaudri Muhammad Ali has written about Hindu and Muslim interaction over time and explains how they “have left their mark on each other. And yet they have remained distinct with an emphasis on their separateness. They have mixed but never fused; they have coexisted but have never become one.”173 Throughout the first half of the 21st century prominent Hindu and Muslim leaders of India joined together to fight the colonial power of Great Britain, but it was not until Muslim leaders realized that never would they be able to fully thrive under a Hindu dominated government without proper reassurances that the momentum for Pakistan truly began rolling.

After overcoming all odds, all while obeying the laws of the land, Muslim League members were astonished at being gifted their precious gift of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. However, with this gift came serious problems that the newly formed government had to deal with. After losing their two men whose vision created this new state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan was left during it’s formative years without a competent leader to herald it into the Cold War Era. Because of this political vacuum, Pakistan eventually had to learn how to rely on foreign aid to survive; especially after military conflict with India from the beginning of their newly found independence. This early military standoff has characterized Pakistani-Indian relations throughout their entire history together and has forced them to consistently look at each other with increasing suspicion as the years go by. This inability to get

173 Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, 1
along has resulted in outside powers being able to penetrate the subcontinent and exert their own agendas into the region.

The Cold War brought the United States and the Soviet Union directly into the subcontinent as Pakistan attempted to align herself with a strong power to bolster her against Indian military aggression. The entire period of the 1950s was spent working towards building a strong alliance with the United States in the hope that it would ensure Pakistani security against India. While Pakistan did align completely to the United States, when it came time for Pakistan to call upon the United States for aid against India, they could not assist her because it was against the foreign policy of their nation. This action, though diplomatically correct, is what caused the first major rift in relations between the United States and Pakistan.

This period is crucial to the American-Pakistani relationship because it was the first time that Pakistan realized that the United States was going to do whatever suited it’s own interests before that of it’s allies. The Pakistanis naively thought that the United States would apply pressure to India during the 1965 War because Pakistan had pledged herself to communist containment, however because the United States had no reason to get involved in the Kashmir issue, they subsequently left Pakistan to deal with the issue themselves. This marks a change in Pakistani politics and public perception of the United States. Although the two nations have gone through many ups and downs over the 66 years of Pakistani independence, when the negative moments present themselves, the Pakistanis are more prepared and not as surprised. This perceived betrayal is exactly what prompted President Ayub Khan to write a book, while still in office, titled *Friends Not Masters*, which is indicative enough to what Pakistani leaders wanted the United States to be to them after the 1965 War.


