Implications of Nazi Past on West German Politics and the Cold War: A Case around State Secretary Hans Globke

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Introduction

In one of his major works, *Europe - a History*, British historian Norman Davies wrote, “After 1949 West German politics were, frankly, unexciting.”¹ With deepest respect to Professor Davies, I cannot agree with this statement in the least. At inception, the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD, West Germany) faced scandals, inadequacies, and problems with continuities across different eras, constituting an exciting field for historians to research. Recovering from the devastation after the Second World War, induced by the National Socialist terror, West German politicians, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and Germans in general had to combat extremely negative international public opinion to regain trust, deal with military occupation, address the issues surrounding a newly divided country, situate itself in the Cold War dynamic, and “come to terms with” its Nazi past.² One of the most exciting controversies of the early BRD, which encompasses and reflects all of these problems, revolves around the figure of Dr. Hans Globke. A civil servant and ultimately a state secretary in the Federal Chancellery, Globke accompanied the first head of the West German state, Konrad Adenauer, as his closest advisor for all of Adenauer’s fourteen years in power.

Thus, examining closely the years 1949-1963, this study aims, first, to investigate the political responses to the controversy around Globke, who held one of the most powerful posts in the new democratic West German government, despite being regarded by many as a

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¹ Norman Davies, *Europe – a History: a Panorama of Europe, East and West, from the Ice Age to the Cold War, from the Urals to Gibraltar* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 1074.

² ‘Coming to terms with Nazi past’ (German: Vergangenheitsbewältigung) is an important part of postwar German history, analyzing, explaining, and interpreting the process of political and cultural reckoning with the legacy of the Third Reich. Historiographical debates on this topic gained substantial momentum in the late 1980s in the course of Historikerstreit (historians’ quarrel) discussions (See e.g. Rudolf Augstein, ed. *Historikerstreit. Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung* (Munich: Piper, 1987)) One of the most prevalent explanations points out to the tense political and international atmosphere of the Adenauer Era as the reason for the delay in a scholarly debate, which could have been taken up only with the passing of time. See e.g. Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich: C.H Beck, 1996).
representative of the Third Reich. Second, it contributes to the discourse on the Cold War through the lens of Nazi past, taking into special consideration the development of West German-American relations and the escalation of tensions between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). And lastly, it offers multi-faceted, new levels of interpretation of the Globke case, as seen from a domestic, diplomatic, and a Cold War perspective.

The central argument that I present in this thesis revolves around the question of pragmatic politics. Although other motivations of various actors concerned here may be hard to pinpoint, as all these actors represented multifarious political and ideological options, many of them, I argue, have forsaken a legitimate discussion of the past for the benefit of the present. Globke – with Adenauer’s active help – benefited from the unclear elements of his personal history, in that he was allowed to mold retrospectively the narrative of his past. Similarly, many other Germans in the early years of the Federal Republic chose not only to look forward to the future, but also tacitly agreed overall with Globke’s astonishing assertion that he should be allowed to write his own past. They saw themselves prepared to accept blurry lines between “perpetrators” and “resisters,” and the politics of the Adenauer era encouraged this sort of acceptance.

This encouragement and acceptance on the part of the West German government – as well as on the part of the American diplomacy and secret services – was very convenient, I posit further, because it would allow the Federal Republic to regain political and economic strength in the face of rising Cold War tensions. Skilled businessmen, intelligence officers, and bureaucrats – Globke being the example of the latter – became an invaluable asset in the eyes of the Western allies. And with the Communists behind the “Iron Curtain” as a foe now, the Americans and the
British regarded the former Nazi enemies as useful in fighting the Cold War. In this sense, Globke served as a switch point between the American and the German institutions, the secret services in particular, to monitor the developments in BRD as well as in GDR. Additionally, I will attempt to demonstrate that Adenauer capitalized on the Cold War dynamic that brought the United States and the Federal Republic closer to each other, as it would help BRD integrate into the western economic and security alliance.\(^3\) I believe this to be one of the important factors behind the cementing of the German division and the continuation of the Cold War.

An additional line of argument of this thesis stresses the irony of supporting Globke toward the end of helping West Germany to establish itself firmly in this sort of a ‘Western Alliance’, although through his former and even present acts consequently threatened this alliance. This threat came from East Germany, which in its anti-fascist ideology disagreed with employment of former Nazis and in its Cold-War-motivated strategy internationalized the Globke case. This inevitably created tensions that could – and to some extent did – undermine the image of the Federal Republic. This dichotomy demonstrates the extent of cynicism with which the Western and Eastern powers formulated utterly different responses to the same problem. This problem, namely the need to resolve the conflict between an individual’s past and his usefulness in the new government and society plagued the officials and intellectuals of the Federal Republic, which had to reintegrate itself into a world newly redivided ideologically and economically into two.

These and other problems also face historians today. Scholarship on the Globke case remains inadequate. Before the 1990s, it was limited to contemporaries debating the personal, political, and moral aspects of Hans Globke’s work. And so, in 1980, Klaus Gotto, the director of

\(^3\) Cf. Dennis L. Bark, David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany: From Shadow to Substance 1945-1963*, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988): xlvii. They argue that “West Germany’s road to full integration in the West is … the most important aspect of the Federal Republic’s history.”
the Archives for Christian Democratic Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, published a
collection of essays written by Globke’s friends and colleagues, in a volume entitled Der
Staatssekretär Adenauers. In spite of its bias, the usefulness and significance of this publication
is enormous, in that it gives a hint about the personality and work environment of Globke.
Further, this volume shows the extent of support Globke enjoyed from among important political
and intellectual figures of the time, such as Karl Carstens, who at the time of its publication
became the President of the Federal Republic. The first major academic work on Globke
appeared in 1992, in form of a doctoral dissertation by Norbert Jacobs, in which he quantifies
and interprets the controversy as reflected in domestic and, to a lesser extent, international press.
Jacobs posits that the Globke case evolved primarily around the contradiction of the man’s
engagement with the Nazi administrative apparatus and the claims of his work for the
Resistance.

In 2009, two publications expressing diametrically different positions on Globke
appeared. First, Der Mann hinter Adenauer by Jürgen Bevers is a journalistic approach to the
case. This work, as its subtitle suggests, traces the rise of Globke from a Nazi collaborator to a
prominent figure of the early Federal Republic, and highlights the scandals connected to
Globke’s activities under Adenauer. Bevers rarely reaches for support in Globke’s collected
papers, he first draws on Globke’s connection with the American intelligence, without reaching
any wider conclusions, and relies on selective oral history accounts. In his strictly negative
attitude toward Hans Globke, Bevers does not give much credibility to the evidence of the man’s

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6 Jürgen Bevers, Der Mann Hinter Adenauer: Hans Globkes Aufstieg vom NS-Juristen zur Grauen Eminenz der Bonner Republik (Berlin: Ch.Links, 2009).
involvement in the anti-Hitler resistance. He does, however, very finely portray the political atmosphere of the 1949-1963 Bonn. Second, Erik Lommatzsch published the most comprehensive volume so far on Globke, in which the figure of the later State Secretary and his actions in the political realm are at the center of the discourse.⁷ Breaking with the conventional negative view of Globke within the German and international public opinion, Lommatzsch focuses on the man as an actor on the West German political scene and not as an object of propagandistic attacks and political strategies. Although his book is compliant with the highest academic standards, Lommatzsch’s pro-Globke bias is evident. My own work does not focus on the person and activities of Hans Globke per se and does not attempt to judge his actions. Instead, it uses the controversy around Globke as a case study for a multi-faceted approach to larger political and international problems. In the spirit of a transnational approach⁸ and the “new diplomatic” current in historiography, this kaleidoscopic study tries to demonstrate how different significant aspects of domestic and Cold War politics manifest themselves in the Globke case.

In order to fulfill these aims, this work uses written documents and press articles from between 1949 and 1963. The source materials come from various collections, mostly from Globke’s declassified papers housed at the Archive for Christian Democratic Policy and from declassified files of the American Central Intelligence Agency. Additional sources were obtained at the German Federal Archives in Berlin and Koblenz, and the collections of the Society for the Prevention of World War III in New York. The documents taken into consideration reflect the workings of Hans Globke, his relationships with other actors on the German and international political stage at the time, the attacks and campaigns led against him, his correspondence, and

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correspondence about him. Those carrying out research on Hans Globke frequently point out several methodological obstacles. First, because of the highly controversial nature of the case, the materials carry a large degree of bias, one way or the other, which must be taken into consideration more so than in some other historical assessments. Second, the peculiarity of Globke-Adenauer work relationship encouraged verbal communication between the two. Therefore, it is likely that a majority of the information and viewpoints they exchanged was never recorded, remaining beyond the reach of the researchers. Third, even if the documents were among the textual records, some are still inaccessible to scholars. Although the opening of them may influence perspectives on the case in the future, presently a considerable portion of the Globke papers remains secret, as they include sensitive institutional and private materials, the control over which rests with the Globke family. Although taken into consideration, I abstained from drawing on additional materials, such as those concerning the responses from France and the United Kingdom. While important for other aspects of West German and international politics, I chose to focus on a small, but critical, range of perspectives, in order to demonstrate the vast and complex nature of the thought processes within and connections among the different players: West German political leaders and other West Germans, military and civilian American officials, and organs of the East German leadership.

It is crucial to keep in mind the backdrop of the larger historical context in which these events are situated. After the Allied victory over Nazi Germany in May of 1945, the country was divided into four sectors, American, British, French, and Soviet.\(^9\) One of the priorities for the occupation authorities was purification of the German society and administration from Nazi

\(^9\) For overview of West German chronology see Bark and Gress, *A History.*
elements in a process collectively referred to as “denazification.” Far from being systematic and unified, denazification took different forms across the zones and time. In its initial stages, denazification in the Western occupation zones focused very broadly on depopulating all administrative offices and investigating anyone suspected of having connections to the Nazi Party. By late 1945, the procedure changed, concentrating on individual cases. Overall, the process of purging the former elites proved to be rather short-lived and unsuccessful, as many former civil servants and industrialists returned to public offices as early as 1947. This caused a heated debate and feeling of injustice among some in West Germany and abroad for the next decades, while millions of others quietly accepted and even favored the strategy, as permitting Germans to collectively put their past behind them.

The Allied Control Council (ACC) governed each of the occupation sectors separately until 1947, when the American and British occupation authorities combined their controlled areas into an economically unified Bizone (A Trizone was established as France joined in 1949). When it became clear in 1949 that the former Allies did not agree at that moment to consolidate the German state into one due to overshadowing Cold War issues, an official division of Germany ensued. The Federal Republic came into being in May of 1949, when the local West German governments approved the new constitutional Basic Law and the military governors of the ACC surrendered their powers. This, however, did not yet end the occupation. A newly created Allied High Commission for Germany (HICOG) kept control over the developments in the BRD until 1955. The eastern German Democratic Republic was founded from the Soviet-occupied Zone in October of the same year as the Federal Republic. With the 1949 victory of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the first postwar West German parliamentary elections,

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the former mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, whom in 1933 the Nazis forced out of office due to differences in ideology and whom the Gestapo arrested on multiple occasions, became the Chancellor of the new Federal Republic.

Although many West Germans hoped to bring the country’s capital back to Berlin at some point, it was not feasible in 1949. Therefore, Bonn, a small city on the river Rhine in the state Nordrhein-Westphalia, became the new capital, chosen over the larger Frankfurt am Main. Konrad Adenauer, a born Rheinlander whose home happened to be in Rhöndorf, a suburb of Bonn, exerted heavy influence in this matter. In this study, following convention, I often refer to West Germany as the Bonn Republic. The Chancellery found its seat at the Schaumburg Palace, also used here metonymically to refer to the West German government. In this setting, Hans Globke worked and directed the West German administrative apparatus.

Born on September 10, 1898 in Düsseldorf, Hans Josef Maria Globke was a son of the artistically talented Sophie Erberich and a local cloth merchant with Polish roots, Josef Globke. Hans Globke excelled in school and in fall 1916, he enrolled at the Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Bonn, pursuing a law degree. From November 1916 to November 1918 Globke served as a gunner on the Western Front in the First World War, which forced him to defer his studies until after the armistice. The financial hardships encountered by the Globke family in light of unexpected passing of the father in 1920 did not preclude Hans from continuing his education; in fact, it forced him to accelerate his studies, receiving his doctor of law degree (magna cum laude) in May 1922. While at the university, the devoutly Catholic Globke joined a student association belonging to a larger organization of Catholic German Fraternities (Cartellverband, CV). His

11 Cf. Bevers, Der Mann, 10-12.
12 Similarly, ‘Pankow’ is a reference to the East German government.
13 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke; Bevers, Der Mann; Gotto, Der Staatsssekretär; and undated fragments of Globke’s unpublished Memoirs, in Archive for Christian Democratic Policy, St. Augustin [later referred to as ACDP], Nachlass Globke [01-070]-071/3.
membership contributed in the 1950s to a series of political controversies around Globke’s activities in the Chancellery and a broader public trepidation, because of their longstanding political views. In 1922, Globke became a member of the German Center Party (Zentrumspartei), a moderate, Catholic-oriented political body that played a significant role in the interwar Weimar Republic, until it was dissolved by the Nazis in 1934. Arguably, the Center Party surrendered to the Nazis in order to protect its members, thus, in a way, allowing Hitler and the NSDAP to pass the Enabling Act and give him unrestricted political power.

Upon passing his bar exam in 1924, Globke entered the circles of civil service. First as a probationary judge and later in various offices of police administration in Aachen, Globke quickly climbed the ranks of the German bureaucratic ladder. In December 1929, Globke joined the Prussian Interior Ministry in Berlin as a councillor responsible primarily for constitutional and legal matters.

As of November 1934, that is some twenty months after the seizure of power by Hitler and the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker’s Party), the governmental institutions of the Weimar Republic were amalgamated into the Nazi state apparatus. Therefore, the former Prussian Interior Ministry became the Reich Ministry of the Interior, in which most employees including Globke remained at their posts. Headed up by powerful Nazi politician Wilhelm Frick, the Interior Ministry was central in “coordinating” – or “Nazifying” – the whole of civil society, and in implementing the successive elimination of rights for political and “racial” “enemies” of the new Reich. Still active in the field of legal and constitutional questions, Globke was an advisor for name change and marital status matters (Namens- und Personenstandsreferent), and from 1937 he worked in the department of “international questions concerning citizenship and option contracts” (Internationale Fragen auf dem Gebiet des Staatangehörigkeitswesens und der
Optionsverträge). In these positions, Globke advised the law makers and drafted some regulations himself, such as the “Name Change Law” of 1938 and the “Decree on German Citizenship in Sudetenland” of 1939. His most notorious contribution to the Nazi legal system – and the one thus most significant for future discussions on Globke – was the co-authorship of the *Commentary to the German Racial Legislation*.\(^{14}\) The work provided interpretation and practical guidelines to the legislation collectively referred to as the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935, which codified the anti-Semitic ideology of the Nazis and stripped “non-Aryans” of civil liberties.

As of 1938 Globke became an undersecretary in the Ministry, a post he kept until the end of the Nazi regime. This high position demanded from Globke an absolute level of loyalty to the Nazi regime, which he attempted to show in 1940, when he applied for membership in the NSDAP. A few months later, however, Globke received a rejection on the grounds of his earlier close connections to the Catholic Center Party. Moreover, according to documents and information appearing after the war, all throughout his presence in the Reich Interior Ministry, Globke had secretly collaborated with the anti-Hitler resistance branch of the Catholic Church, also playing a role in the assassination attempt on Hitler from July 20, 1944. The same sources allege that he remained at his post only at the request of leaders in the Catholic resistance. As the war ended in 1945, and the new West German state was emerging, new opportunities for specialists arose. With these new opportunities arose challenges and controversies that followed Hans Globke for the remainder of his life, which ended on February 13, 1973.

Thus, the following chapters will inspect these controversies from different angles. The first section focuses on the social and political developments in the Federal Republic. It will trace the trajectory of Hans Globke’s rise to power at the side of Chancellor Adenauer, his works as

the State Secretary, as well as the criticisms that accompanied him for all of the fourteen years in office. The second chapter deals with actions (and reactions) of the East German leadership to the Globke case, and its attempts to internationalize the issue of former Nazis wielding power in Bonn. One of its main aims is a portrayal of the controversy around Globke not as an exclusively intra-German problem, but as an element of a larger Cold War struggle between East and West. The West German relationship with the American public – a representative of the said West – is at the core of the third section. In it, I present the differing attitudes among Americans toward the Federal Republic and its policies of overcoming the past. This chapter also illuminates the degree to which Bonn actively tried to adjust the narratives of its past in order to secure its future as an ally of the United States. As the last chapter will demonstrate, however, the American secret services were not interested in German Nazi past, as they focused on the present Communist threat. Toward this end, the Central Intelligence Agency gladly cooperated with powerful West German officials such as Globke, who, conveniently positioned as Adenauer’s advisor, had unrestricted access to the Chancellor all throughout the man’s fourteen years in power.
Chapter 1: The Globke Case in the Federal Republic of Germany

Heated political and social discussions on Nazi past in West German present characterized the fourteen years of Hans Globke’s time in service of Chancellor Adenauer. Employed on the grounds of his expertise and organizational talent, Globke became both an agent\(^1\) and, to a much larger degree, an object of the political processes in the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) and on the international stage. This chapter will attend first, to the controversy around Adenauer offering the office of a head of the department and then a position of a state secretary to Globke. Initially, this controversy stemmed from his activities in the Third Reich. Although never a member of the Nazi Party, among other things, Globke had co-authored the legal commentary to the Nuremberg Race Laws. This involvement in the unjust legal apparatus of the preceding regime prompted Globke’s opponents to formulate arguments against his presence in a public office of the democratic West Germany. Globke’s defenders, Adenauer among them, argued based on other evidence to the contrary, emphasizing Globke’s work for the anti-Hitler resistance. This sort of defense, grounded in only one version of the assessment of the man, suggests how inconvenient an honest debate on the Nazi past was. Moreover, the conflict between one’s past and the present-day need for technocrats becomes evident in the Globke case, demonstrating certain continuity across these different political and ideological systems, being quite characteristic of post-fascist states.\(^2\)

Second, it will examine the arguments against Globke’s political activities as state secretary. Because of the nature of his work, dealing primarily with personnel matters,

\(^1\) The thesis offered by Erik Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke (1898-1973): Beamter im Dritten Reich und Staatssekretär Adenauers* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009), suggests that contrary to the general view of Globke as an object of domestic and international politics, he was as influential of an actor in this field.

\(^2\) Cf. Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972): 331-352 in which he points similar dynamics taking place in the successor regime to the Vichy Republic. He argues, that “many Frenchmen who served Vichy continued to do their jobs under the new regime,” because of their valuable expertise in running the bureaucracy.
information politics, and intelligence services, a lot of Globke’s activities remained undisclosed to the general public – and the parliamentary opposition. This mist of uncertainty around the man led to his gaining a reputation as the ‘gray eminence’ of the new Bonn republic and as some historians put it, the creation of a myth around Hans Globke. Arguably, Globke became a representative of undemocratic proceedings of the Third Reich, which now characterized this lack of transparency around the actions of the State Secretary. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the nature and implications of some pro-Globke voices within the Federal Republic. For multiple reasons Globke had a number of advocates not only in parliamentary and administrative circles, but also among some private citizens. These people openly contested the attacks against his person, demonstrating strong support for Globke on the basis of personal and political convictions. By dismissing the attacks on Globke as propaganda, however, these people contributed to a delay in reckoning with the Nazi past in the Federal Republic.

Many sources confirm the thesis that Adenauer did not know Globke personally until the very late 1940s, even though some do not exclude the possibility of the future Chancellor being aware of Globke’s existence and his earlier works. Different sources suggest also that many officials of the new postwar state had heard about or dealt with Globke earlier and were impressed by his abilities, and thus, gladly recommended him for various posts. When in 1946 Adenauer gave the General Secretary of the German liaison to the British occupation authorities names of possible advisers and collaborators, Globke’s name appears on the list, though misspelled as ‘Glopke’. This suggests the limits of Adenauer’s own direct knowledge of the

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3 Appears among others in Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*.
man. At around that time, Globke was searching for a post in the Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) local government, becoming as of July 1, 1946 the treasurer of the city Aachen. He held this post until August of 1949, when Globke was appointed the vice-president of the NRW audit office. Globke’s access to these offices had already depended on the results of his denazification process. He was interned first by the Americans starting in August of 1945, but a few months later, the British authorities expressed a wish to consult Globke as a specialist on electoral law, which required his transfer into the British occupation zone. Thus, the British were in charge of Globke’s denazification. They believed Globke was not highly involved in Nazi propaganda or war crimes, which in the end allowed the occupation authorities to classify him as ‘entlastet’ (acquitted) in the denazification process. In light of their need for Globke’s expertise and the resulting cooperation, one could question the fairness of the British authorities’ judgment. The major favorable factor, which impressed the occupation authorities and which helped Globke retain his reputation, were the testimonies of his partaking in the anti-Hitler resistance.

The topic of resistance against the Nazi regime holds a place on its own in modern historiography, but deserves a brief consideration for the purpose of this study. The act of resisting a political power from within can take various forms and historians draw a line between these types of engagement against Hitler. In the case of the Third Reich, the resistance and opposition was not a unified movement; organizations and individuals within Nazi Germany often formed their own cells, through which they attempted to obstruct and undermine the unjust system and the war effort. Among these, figure the members of the political left, such as the

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7 Biographical elements from Lommatzsch, Hans Globke.
8 British Authorities in Land North Rhein-Westphalia, “Dr. Hans GLOBKE – City Treasurer of AACHEN,” in an Air Pouch to US Foreign Service Department, May 9, 1950, Globke CIA Files 0012.
Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party (KPD), and underground groups like “Rote Kapelle” or “Die Weiße Rose,” which could be characterized as a prolonged and systematic resistance movement. On the other hand, there were “those practitioners of occasional, intermittent, conditioned, or partial resistance – in other words the vast majority of those who had bothered to oppose the regime” – who organized very loosely and with a particular goal in mind, the July 20 Movement being the case in point. These people might have not opposed the Nazi regime in general, but wanted to counteract some particular policy. In these terms, one must approach the issue of differentiating a resistor from a collaborator – a matter that is important in assessing Hans Globke’s stance. Additionally, it is important to remember that the discussion on resistance became a political one in the immediate postwar years. The debate attempted to shape the notions of who could be considered a resistance member: how to recognize the achievements of the left-wing groups (which proved inconvenient to the conservatives, included among the Western Occupation forces, in the face of the Cold War), and how to account for individual participation and motives.

Hans Globke had a record of engagement in oppositional activities. However, due to the secretive nature of such operations, the only hints at his work for the resistance come from postwar testimonies of other people. Globke managed to obtain a voluminous dossier of so-called Persilscheine – declarations of integrity written by victims or enemies of the Nazi regime that served the purpose of assuring the potential persecutors of the man’s innocence and decency during the Third Reich (this colloquial term – stemming from a brand of laundry detergent, Persil – implied often the washing away of earlier sins). Globke’s affidavits were issued by prominent

11 Large, “A Beacon,” 245.
12 The group of officers and civil servants around Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg, which attempted to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944.
personalities with anti-Nazi convictions who were acquainted with him and his activities. The leader of the Catholic-oriented Center Party, Jakob Kaiser, a member of the July 20 conspiracy and a close friend of Globke’s, Otto Lenz, lawyer Herbert Nath, and the bishop of Berlin, Konrad Graf von Preysing all wrote on behalf of Globke. Most spectacularly, the declaration by Cardinal von Preysing reveals a strongly debatable aspect of Globke’s work under the Nazi regime.

Globke, Preysing wrote,

informed me and my colleagues about Plans and decisions of the Interior Ministry. He shared with us knowledge about draft laws that were kept in secrecy, and thus provided us with materials for protests and threats… Globke’s most valuable services for our aid to the persecuted Jews and Half-Jews, consisted of his reports and timely warnings… In order to assure its effectiveness, this sabotage had to be kept in utmost secrecy. Thus, it remained unknown to all those who were not involved in it, how much the German Jews owe to Dr. Globke.\(^\text{14}\)

These often reproduced lines served later as a counterargument to the attacks against Globke, but in the immediate years, they facilitated his return to governmental positions. Moreover, the legal adviser to the Berliner Ordinariate, Wilhelm Happ, stated in his “Declaration under Oath” that Globke “often intended to leave the civil service… Only upon our urgent requests to continue working, and through that, help us and the whole Resistance movement, he decided not to hand in a resignation.”\(^\text{15}\) The claim that Globke remained active as an assistant in the Interior Ministry of the Third Reich solely on the request of the Catholic Church, additionally supplemented the positive impressions about Globke. Later however, his adversaries contested this characterization in public on moral grounds, as the oppositional work of the Church itself was a subject of contention. With the signing of the Reich Concordat in July 1933, the Catholic Church in Nazi Germany secured certain rights, which the bishops did not want to endanger by provoking

\(^{14}\) Kardinal Konrad von Preysing, Der Bischof von Berlin, January 18, 1946, ACDP 01-070-93/2.

And although the official position of the German Church seemed rather expedient – this is not to say that the Church actively cooperated with the Nazis – it did not actively oppose it on a large scale. However, there were cases, when clergy actively fought against the regime. The bottom line here is, it is hard to refute the claim that Hans Globke cooperated with Bishop von Preysing and an oppositional circle around the Berlin diocese. Questionable remain only the claims of the extent and significance of this cooperation.

Despite such a seemingly positive record, Globke was consistently associated with the co-authorship of the Commentary. Already in late spring of 1948, some officials of the German administration expressed their concerns about possible problems with Globke. In this spirit, Karl Arnold, at the time Christian Democratic Minister President of NRW, informed Konrad Adenauer of his reservations to Globke holding an office. As Arnold explains, even though Globke’s technical qualifications were adequate, “some serious fellow party members brought it to his attentions that an appointment of Globke would only do him a disservice, because in case of his appointment as the head of personnel in [a future] Interior Ministry, one should certainly expect attacks.”

The said attacks would pertain obviously to Globke’s earlier involvement in the Nazi legal apparatus. These concerns suggest that the post-war German leadership took seriously the possible risks of employing people with a Nazi past, which could consequently lead to impaired reintegration of the German state into an international community. Also, in a national context, negative reactions to the CDU endorsing people with a burdened history could damage the party’s political aspirations.

One widely debated thesis of why Adenauer embraced Globke throughout the years of his leadership supposes that the Chancellor wanted to demonstrate his acceptance of the large

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17 Karl Arnold to Konrad Adenauer, June 9, 1948, BKAH, Nachlass Adenauer 08/63.
portion of the German population, which in one way or another collaborated with the Nazis. However, it is hard to disagree with Norbert Frei, German historian of the period, who rejects this position saying that “even without Globke, one could see how extensive were the reintegration opportunities offered by the Chancellor.”\(^\text{18}\) Whereas in the immediate postwar years the Allies, each one separately within its zone, unsuccessfully attempted to conduct a comprehensive reckoning with the Nazi past, the Adenauer era witnessed a much more evident slowdown or even a regression of the denazification process. Frei writes, “In fall of 1949 – right after the opening of the first Bundestag – all factions attempted to end, or even reverse, the political cleansing... Above all, they tried to repeal punishments and provide integration opportunities to the benefit of millions of former party [NSDAP – MS] members...”\(^\text{19}\) In view of the politics of the era, therefore, it becomes infeasible to assume that Globke would serve as an example of a successfully reintegrated Nazi collaborator, especially when the Bonn government included a number of people, who were involved in the Nazi regime to a far more perceptible extent (e.g. Gerhard Schröder\(^\text{20}\), Theodor Oberländer, Reinhard Gehlen) than Globke. Also, it is important to keep in mind that Globke never belonged to the Nazi Party – as his application was rejected on the grounds of his past connections to the Weimar-era Catholic Center Party.\(^\text{21}\)

A much more persuasive argument in the debate on Adenauer’s decision to employ Globke lies within the idea that the Chancellor observed a certain technocratic principle. In light of the government formation process after 1949, the expertise of technocrats like Globke could have had a strong appeal. In fact, the contemporaries attributed to Globke later a leading role in

\(^{19}\) Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, 13.
\(^{20}\) Not to be confused with Gerhard Schröder, the SPD Chancellor 1998-2005.
\(^{21}\) Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 60-1.
the creation of the federal administrative apparatus. As Jürgen Bevers indicates in his book on Globke, Adenauer indeed wanted to acquire the best people for the job, and Globke seemed perfect for the field of personnel politics, which later proved to be true as Globke masterminded the organization of the civil service and allocated posts for the benefit of the Party and his superior. Bevers, however, implicitly suggests that the connections on ideological level also influenced Adenauer’s choice. Both Adenauer and Globke were born Rheinlanders, Catholics, and members of the Center Party before the NS-era. One should however, be careful with this sort of assumptions, as the role these factors played cannot be easily substantiated. The question why Adenauer employed Globke, therefore, remains open for debate and speculation.

Indisputable is the fact, however, that the nomination of Hans Globke – the commentator of the Nuremberg Laws – as Adenauer’s Head of the Chancellery stirred a lot of controversy in the Federal Republic. Just as Minister President Arnold predicted in 1948, Globke’s appointment prompted attacks against his person, as well as against Chancellor Adenauer and his Christian Democratic Union. Historian Norbert Jacobs has quantified and analyzed all German (East and West) press utterances on the case Globke between 1949 and 1973. Jacobs established that the first newspaper article attacking Globke appeared on October 28, 1949 (about a month after his taking the office) in Telegraf, a daily newspaper out of West Berlin (affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SPD)). Of much greater significance and socio-political reaction was a November 9, 1949 article “Wer ist Dr. Globke?” (Who is Dr. Globke?) printed in the likewise left-leaning Frankfurter Rundschau. In it, excerpts from Globke’s Commentary to the

23 Bevers, Der Mann, 106.
25 Ibid., 74.
Nuremberg Laws supported the biting criticism against Adenauer’s aide. This, and a series of editorials that followed the initial publication, posited that Globke was not particularly suitable for the post, because of his work in the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{26}

Nevertheless, the first expressions of criticism against Globke prompted also the first open statements of support, which demonstrate the nature of handling the past. Franz-Josef Wuermeling, also a state secretary at the Chancellery, expressed this support in a letter to the editors of the \textit{Rundschau}, which appeared on November 25. In it, Wuermeling mentioned Globke’s negative attitude towards the Nazis, as well as his merits as a resistance fighter. Furthermore, he defended the decision to appoint Globke, reminding readers that the man’s activities under Hitler “were a subject of extensive verification, first by the British and the American, later by the German authorities. Based on numerous convincing materials (...) neither the English or the American authorities have raised objections against reemployment of Dr. Globke.”\textsuperscript{27} These words by Wuermeling advert to a recurring aspect of the Globke case, namely the reaffirmation of one version of reality. The argument that the British occupation authorities absolved Globke became the official line of defense for the State Secretary’s supporters, even if many agreed that the denazification process included inconsistencies and failures. Thus, the British characterization of Globke became a defining element of the portrayal of his own past and present.

Wuermeling further mentions the acceptance Globke received from the communities that one would expect to antagonize Globke: “Upon inspecting [Globke’s] dossier, even the representative of racially, religiously, and politically persecuted, Dr. Auerbach of Munich,

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\item \textsuperscript{26} Cf. “Globke denkbar ungeeignet,” \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, November 9, 1949. This article on Globke appeared on November 9, the eleventh anniversary of the Reichskristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass), which undoubtedly was not a coincidence.
\item \textsuperscript{27} F.-J. Wuermeling, response to “Wer ist Dr. Globke?” \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, November 25, 1949.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
expressed a positive opinion about reemployment of Dr. Globke." The episode around Philipp Auerbach is very interesting. Born in a German-Jewish family, Auerbach spent most of the war in a concentration camp. After the fall of the Third Reich he was appointed commissioner of the Bavarian government for the racially, religiously, and politically persecuted, which made him one of the first Jews to enter the postwar German political life. His work for and with the victims of Nazism focused among other things on obtaining financial compensation for the survivors.

His personal history and later position as a kind of representative of Holocaust survivors rendered Auerbach’s remarks an effective argument for Globke advocates. However, the candor of his statements about Globke can be questioned in the light of correspondence between Globke and his friend from the Nazi times and a colleague in the Chancellery, Otto Lenz. In a letter from November 18, so in the midst of the Frankfurter Rundschau campaign, Hans Globke wrote to Lenz about “the apparently organized campaign,” hoping that "the issue would wind down again by itself." Additionally, he asked Lenz to talk to Auerbach about it.

In his response from November 22, Lenz reported to Globke about his conversation with Auerbach, who supposedly "does not want to cause you [Globke] any trouble. He has heard very positive opinions about you. I don’t know, however, if the press campaigns will stop with this." Regardless of any possible pressures close friends of Globke could have exerted on Auerbach, the fact remains that the representative of ‘racially’, religiously, and politically persecuted individuals voiced a positive opinion about Adenauer’s chief of the Chancellery. And although in the long run it did not prevent further attacks on Globke, it certainly assured him and his boss Adenauer, that they could count on support from at least some strategic anti-fascist quarters.

28 Wuermeling, response to “Wer ist Dr. Globke?” Frankfurter Rundschau, November 25, 1949
30 Hans Globke to Otto Lenz, November 18, 1949, ACDP, Otto Lenz Nachlass 01-172-016/1.
It should not come as a surprise that the attacks against Hans Globke originated in the left-leaning, SPD-affiliated press. Not very long after the first publications, SPD politicians also voiced their outrage with Globke and used it to polemicize against Chancellor Adenauer from the floor of the Bundestag. During one of the most important parliamentary sessions of the year – the budget debate – Gerhard Lütkens of the SPD, who occupied himself with foreign matters, voiced strong criticism against the Adenauer government. One of the main motifs in his speech was international perception and respect towards the new democratic Federal Republic, and the employment of former Nazis in relation to this deeply sought respect. After mentioning other names, Lütkens directed a question toward the Chancellor,

It is known that he [Globke] was the commentator of the Nuremberg laws. Perhaps he was also a contributor to the legislation, which was reflected in the Nuremberg laws? (...) Today I ask the Chancellor, if he is aware that Mr. Globke testified as a witness at the Nuremberg trials, and if he is aware of the statements [Globke] made there. Finally, I want to ask the Chancellor, if he is aware (...) of other particular events that could have taken place in that context.³²

This part of the speech was accompanied by shouts of encouragement from the SPD faction, demonstrating the extent to which the Globke case animated any political debate. The Chancellor responded to these questions with his famous lines, “the case of Mr. Globke has been meticulously checked by the occupation authorities. I believe that a German should not be more meticulous than the occupation authorities.”³³ Thus, using the same strategy of reaffirming the early British judgment on Globke, Adenauer had hoped he put to rest the attacks, precisely with reference to the perceived watchful eyes of the outside world. Yet in the event, Lütkens’ speech launched what became the long and intense crusade of the political opposition against Globke, and in fact, as most historians agree, against Konrad Adenauer.

³³ Konrad Adenauer, speaking in Bundestag on March 30, 1950, 55th Session, 1st Bundestag, 2055.
Thus, the attacks continued almost immediately with the SPD taking political measures against Globke and the plans of restructuring the administrative apparatus. And even though the core of the matter pertained to the present circumstances in a political realm of Globke’s activities, his Nazi past remained a vivid element of the debate – a running motif in early West German politics. In the spring of 1950, members of the SPD submitted to the Bundestag an interpellation regarding a possible breach of the Constitution. The parliament debated on the matter on July 12, and a SPD representative, Adolf Arndt, presented the grievances. The reason for the interpellation was the government’s plan to recreate the *Berufsbeamtentum* (civil service system). On behalf of the Social Democratic Party, Arndt argued generally against the idea, which dated back to the Prussian system, and which to Arndt was a hindrance to a positive development of democracy and tolerance.\(^{34}\)

Furthermore, Arndt expressed concerns regarding the policy of confessional discrimination that characterized the personnel politics of the Adenauer government. In a country divided mostly between Catholics and Protestants, the question of administrative influence played a significant role in the early years of the Federal Republic. As some opponents alleged at the time,\(^{35}\) the Catholics and Christian Democrats Adenauer and Globke wanted to assert the prevalence of their ilk in the key positions in the Bonn state apparatus. Globke refuted these claims, and, historians agree, that he in fact wanted to introduce parity between the representatives of both denominations in administrative positions, though to be sure, the general West German population was slightly more Protestant than Catholic.\(^{36}\) Arndt, however, pointed

\(^{34}\) Adolf Arndt, speaking in Bundestag on July 12, 1950, 73\(^{rd}\) Session, 1\(^{st}\) Bundestag, *Plenarprotokolle des deutschen Bundestages*, 2630.

\(^{35}\) Cf. Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 248. The handling of confessional matters such as parity and favoritism became a subject of political debate and the grounds for accusations against Globke and Adenauer primarily in the first half of their time in office.

\(^{36}\) Bevers, *Der Mann*, 115.
to the fact that personnel files, all of which at some point or another went through the hands of Hans Globke, included information on an official’s religion – K for Catholic or E for Evangelical Protestant.\(^\text{37}\) This indeed was a violation of the new Basic Law (Article 33), which gave the SPD basis for raising the interpellation. This was also a reason to ascribe to the Chancellor authoritarian rule, as he and his majority Christian Democratic Union would have the power to control the appointments of the civil servants to most administrative posts. Arndt complained that the parliamentary opposition did not have a say in who is appointed for the civil service posts. He justified the need to consult the opposition with the larger context of “international validity of the new German democracy.”\(^\text{38}\)

Concerned about West Germany’s appearance on the international stage, Arndt proceeded to discuss the suitability of German civil servants at home and abroad, who were burdened with a ‘brown past’. He stated that SPD, which he represented, did not call for a renewed denazification. On the contrary, they “were for an equal treatment of ‘any old’ party members, but [they] were against a silent conspiracy of former party members, who press for a renewed takeover of power in the realm of personnel policy.”\(^\text{39}\) This fear over a return of the old elites, or any sort of political cliques, was grounded in the rumors that the people responsible for personnel politics in Bonn practiced unfair, discriminatory patronage when assigning posts within the Federal system. Arndt specified this by mentioning the connections and the “underground battle” between different student fraternities and associations, such as the Cartellverband to which Globke and a number of other ministerial officials belonged.\(^\text{40}\) This issue would become a recurring theme in the Globke case, but in July 1950, Arndt still focused


\(^{38}\) Arndt, 2632.

\(^{39}\) Arndt, 2631.

\(^{40}\) Bevers, 114.
on the Nazi past: “Occasionally, the camaraderie of the student organizations joins the camaraderie of those men, who feel burdened by their political past from the Hitler era.”

Speaking about the violations in personnel politics Arndt mentioned in passing individual cases from the Interior and the Justice Ministries. He admonished the Justice Minister, Thomas Dehler (FDP), for his ”noted aversion… to the red color,” due to which “his ministry is void of anyone, who would somehow appear under suspicion of exhibiting socialist tendencies.” These words of the socialist politician reflected an important Cold War aspect of West German politics. The conservative factions, which embraced the integration into the Western capitalist system from the beginning – and likewise received support from the Western Allies – worried about the agenda of the left-leaning parties such as SPD, not to mention the Communists (KPD). Although purely political motives for excluding from administrative positions the members of the oppositional socialist camps also are a significant factor in this matter, the larger ideological fears became highly evident.

Eventually, Arndt criticized Adenauer for exhibiting a weak stance against these unconstitutional perpetrated, and pointed out to Globke as the reason behind Adenauer’s lack of action. “I am not able to find a different reason for this deplorable fact, other than that the spoils system, the denominational discrimination, and the ties to National Socialism are centrally based in the office of the chancellor and are personified by Dr. Globke.” In the eyes of the political opposition, therefore, Globke became a symbol, a representation of all wrong in the Federal Republic, what has contributed to the strengthening of the Globke mythos.

This Bundestag speech gave Arndt the status of the most ardent political disputant of Globke. Arndt implied that Adenauer’s chief of the Chancellery stood in the way of the trust,

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41 Arndt, 2631.
42 Cf. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics, 8, 36-7.
43 Arndt, 2633.
“which the young democracy needs essentially inside and outside [of its borders].”\textsuperscript{44} The main charge against Globke was naturally his co-authorship of the Commentary, which Arndt described with the following words: “Whoever commented academically on such a thing, or crime, as the Nuremberg laws, exposes oneself to the accusation that whatever he did there, cannot be described as anything else, but as legal prostitution.”\textsuperscript{45} Arndt, who himself was a lawyer, stated that he has read Globke’s work and in contrary to the notions propagated by Globke’s advocates, he did not find the Commentary to be of any help to anyone. And even if, Arndt went on, Globke tried to undermine the Nazis, the mere fact of his participating in the Hitlerite legislation made him an accomplice of that terrorist regime and thus unfit for a position in the present Federal Republic. Eventually, the statements made by Representative Arndt, and by Lütckens on March 30, 1950, became the official opinion of the SPD faction for the coming years. Arndt reminded Chancellor Adenauer about their stance almost a year later, in a letter in response to rumors that the attitude in the Social Democratic camp might have changed,\textsuperscript{46} and in the SPD published newsletter in March 1956.\textsuperscript{47} The attacks on the State Secretary however, would come in waves,\textsuperscript{48} often prompted by a political event involving Globke.

As the attitude of the parliamentary opposition (the SPD being the major one, but also KPD and other smaller parties of the left) did not change for the remainder of the Adenauer-Globke era, as the publicity around Globke increased, so did the concerns among members of the ruling CDU. Of interest is the March 17, 1961 letter of the members of a local CDU cell from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Arndt, 2633.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Arndt, 2633-4.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Adolf Arndt to Konrad Adenauer, June 12, 1951, ACDP, 01-070-114/2.
\item \textsuperscript{47} „Dokumentation zum Falle Globke,“ in „Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst,“ March 12, 1956, ACDP, Nachlass Lenz 01-172-093/2.
\end{itemize}
Motivated by all the talk about Globke, the provincial party leaders demanded a “clear and objective statement to the problematic around the person of Mr. Globke.” The Raesfelder CDU justified their concerns with the insecurity about the results of the upcoming election in the fall. Some three weeks later, the Head of the Chancellor’s office, Manfred Baden, responded on behalf of Adenauer to the request from Raesfeld. Baden kindly explained that in the meantime, on March 10, the Chancellor repudiated all accusations against Hans Globke, who “continuously enjoys [Adenauer’s] trust.” Moreover, with the letter Baden sent some clippings and copies of articles that present the State Secretary and his past in a better (perhaps more objective) light. Also, after praising Globke’s work for the Resistance, Baden wrote, “I believe, it is a duty of every good German to give a due consideration to those merits [referring to the work for the Resistance – MS]. Out of respect for these men, who back then were active in the oppositional circles, one should allow them to exert public influence in the Federal Republic.” This unshaken faith in Globke’s innocence – the acceptance of this version of his past – characterized Adenauer and many other sympathizers of Hans Globke. However, to people who perhaps were not well acquainted with him and who were influenced by only one side of the ‘propaganda,’ because the other ‘good’ side was not reaching them, Globke remained an accomplice to the Nazi regime. Through this lens, CDU members such as these from Raesfeld worried about their political futures, especially in the course of the local and national electoral campaign, during which the SPD used all their trumps to discredit the Adenauer government.

The Raesfeld letter appeared in response to a larger international context, namely the Eichmann case. Captured and brought before Israeli justice in the spring of 1960, the former SS-

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49 Willi Hoffmann, A. Büsken (Ortsunion Raesfeld) to Konrad Adenauer, February 25, 1961, ACDP, 07-001/10096.
50 Manfred Baden (Leiter des Kanzler Buros) to Willi Hoffmann (Vorstand der Ortsunion Raesfeld der CDU), March 17, 1961, ACDP, 07-001/10096.
man Adolf Eichmann (in detail in Section 2) reawakened the debate on Nazism and the German Nazi past – and present – in the Federal Republic as well as internationally. As his trial proceeded, authorities in Germany worried, Eichmann might implicate Hans Globke into his case, a fear on which the East German agitation capitalized. It is around that time then, that the publicity about Globke reached its peak, with as many as thirteen hundred press articles published in 1961 alone.\(^{51}\)

As Globke and the highest echelons of the CDU correctly anticipated a strengthening of the defamation campaigns as a result of the Eichmann case, Globke allegedly took steps to minimize the influence this matter would have on the 1961 parliamentary elections. Included in Bevers’ study,\(^{52}\) but omitted by Lommatzsch, are the American intelligence sources, which referred to an agreement Globke was supposed to have made with Willi Brandt. Brandt was the Social Democratic mayor of West Berlin 1957-1966, running as the SPD candidate for chancellor in 1961. The political opponents tried very hard to discredit him as a traitor, who emigrated during the Nazi era.\(^{53}\) Thus, in view of the developments in the Eichmann case and the upcoming elections, CIA sources reported, Brandt “had had a talk with State Secretary Hans Globke just before Christmas [1960] on the latter’s initiative. Globke told him that he expected a new campaign against himself,” prepared by the East German Communists.\(^{54}\) Globke opined it would be harmful to the Federal Republic to take part in propagating the defamations. Further, “Globke said that if Brandt could pledge that his Party would refrain from exploiting Communist charges, he would prevail upon the CDU not to make personal attacks upon Brandt.”

\(^{51}\) According to Jacob’s findings.

\(^{52}\) Bevers, Der Mann, 172-5.


that such a meeting took place and this deal was agreed upon, it would support the assumption that the SPD slanders against Globke served additionally the purpose of political expediency. Then if a leading politician – Brandt – was ready to ignore, even for a moment, the traditional line of argument presented by Arndt, for his own political benefit, it diminishes the extent to which Globke’s Nazi past was contested on moral grounds.

In fact, the CIA reports further that some SPD members found it unwise to make “such a commitment for personal reasons,” and criticized Brandt for it in private. Sources from Globke’s collection, however, do not corroborate that this agreement ever came into effect. What additionally speaks against the enforcement of this deal on a wider scale are the continued mutual attacks in the course of both the electoral campaign and the Eichmann trial. In a conversation with the American Consul in Frankfurt, Wayland Waters, on January 30, 1961, a SPD politician and Hessian Attorney General, Fritz Bauer, stated that he and “the SPD would continue to the maximum juridically feasible and politically profitable point to push allegations of complicity in Nazi war crimes against Globke.” The political profit would include naturally an accrual of trust toward SPD, which could have threatened the position of the CDU and Chancellor Adenauer.

In the early 1960s, Hans Globke began facing intensified attacks from institutions and groupings outside of parliamentary politics as well. The most prominent one was the Verband für Freiheit und Menschenwürde (Society for Freedom and Human Dignity, VFM) headed by a certain Alfred Dietrich. The VFM concerned itself with matters of the victims of the Third Reich and often took stance against former Nazis in postwar West German public sphere. In a confidential note without an addressee, found among Globke’s papers, though, Manfred Baden

55 Globke CIA Files 0176.
56 Wayland B. Waters to the Department of State, Washington, February 7, 1961, Globke CIA Files 0178.
presents information about the man. Dietrich was supposed to have had good connections with the Social Democratic Attorney General, Fritz Bauer, as well as with the socialist left and other pro-European, non-governmental organizations. The matter around Dietrich is unique in a sense that through the correspondence one can notice a change over time in Dietrich’s attitude toward the State Secretary. In March of 1961, the VFM sent a letter to Globke, presenting him with the Society’s wish – that is, that he resign from his post in the Chancellery. Dietrich assured Globke, that as members of the Society, they did not have the intention to participate in the ongoing smear campaigns, nor did they want to bring up any singular accusations regarding Globke’s Nazi past. To the contrary, Dietrich claimed that he wished to warn Globke that the general disposition of other associations of persecuted by the Hitler regime might intensify soon. This intensification would be a result of a certain Wolfgang Müller, a journalist and a leading member of an Association of democratic Resistance Fighters (ZDWV), who managed to impugn Globke via the faintest praise. This was supposed to provoke a “severe” reaction in these circles of society.

While Dietrich’s letter from March can be described as relatively polite, a message from May 10 has a dramatically changed tone. The reason for this change, as one can extract from the text, was Dietrich’s learning about Globke’s involvement in the Nazi policy of changing the first names of German Jews to Israel and Sara. To be sure, on January 5, 1938 the Reich government issued the “Act on Alteration of First and Last Names,” and in August 1938 an addendum to this law, affixing additional ‘Israel’ or ‘Sara’ to all Jewish names. In his study, Lommatzsch invokes a statement by Globke, albeit without hinting at a specific source material,

58 Baden (Manfred), „Vermerk,“ December 4, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1.
59 Alfred Dietrich to Hans Globke, March 18, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1.
60 Alfred Dietrich to Hans Globke, May 10, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1.
61 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 75. For more details on Globke’s activities in the Third Reich also refer to Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 43-104.
in which Globke admitted that he has been responsible for working out the legal issues. However, he claimed he had been trying his best to delay these coercive measures, “hoping that the interest for it would finally be lost.”\textsuperscript{62} Even though his hopes in this particular matter were in vain, “Globke explained later that he succeeded at least to prevent the motions of the Party (NSDAP) offices and the Reich Interior Minister, Wilhelm Frick,” according to which hyphenated names were to be introduced. In this case, all German Jews would have been identified with a last name suffix ‘Judd’, ‘Jüd’, or ‘Itzig’,\textsuperscript{63} the last one being an extremely pejorative term at the time.

Back to Dietrich’s letter. One can assume that the knowledge of Globke’s contribution to the name-change law was not widely known until it must have been brought up as a part of the campaign around the Eichmann trial. Dietrich writes, “We did not know the name of the person responsible for this (…) but we cursed him, regardless of who he might be!”\textsuperscript{64} The reason for the curse and the eventual animosity towards Hans Globke was, as Dietrich revealed, the suicide of his wife, who as a reference “to the nefarious defamation of Jews,” signed her last will with ‘Sara’. Lastly, Dietrich declared Globke “Hitler’s servant,” guilty of the death of his wife, stepson, and millions of others, by whom Globke “is imprecated and cursed.” Globke, Dietrich wrote further, did not have the right to want his past forgotten, and to grotesquely pinpoint his “abundant merits,” for “there is no spot in the Federal Republic for the sidekicks from the most dreadful period of German history.” This letter achieves two things. First, it underlines the central element of this thesis, verbalizing the socio-political outrage at the attempts of those individuals encumbered in the Nazi Regime to refine the reality by ‘wanting to have their past forgotten.’ Second, the personal and emotional dimension it contains, suggests that Dietrich’s

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. Lommatzsch, \textit{Hans Globke}, 76.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{64} Alfred Dietrich to Hans Globke, May 10, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1.
motives abstract from simply political ones, and demonstrate, in turn, a larger array of reasons why one would show concerns – if not animosity – toward people like Globke. And while the question of motives is hard to answer with the given sources, Dietrich represents a larger class of those, who might not have used the Globke case out of political expediency, but genuinely believed in the moral responsibility of the Federal Republic to remove former Nazi collaborators from office.

Towards this end, and now officially as the chair of the VFM, Dietrich continuously submitted letters to both Globke, pressuring him to resign, and to Adenauer with a demand to relieve the State Secretary of his duties. In a letter to the Chancellor from November 13, 1961, Dietrich complains that his previous messages were acknowledged as received, but inadequately answered by only assistants in the secretariat. The occasion for this particular letter was a reaction of the VFM to a televised interview with Adenauer, in which the Chancellor allegedly remarked, “No, I don’t see a reason” to make any changes in the post of the state secretary. “The public opinion is shocked by this answer,” Dietrich wrote, especially since “Dr. Globke solicited many times for his dismissal, because of his health. Likewise, Mrs. Globke asked [the Chancellor] to release her husband.“ As a matter of fact, other sources corroborate the implication that Globke intended to leave office on numerous occasions. Each time, however, Adenauer rejected these intentions. Moreover, Dietrich assured the Chancellor that in this case it was not a subversive campaign of the Communists, but an act on behalf of moral responsibility

65 Verband für Freiheit und Menschenwürde (A. Dietrich) to Konrad Adenauer, November 13, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1: 1.
66 Cf. Bach, „Konrad Adenauer und Hans Globke,“ 183; and Bevers, Der Mann, 202.
to the survivors of the Nazi terror, and an expression of concern regarding Germany’s image in the West.\(^{67}\)

According to Dietrich’s words, the above-mentioned letter to Adenauer remained unanswered, a fact that he brings up to the attention of an even higher instance – the President of the Federal Republic, Heinrich Lübke.\(^{68}\) Interestingly enough, Lübke himself had been involved as an engineer in building concentration camps, earning him the moniker ‘KZ-Baumeister Lübke (Camp Builder Lübke), which became a subject of controversy and attacks in West Germany on its own. As VFM, Dietrich and other members also prompted the President to take action. They themselves “have self-evidently refrained from personal attacks on Dr. Globke, but [they] maintain the opinion, that he does not belong in this position.” In a sense, Dietrich’s correspondence with the two highest representatives of the West German state, can be seen as a voice of dissatisfaction or disappointment with the policies of Konrad Adenauer, which did not have an underlying explicit political purpose, but rather aimed to satisfy personal and moral qualms connected to the debatable past of Hans Globke.

By this time, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, concern for the past of Globke and other former Nazis who remained in public positions had begun to manifest itself more prominently in the expression of West Germans outside the channels of formal political power – and even beyond prominent political organizations, such as Dietrich’s. In 1961, Reinhard-M. Strecker published a book – resembling more a collection of annotated copies of documents by and about Hans Globke from the Third Reich – entitled *Dr. Hans Globke. Aktenauszüge - Dokumente*.\(^{69}\) Strecker at that time was a doctoral student at the Free University of Berlin and an activist of the

\(^{67}\) Verband für Freiheit und Menschenwürde (A. Dietrich) to Konrad Adenauer, November 13, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1: 2.
\(^{68}\) Verband für Freiheit und Menschenwürde (A. Dietrich) to Heinrich Lübke, December 14, 1961, Bundesarchiv Koblenz [from now on, BA Koblenz], B 122/4975, Fiche 4.
Socialist German Student Union (SDS), who in 1959 became known for organizing the “Ungesühnte Nazijustiz” (Unpunished Nazi Justice) exhibit, which focused on Nazi jurists who still held offices in the Federal Republic. Almost immediately after the publication of Strecker’s book, Hans Globke opened a lawsuit against the publishers, accusing them of libel and dissemination of false materials about his person. Globke won, forcing the publisher to stop the printing of new editions and to recall the remaining 27,000 copies. Lommatzsch points out that Strecker’s book on Globke corresponds in style to the publications of the East German propagandists and includes facsimiles of documents with stamps of the East German archives, arguing that the Communists from the former Soviet Zone helped Strecker out, contributing to the smear campaigns against Globke. At that time, Strecker himself was under suspicion of cooperation with the Communists. According to a high-level classified document, Strecker established contacts in “East Berlin circles, through which his alleged connections to the ‘Ausschuß für Deutsche Einheit’ …and to the East Berlin Soviet Embassy.” These contacts, provided that they in fact had taken place, reflect the nature of inter-German politics. Despite the political and ideological divide, connections between one regime, or its representatives, and civilians on the other side of the border existed and contributed to the social and political discourse, such as in the case of Strecker.

71 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 319; and Bevers, Der Mann, 177. Some documents used by Strecker could hardly be considered libelous as they corroborated the facts of Globke’s involvement in Hitler’s bureaucracy. At the time, however, the West German authorities claimed many of these documents were falsified – a case that still demands historical investigation.
72 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 319; and Frei, Hitlers Eliten, 294.
73 East German propagandist department - in detail in the next chapter.
74 Message Tgb. Nr.: 6066-61 VS-Vertr. to State Secretary of the Chancellery, November 20, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-103/2. Document is without a clear author – the signature is illegible – but judging by the codification at the top of the page, it is very likely that the said document came from the Federal Intelligence Service (BND).
For the remainder of the 1950s, especially after 1953 when Globke became the State Secretary in the Chancellery, domestic political issues constituted the core of the charges brought in against Globke, even though no one forgot about the controversy around his involvement in the Hitler regime. As he established himself firmly on the side of Konrad Adenauer, the political opposition initiated the period of criticizing Globke’s political activity as Adenauer’s ‘gray eminence’. This negative reference to the State Secretary, used widely at that time, came to symbolize the perceived as unclear, undemocratic practices of the administration in Schaumburg Palace, alluding to certain continuities carried over from the Third Reich, which manifested themselves in Globke.

The perception of Hans Globke as Adenauer’s ‘gray eminence’ can be attributed to the lack of transparency surrounding his person, actions, and interactions with the Chancellor and other key government figures. In this regard, West German press referred to Globke occasionally as “the man in gloom,” “a pussyfooting Sphinx,” “a black-gray eminence,” or even “the spider in the Bonner web.” What contributed to the creation of this ‘gray eminence myth’ was the fact that relatively very little information about Globke ever leaked out from the Schaumburg Palace. The majority of exchanges between the Chancellor and his adviser took place verbally, which posed a problem for the public then and remains an obstacle for researchers today. Nevertheless, close contemporaries of the two, such as CDU politician Franz Josef Bach, describe the cooperation of the Chancellor and his closest advisor as professionally very close, characterized by trust and mutual loyalty, but at a distance on personal level. Reflecting on the daily walks through the gardens of the Schaumburg Palace, Bach talks about Globke accompanying Adenauer as “the most devoted, most loyal, most knowledgable adviser and co-worker, who

76 Cf. Bevers, Der Mann, 12; Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 168.
almost imperceptibly, one step behind, quietly listening with his head tilted forward followed Adenauer.”\(^77\) The successful collaboration of the two men can be attributed to the compatibility of their characters. While Adenauer was a first-class statesman, who preferred an authoritarian style of governing – thus the development of the term Kanzlerdemokratie (Chancellor democracy) – Globke demonstrated all the characteristics of a loyal civil servant, a better listener than a talker, who shied away from the spotlights of publicity.\(^78\) Eugen Gerstenmeier, another CDU politician and the president of the Bundestag 1954-1969, went even further, positing that Globke became an institution in himself, which “did not cater to the state, not even to the Chancellery; it was characterized by devoted service to the Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer only.”\(^79\)

What impressed, or professionally satisfied, Adenauer was not only Globke’s full commitment and availability, but according to Horst Osterfeld, the head of the foreign department at the Chancellery, also his “immense, ever-present knowledge. He knew the résumés of all politically interesting men, their customs, their conduct before, during, and after the war… For the Chancellor, he was a walking encyclopedia, a comprehensive and practically irreplaceable information service.”\(^80\) While on the one hand such skills could be regarded as impressive and valuable, on the other hand, they could have resonated negatively with an image of an omniscient official of an authoritarian regime, who was ready to use his skills against any enemy of the state.\(^81\) Just how much Adenauer relied on Globke’s advice becomes apparent in a relatively few written sources. For example, when the government was preparing a health

\(^{77}\) Bach, “Konrad Adenauer und Hans Globke,” 177.

\(^{78}\) Cf. Bach, “Konrad Adenauer und Hans Globke,” Klaus Gotto, Der Staatssekretär Adenauers.


\(^{80}\) Horst Osterfeld, “Der Staatssekretär des bundeskanzleramtes,” in Klaus Gotto, ed., Der Staatssekretär Adenauers, 102.

\(^{81}\) Globke was often compared to Joseph Fouché, the French Police Minister under the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte. Cf. “Bürovorsteher im Vorraum der Macht,” Der Spiegel, No. 14, April 4, 1956.
insurance reform in the summer of 1960, Globke was away on vacation. Adenauer however, wrote to him apologizing “that he has to disturb his holiday. But [he] would like to ask for [Globke’s] advice on the health insurance matter.” And as the anecdote has it, anytime when during a Bundestag session Adenauer turned his head back, his State Secretary Globke knew exactly what background information or tips he should whisper in the Chancellor’s ear.

Globke’s being a man of few words also became a Bonn legend. Die Welt reported in January of 1959 that during a Bundestag debate a certain representative Bucher attacked the State Secretary Globke, exclaiming the man was intolerable for his post. “Immediately, representative Schneider from the Deutsche Partei turned into Globke’s defender, shouting: ‘[Globke] has one good virtue, important for his office: he can keep silent.’ Even the Chancellor, having heard this, burst into laughter.”

The public and political concerns around the obscure workings of Globke were not merely a figment of journalistic and oppositional imagination, but were grounded in factual circumstances, perceived as a violation of the law and a threat to the reemerging democracy. One of such matters was existence of the so-called Reptilienfonds, or slush funds, approbated for the exclusive use of the Chancellery. According to Der Spiegel, these confidential accounts amounted in 1956 to some 12.5 million D-Marks, and were used to “supervise the governmental propaganda tool, the Press and Information Office (...) and to exercise power over the two largest federal secret services, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution [Bundesverfassungsschutzamt] (...) and the intelligence organization of General Reinhard

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82 Konrad Adenauer to Hans Globke, July 4, 1960, ACDP, 01-070-052/2.
83 Bevers, Der Mann, 120.
Gehlen.\textsuperscript{85} Erik Lommatzsch in his study on Globke contests the charge that the State Secretary had the funds at his disposal, saying that Globke rather used his connections to other individuals in order to make needed financial means available.\textsuperscript{86} In the light of the fact that Globke had excellent connections within the Bonn administrative system,\textsuperscript{87} the thesis proposed by Lommatzsch deserves consideration, albeit it would be hard to prove or disprove with the source material that Globke actually had personal control over any extra-budgetary funding.

Another, perhaps even more significant occasion for criticism of Globke and the amount of power he wielded was the absence from government offices of Konrad Adenauer, who in November of 1955 fell sick with pneumonia. Adenauer trusted Globke to such an extent that whenever the Chancellor was not around – or as in this case was unfit to work – he left the businesses of the Chancellery to his closest adviser, who functioned as a de facto deputy chancellor, even though the de jure position rested in the hands of Franz Blücher, a minister for Matters of the Marshall Plan (later the Ministry for the Treasury).\textsuperscript{88} The West German and international press heavily commented on the issue,\textsuperscript{89} and inasmuch as the case Globke might have been overworked at that time already, journalists quickly noticed the political implications of Globke’s alleged power, oftentimes supplemented by the highly frustrated parliamentary opposition – and coalition. The \textit{Frankfurter Neue Presse} published already at the beginning of November 1955 an article whose title, “Globke-Demokratie?” (Globke Democracy) – implied that “for few weeks, the State Secretary Globke stood – and in a certain way still stands – at the


\textsuperscript{86} Lommatzsch, \textit{Hans Globke}, 175.

\textsuperscript{87} Cf. Bach, “Konrad Adenauer und Hans Globke,” 179.

\textsuperscript{88} Lommatzsch, \textit{Hans Globke}, 339.

\textsuperscript{89} Cf. Jacobs, “Der Streit,” 82. I disagree on this with Jacobs, who posited that even though in the context of Adenauer’s illness the media paid attention to Globke’s influence, the topic was quickly exhausted, averting attacks against the State Secretary
top of the federal executive branch.”90 Because “Dr. Globke, as the only one, got the access to
the sickbed of the Chancellor (...) he filtered the official statements about Chancellor’s state of
health,“ what made everyone in Bonn realize “in what kind of danger the German Federal
Republic was.“ Also the independent, left-liberal weekly news magazine, Der Spiegel devoted its
April 4, 1956 issue to Hans Globke. In it, among other things, the journalists elaborated on the
circumstances of Adenauer automatically delegating power to his State Secretary, and not to the
deputy Chancellor Blücher. The article also reflected on the fury of the parliamentary opposition,
quoting the comment SPD made at the time, “the chancellor’s name is Globke.”91 The issue of
unconstitutionally delegated power to Globke reached even beyond the borders of the Federal
Republic. The British New Chronicle’s correspondent from Bonn also occupied himself with the
matter, writing that “Objections are mounting in Germany to the unobtrusive civil servant, who
(…) suddenly became the most powerful man in Bonn. (…) He has allowed only one cabinet
minister, Foreign Secretary Heinrich von Brentano to visit [Adenauer].”92 The journalist
moreover, highlighted the concerns of SPD, leaders of which protested that “an official ‘who
does not have the confidence of the whole coalition, let alone the opposition, should not hold all
the reins in his hands.’” The caption under the accompanying photo of Globke read “Dr. Hans
Globke – distrusted…disliked…” correctly assessing the attitude of West German politicians to
the State Secretary of the Chancellery. In a much broader picture, the situation represented by
Adenauer entrusting his closest and most trusted aide mirrored the larger problems of the early
Federal Republic. The development of the Kanzlerdemokratie, manifested in Adenauer’s
consistent practice of exercising very close control over governmental and administrative

90 „Globke Demokratie?“ Frankfurter Neue Presse, November 7, 1955.
91 „Bürovorsteher im Vorraum der Macht,” Der Spiegel, 18.
decisions, genuinely worried many within the BRD as to what course the young democracy in a post-fascist state would take.

It seemed however, that the American secret services and the state department, with whom the West German government – and most importantly Globke – cooperated, did not perceive the situation as threatening. Although this subject will be discussed in more detail later, at this point it crucial to understand Globke’s position in the Chancellery in respect to his perception by the most important ally. Representative is the opinion included in a memorandum sent in April 1956 by a CIA agent to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles. The five-page memo seems as a rather fair portrayal of Hans Globke, based on observations, conversations, and the mood in German political and public circles.93 Regarding Globke’s Nazi past, the source states, he personally believes “a man so deeply implicated in one of the worst features of the Third Reich [the Nuremberg Laws – MS] has no business to play such an all-important role in the Adenauer Regime.” He, however, trusted the postwar documents and explanations on behalf of Globke and acknowledged Globke’s merits in service of the anti-Hitler resistance and assistance to the oppressed. In terms of Globke’s political activities as Head of the Department and after 1953, as the State Secretary, the CIA man referred to Adenauer’s closest aide per “Globke Pasha – as the Bonners calls him,” pointing to his alleged influence on the political matters of the Federal Republic. Evaluating Globke’s actions, the American observed:

Journalists and politicos find it more striking and simpler to say or write, ‘Globke did it,’ than to seek for any real explanation (…). There is no doubt that he does dominate all the nerve centers of the Government – the Press and Information services & the Gehlen organization depend directly on the Bundeskanzleramt, the Defense ministry unofficially, the CDU-party-organizations naturally. Thus the pressures he can bring, aided by the ‘Reptilienfonds,’ are considerable. And in view of the fact that to him the Opposition is the enemy, you can be sure that he uses his power in a strictly partisan manner.

93 Memorandum for DCI, April 12, 1956, Globke CIA Files 0104.
In this brief excerpt the CIA agent managed to accurately summarize the main charges made against Globke by the contemporaries and modern investigations. Further in his report however, the agent qualifies his statements, clarifying that in spite of the access to information, money, and the Chancellor, Globke is not “a man of superior political intelligence,” and all his actions are connected to “his favorite word: German stability,” which in the end mean “namely a perpetuation of the CDU-regime.” In this sense, the picture of Globke from the report of the CIA representative differs from the convictions of CDU politician Eugen Gerstenmaier. This dichotomy certainly complicates the assessment of Globke’s professional and political intentions. However, a fellow Christian-Democrat Gerstenmaier would have had more reasons to exhibit bias in such a case.

Another part of Globke’s alleged political activities mentioned in the CIA report referred to his function as the coordinator of secret services. Although Globke’s relationship with these institutions will be investigated in detail in a later section, a certain aspect regarding this matter pertains to domestic West German politics. A British author of espionage novels, John Le Carré, in a recent interview with a German newspaper described the actions and interactions of various secret services in early Bonn as a “nearly incredible comedy.” This comedy had many actors; the Gehlen Organization (the “Org”), Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz’s organization (Heinz Dienst), and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) competed with each other in the field of providing the government with intelligence. The Org, supported by the Americans as an international intelligence agency with strategic Cold War aims, stood under governmental control of Hans Globke. The Heinz Dienst, on the other hand, was supervised by the ‘Blank

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Office⁹⁶ – future Defense Ministry, and the BfV belonged to the Interior Ministry. Thus, in the early 1950s, the West German intelligence and information services were in chaos, giving rise to rumors that Globke and Adenauer manipulated all of these institutions. The extent to which Globke made use of all these institutions for the benefit of the Adenauer government and the CDU remains hotly debated among Globke scholars. Whereas people like Bevers champion the thesis that it came natural to Globke to meddle in the political affairs from the background and in secrecy,⁹⁷ other researchers such as Lommatzsch maintain that the claims that “Globke himself commissioned espionage and used the BND for his own purposes, may be exaggerated.”⁹⁸ To support the opinion of Bevers could prove problematic, because he substantiates his position largely with secondary sources and press articles, as well as CIA files, which however are ambiguously interpreted. Lommatzsch, on the other hand, bases his thesis on primary documents from the Globke papers, which, as he correctly reasons, might be insufficient to allow for definitive conclusions.

Undisputed remains the fact that Hans Globke was the most well informed man in Bonn. Among other things, numerous notices and reports in his collected papers attest to this. To Globke’s sources belonged naturally Gehlen and the BND, the Federal Press Office, his friends in the foreign service, as well as individual informants such as a certain Wolfgang Müller, a journalist and a leading member of an Association of democratic Resistance Fighters. Anecdotal was a story about Der Spiegel editors informing Globke about their intention to publish the famous lead article in April 1956. The State Secretary is supposed to have answered, “I was

⁹⁶ Blank Office (Amt Blank, or Dienststelle Blank), before becoming the Defense Ministry, was an office of Special Assistant to the Federal Chancellor for Matters Related to the Increase of Allied Forces, and later responsible for the questions of rearmament. It received its name after the first head of this department, Theodor Blank. Cf. Bark and Gress, A History, 286.
⁹⁷ Cf. Bevers, Der Mann, 125-48.
⁹⁸ Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 175.
aware of that for several weeks now,”99 which the authors included in the piece, most likely to prove their point about Globke’s wide-reaching knowledge. And while to some it might have looked like a comedy, Der Spiegel summed up their article about Hans Globke, calling it a “real tragedy (...) in that no one knows the real mysteries of the secretive Hans Globke, but everyone blames him for these mysteries, precisely because no one knows them.”100

It is important to remember that Hans Globke did not remain passive in the light of all the attacks. He himself however, only rarely took a stance in his defense. According to a contemporary Bonn psychologist quoted in Der Spiegel article, types like Globke, “carry themselves with a highly developed, but always artificial self-confidence. There is only one thing they cannot do: attack openly, head-on.”101 A professional assessment of this statement should be left for psychologists, but a lot seems to show that Globke in fact did not like to act as his own attorney. In his papers, one can see that, more often than not, Globke’s assistants such as Manfred Baden signed responses to various attacks and accusations. Globke also had a habit of openly asking his friends to intercede for him with the press, institutions, or even his advocates. A letter to Otto Lenz from July 10, 1950 substantiates this claim. In it, Globke informs his friend Lenz that the famous member of the resistance and an affiliated with the CDU journalist, Rudolf Pechel (whom Globke remembered as the one, who “got horribly drunk at a party one time”), joined the circle of his antagonists by publishing “the nastiest of all” articles in Welt am Sonntag.102 “Since the Welt am Sonntag puts it up for a discussion,” Globke asked Lenz, “I would be grateful to you, if perhaps you could write a few words to it.” Additionally, for unclear reasons unwilling to do it himself, Globke requested that Lenz try to influence Prelate

100 “Bürovorsteher im Vorraum der Macht,” Der Spiegel, 25.
Maximillian Prange of the Berlin Diocese, with whom they were acquainted since the war, to also take a stance in the magazine’s discussion. As further correspondence between Lenz and Globke demonstrates, Lenz promptly acquiesced to the wishes of his friend. This strategic reliance on the opinions of other people forced Globke to look for advocates, who, as it seems, were very eager to help him. By doing so, he managed for the most part to remain removed from the discourse not taking the risk to have more of the details of his past and present exposed.

Whereas Hans Globke only rarely took a public stance on the accusations made against him, for example in the 1961 *Die Zeit* interview, more often he made use of the Federal Press and Information Office (PIA). Globke and his assistants worked closely with the said agency to disseminate materials for Globke’s defense. For example, toward the end of the East Berlin show trial in July 1963, the state secretariat, asked by PIA, compiled and sent a list of outcomes of investigations and decisions of federal courts in the case Globke. “State Secretary Dr. Globke asked to make use of these materials in case of questions at the next press conference, for example.” These instances demonstrate that Globke could count on his connections in PIA, which were at his disposal, and that these government-controlled agencies were willing to cooperate on the task of improving Globke’s image, as it also meant improving the image of the ruling party at home and Federal Republic abroad.

Not only government agencies though, were on the side of the burdened State Secretary. Also, his friends and colleagues, some media, and common individuals supported Hans Globke while his name and reputation were sullied. Naturally, Konrad Adenauer upheld his closest

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104 “Ergebnisse staatsanwaltschaftlicher Ermittlungen und Entscheidungen von Gerichten in der Bundesrepublik,” attached to Friedmann to Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Karl-Günther von Hase), July 23, 1963, ACDP, 01-070-093/2; cf. also among others: Manfred Baden to Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Dr. Zöller), May 25, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-114/1.
advisor frequently and as long as both were alive. Especially in the 1960s, when the campaigns against Globke reached its apogee, one sees the relative abundance of his defenders. The deputy editor-in-chief of Deutsche Tagespost, Erwin Stindl, reported to Globke that their paper has published an article “about [his] exemplary conduct in the Third Reich.” The editors hoped, Stindl wrote, that they succeeded at contributing to a refutation of “untenable accusations” made by the GDR and “regrettably” picked up on by the press in the Federal Republic. In the end, Stindl ascertained Globke, that their desk “gladly awaits his dispositions.” Here again, the question of motives becomes evident. Though hard to judge, one cannot dismiss a thesis that it might have been useful to some to be in good graces of Globke, who played a seemingly important role in the Schaumburg Palace.

The most interesting of all are letters of support coming from individual citizens, who may have known the State Secretary personally, but in some occasions, they admitted that they did not. And so, in July 1963, Globke received a letter from a certain Josef Olszer of Berlin, “a Jew from Poland, who through forced labor and ghetto had to suffer in indignity.” Despite of his experiences, Olszer assured Globke that he would not allow for “the lowermost type of political propaganda” to besmirch the Secretary’s person and proclaimed that he “has already and will continue to more boldly” defend Globke in the world press. Olszer’s letter, among other ones, demonstrates how much the West German society was divided on the issue of Hans Globke. It also illuminates the degree to which the question of Nazi collaboration and Nazi continuities in a democratic country was reduced to a single dimension, perceived as propaganda of domestic and international political forces.

105 Cf. Adenauer to Globke, April 12, 1956; Adenauer to Globke, September 21, 1964, ACDP, 01-070-052/2
106 Erwin Stindl to Globke, August 8, 1960, ACDP, 01-070-061/1.
107 Josef Olszer to Globke, July 8, 1963, ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
This sort of dismissal of a comprehensive approach to Nazi past in West German politics delayed the opening of a serious debate, which opened only after the end of the Adenauer era. Arguably, the fact that the West German public was split on the question of Globke, with voices pro and con, allowed the tandem Adenauer-Globke to continue their cooperation. This cooperation has caused a long-lasting controversy around Globke’s position, which also gave rise to a political and public debate on the style of Globke and Adenauer’s rule, having the State Secretary earn the unpleasant title of a ‘gray eminence,’ and the Chancellor being accused of undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies. These debates and the attacks on Globke and Adenauer reflect the deeper problems of the young republic; problems which revolve around the interplay of denazification and ‘coming to terms with the past’, political expediency and morality, struggle to gain acceptance in the ‘western alliance’ and struggle against the East German accusations of supporting former Nazis.
Chapter 2: The German Democratic Republic and the Internationalization of the Globke Case

Since its founding in 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) strove for inter- and intra-national legitimization as the single German state. As a means of achieving the acceptance, the East German government capitalized on its strong antifascist convictions, stemming from the ideological basis of the Communist system. In order to differentiate it from the Federal Republic, GDR officials often pointed out the West German continuities of the fascist regime, from which East Germany broke off categorically after the war. The East German regime wanted to promote the image of a morally purified Germany, and to this end, advocated punishment for former Nazis, who were holding public offices in Bonn. Caught in the midst of the Cold War, however, the East German government in Berlin’s Pankow began using its moral convictions for propagandist purposes. This, in turn, blurred the lines between genuine concerns for development of democracy and Communist agitation aimed at discrediting the Federal Republic in the eyes of its allies. Hence, the East German propagandists waged the Cold War through numerous publications, exhibitions and press releases. Perusing archival Nazi documents, conveniently located in East Berlin and in the Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, they attempted to make the Nazi past of the most prominent West German government officials, scientists, businessmen, and lawyers widely known. This chapter will focus on the East German campaigns against Hans Globke, which as earlier studies show, were prompted in his case by the anti-Nazi movements in the Federal Republic. The apex of the East German smear campaigns was the show-trial in the summer of 1963, which did not achieve the desired effect. Reaching similar conclusion based on the study of different sources, I will confirm the thesis posed by other contributors to the topic, who only claim that Adenauer was the first and foremost indirect target...
of the attacks on Globke.\(^1\) Going further, I will argue that inasmuch as Adenauer and Globke’s compromised integrity was a clear aim of the Communists, they additionally wanted to arouse general international distrust toward the Federal Republic, demonstrating how different parties used discussion of Globke for different purposes.

Although Hans Globke has been criticized since 1949 by the West German political opposition the – German Social Democrats (SPD) – for his powerful position in the Chancellery and for his co-authorship of the Commentaries to the Nuremberg Race Laws, the massive attacks from abroad regarding his ‘brown past’ did not start until 1959. With the preparation of their “Ungesühnte Nazijustiz” exhibit, Reinhard Strecker and the Socialist German Student Union (SDS) turned for help to the archives in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ), as the West German ones denied them the access.\(^2\) As historians suggest, the success of the students and earlier West German Social Democrats’ agitations moved the GDR leadership to “build up massive campaigns against war and Nazi criminals in the Federal Republic.”\(^3\)

The incipience of these overt GDR anti-Globke campaigns dates to the summer of 1960, when the GDR first disclosed the collected archival files on Globke’s activities in the Reich Interior Ministry. This is not to say, however, that the East Germans were not aware of Globke’s existence before; very little press coverage has taken place in the 1950s.\(^4\) The target audience for SED’s (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) findings consisted naturally of the domestic and foreign press, potentially interested public opinion groups, and the highest representatives of the Bonn government. Allegedly, on August 17, 1960, the chairman of the SED’s Ausschuß für

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Deutsche Einheit (Committee for German Unity, ADE), Max Suhrbier sent Bundespresident Lübke all documents “in order to enable [him] to form an objective judgment of the Case Globke.”\(^5\) Here once more, the highly dubious nature of Lübke’s own activities in the Third Reich speaks to the ubiquitous nature of these issues, including in the highest offices. The existence of the said document, however, supports the assumption that the overt East German agitations against Globke started to take place in the early 1960s.

Articles in the press also hint at the 1960 as the time the GDR defamation campaigns began. An interesting text appeared in the September 2, 1960 issue of the English-language East German propaganda newsletter *Democratic German Report*, edited by John Peet, an Englishman who defected to the GDR in June of 1950 out of ideological reasons, and whose later task was to propagate, mainly in Great Britain, East Germany as the anti-fascist state.\(^6\) The said article titled “Dr. Globke’s File: the story of a murderous bureaucrat,” features a photograph of what appears to be Globke’s personal file from the Interior Ministry of the Third Reich. The column reads: “The shabby, tattered file shown on the right was recently discovered amongst huge stacks of Nazi documents in the archives of the German Democratic Republic. This file (…) on a certain Dr. Hans Globke, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that this gentleman was one of the key figures in the Nazi campaign to liquidate the Jews.”\(^7\) One could conclude from this statement that first, the author assumes his readership is not very aware of the ‘certain’ Dr. Globke and his involvement in the Nazi crimes, and second, that publishing the compromising materials on Globke stroke even the East German public opinion as a novelty. Because of the propagandistic nature of the publication however, one could object this claim, pointing out that Peet wanted to

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contribute to causing a scandal. Yet, if this were the case, a more likely scenario would involve a reminder that the GDR has since long been warning the international public about the past complications of Adenauer’s chief aide.

According to a confidential note to the Chancellery, dated February 18, 1961, a security division of the Federal Criminal Bureau received intelligence on planned activities of a “Communist Resistance Group.” The said activity was supposed to take place from February 20 to 22 and involve a postcard campaign against the State Secretary Globke. “In the context of this campaign, one should expect that the Dutch members of this oppositional group will appear in person at the highest federal offices and will attempt to hand out their rabble-rousing materials.“ The precautions taken involved the security service instructing the Chancellery not to receive this sort of material and if possible, “to try to determine the identity of members of the Communist delegation.” The fact that the Federal security forces were involved in detecting and attempting to minimize the effects of such a campaign supports a larger thesis that the West German political image at home and abroad needed to remain positive. Globke’s collected papers include a postcard addressed to the State Secretary, with a message in English, “Don’t you think how ridiculous it is that you are working now in the cabinet of a country which is called a ‘free country’?” At any rate, it is hard to say with all certainty that this card has been sent as a part of the above-mentioned action. First, there is a three-month-time gap between the predicted campaign and the date on the one found; second, the postcard dated May 2, 1961 was signed by “a free Italian” and sent from Milan. In connection with this, the February 1961 Note demands further research in the aspect of internationalization of the case. Since the Dutch Communists were supposed to carry out the postcard campaign the question remains, if and to what extent has

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9 Postcard to Globke, May 2, 1961, ACDP 01-070-114/2.
the East German or Soviet government supported them – or other sympathetic groups around Europe – and what was the content of the said postcards. With certainty however, one can advance the argument that Hans Globke was the subject of their attacks and a means of undermining the Federal Republic’s reputation as a continuing fascist state, even if the underlying motivations might have been founded in moral questions.

The timing of the Postcard Campaign coincides with the scandal around Hans Globke, which arose in the light of the Eichmann trial. Induced by the news of capture of Adolf Eichmann, the Eastern Bloc immediately increased the magnitude of its anti-West German propaganda. Apprehended by the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad, on May 11, 1960 in Argentina, the former SS-Lieutenant Colonel Eichmann has been considered one of the most highly involved people in organizing the Holocaust and the extermination of Eastern European Jews. When finally brought before the justice, the Israeli prosecution presented him with 15 criminal charges of crimes against humanity, crimes against the Jewish people, and membership in a criminal organization among others. As a result of the trial held in Jerusalem from April 11 to August 14, 1961, Eichmann was found guilty of most of the charges on which he was indicted, and was sentenced to death; the execution took place on May 31, 1962.

The scandal around Eichmann prompted the East German propagandists to launch campaigns implicating other West German officials, most prominently Hans Globke, as Eichmann’s accomplices. Already three months after the capture of Eichmann, an Israeli official, whose identity is not disclosed, received on August 5, 1960, a note entitled “DDR accuses Hans Globke of Nazi Crimes.” The said note, however, was not an official message from East Berlin, as Israel and the German Democratic Republic did not have any diplomatic

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11 Air Pouch NFVA 1573, August 8, 1960, Globke CIA Files 0164.
relations at that point. Suspecting that this is an East German gambit, the Israeli Official expressed the opinion “that the DDR statement is merely a cold war move.”

The fact that the Eastern Bloc utilized Eichmann’s war crimes process on the international stage for their own purposes became apparent to the Allies soon after the official Israeli investigation began. The CIA based its January 1961 report on sources from a “regular informant with good international connections,” who claimed that instead of providing Israel directly with files on Eichmann’s activities in the SS, “the USSR will furnish the material to the East German Government, which they believe to be the logical and most effective instrument for a propaganda campaign against Hans Globke, State Secretary in the West German Chancellery.”¹² The source, furthermore, laid bare the Soviet aim to “embarrass seriously the Adenauer Government and cause a loss of faith in Germany on the part of her Western allies.” The Soviets were to anticipate that “the Eichmann trial will reawaken anti-German feelings throughout the world and that an ‘exposure’ of Globke’s role will add drama and force to the Soviet claim that the West German Government is riddled with ex-Nazi officials bent on revenge for Germany.”

Although the Communists might have been correct in assuming that these revelations about Eichmann and Globke would incite mistrust around the Western societies, what to a certain degree was reflected in popular press in the United States, they certainly underestimated the strength of the German-American relationship and a diplomatic position they were in. Timothy Naftali, an American historian, who in 2006 published a paper on the newly disclosed CIA Eichmann documents, points out that the BND and the CIA knew about Eichmann’s cover in Argentina since the 1950s, “but feared the consequences of what he might say about State

Secretary Dr. Hans Globke,“13 if he were investigated. Hence, since both the US and Federal Republic had obstructed the bringing of Eichmann to justice, they were locked in a virtual mutual agreement. It pushed them to covertly back each other in this case, and as some journalists (including Bevers and Die Zeit’s Thomas Kleine-Brockoff) suggest, the CIA “gladly agreed to the requests from Bonn, because Globke was ‘an important man in the Cold War era,’ and was regarded by the NATO as a time-bomb, because of his connections to the secret services and the NATO.“14

It is safe to assume therefore, that the United States was well aware of Globke’s connection to Eichmann and together with the Germans expected an attack on the State Secretary. Knowing “that the Communist campaign against Globke is assuming the proportions of a coordinated international effort, [and] the alleged links between Eichmann and Globke have become a favored subject of Communist propaganda,”15 the American Intelligence did exactly the opposite of what Moscow and East Berlin wished for. Expecting a propagandist aggression, the CIA in cooperation with Bonn tried to keep Globke’s reputation unblemished by precluding his name being mentioned at the trial.16 Most spectacularly, the secret services managed to withhold the publication of passages involving Globke in Eichmann’s memoirs. A source in the West German intelligence service brought the existence thereof to the knowledge of the Americans in early September of 1960. A secret message to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, briefly evaluates the content of the memoir, describes the circumstances of its sale to the press, and discusses Bonn’s approach.17 The Germans, the message reads, wanted to

14 Cf. Bevers, Der Mann, 186.
15 Headquarters Comment to Globke CIA Files 0173.
17 Munich Base to Director, September 16, 1960, Eichmann CIA Files 02/0155.
“make request through diplomatic channels that memoirs be suppressed,” when they would be certain of who was then in the possession of the manuscripts. Although the source hints at the American *Life* Magazine as a possible vendee, other publishers also came under consideration.

Four days after the initial report, CIA Director passed the information to the chief of the German BND, Reinhard Gehlen on September 20, that the *Life* Magazine did in fact obtain the said materials, which included “one obscure mention of Globke which Life [is] cutting at our request.”¹⁸ The secret services however, continued to be vigilant, because nobody knew how many copies of Eichmann’s memoirs were let on to the market. The CIA files reflect later sporadic notes on various media planning to cover the memoirs story, none of them ever printing the passages on Globke.

Apart from the memoirs, press around the world speculated heavily about Globke’s involvement in the Nazi crimes judged at that moment in Jerusalem, what further induced the German American intelligence to take a closer look and preventative steps. With a secret dispatch from Washington to the Station in Bonn from early spring of 1961, the Americans forwarded a collection of articles on the Globke case, hoping “that the statements defending Globke could if necessary be replayed with good effect… It is possible that Eichmann (…) may refrain from mentioning Globke at all, in which case we may hopefully avoid the issue entirely. Headquarters has no objections to passing any of these articles to liaison.”¹⁹ Through such expressions, it becomes evident that the Western allies had a stake in protecting the good name of the State Secretary Globke, helping to keep up the reputation of the Federal Republic at the same time, and counteracting the propagandist advances of the Cold War enemy.

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¹⁸ Director to Munich Base, September 20, 1960, Eichmann CIA Files 02/0157.
¹⁹ Chief EE to Chief of Station, Dispatch EKAW-2297, April 27, 1961, Max Merten CIA Files 0067.
Whereas it is hardly surprising that the American ally was making such effort to aid its important contact in Bonn, a similar stance of Israel may seem unexpected at first. The rapprochement in political and diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and Israel in the early 1960s however, proved to be beneficial to Globke’s case. In his study of the State Secretary, Bevers implicitly characterizes Adenauer and Globke’s attempts in the 1950s to establish connections with Jewish organizations and Israel as pragmatic, in that he “did not want to give anybody a room for attacks, but strived for sympathy,” and “tried very skillfully to protect himself against possible attacks at Jewish and Israel’s end.” Thanks to his position in the Chancellery and the connections with the intelligence services, Globke swiftly achieved his goal of being regarded as a benefactor. This prompted Jewish-German writer Inge Deutschkron, who observed the Eichmann trial, to state in one interview that when it came to reparations, money or weapons, “people said – and I do not have any written proof of this – that Mr. Globke was very approachable in this matter. It even got to the point, where people in Jewish circles laughed and said: ‘Just ask Globke, he will surely help!’” Regardless of their underlying reasons, the improvement in West German-Israeli relations was a fact, exemplified by the German willingness to pay war reparations, the secret sale of arms to Israel, and the amicable spirit of the March 18, 1960, New York meeting of Adenauer and Israel’s Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. It would have been inexpedient on the part of Israel therefore, to be willing to implicate Globke into the internationally covered Eichmann trial. A contemporary CIA report from a private conversation with Fritz Bauer, a West German social-democratic (SPD) politician, at the time a Hessian attorney general, and Globke opponent, dated February 7, 1961 relates

20 Bevers, Der Mann, 180, 183.
21 Quoted in Bevers, Der Mann, 187.
Bauer’s stance on the Case Globke. As Bauer “made clear throughout the conversation his animosity toward Globke,” he believed,

there was little reason for anyone in Bonn to ‘lay awake nights’ worrying about the Eichmann trial, as the press was speculating. No one in the Israeli government, least of all BEN GURION himself, Bauer went on, wanted to complicate or in any way exacerbate German-Israeli relations…. No one in Israel wanted to place in jeopardy the gratefully acknowledged the reparations payment of the German government, nor the possibility of further improving relations in the future.\(^{22}\)

Inasmuch as these speculations by Bauer proved to be true and Globke’s name appeared only minimally during the trial in Jerusalem, what in the end can be attributed to the efforts of German, American and Israeli diplomatic channels, the media coverage and the anti-Globke campaigns left the State Secretary exhausted and willing to resign.\(^{23}\)

Hans Globke, however, remained on the post of the Secretary of State and Adenauer’s closest adviser only upon the wish of the Chancellor. As other historians claim, Adenauer would not accept Globke’s resignation, because such a step would mean in the eyes of the Chancellor acquiescence to the Communist demands and consequently would demonstrate Bonn’s weakness.\(^{24}\) The East German government however, continued to disseminate anti-Globke propaganda towards the end of compromising the Federal Republic as a fascist state. This certainly contributed to a political and social dissatisfaction with the Adenauer government. The unclear past of many of its functionaries, the Spiegel Scandal of 1962, and the authoritarianism and lack of transparency characterizing Adenauer brought down the first West German political leadership in shame, forcing the Chancellor to resign. Thus, in early 1963, Adenauer announced that he – as well as Globke – would retire in the fall.

\(^{22}\) Wayland B. Waters to Department of State, February 7, 1961, Globke CIA Files 0178.
\(^{23}\) Bevers, *Der Mann*, 202.
The Communist campaigns against the Bonn State Secretary reached its peak in 1963 when the SED-regime decided to put Hans Globke on trial. The BND anticipated such trial already in 1961. In a classified message dated July 4, 1961, West German agents in the so-called (even after twelve years of the establishment of the GDR) Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) reported that the attorney general “received orders from the Central Committee of the SED to press charges against [State Secretary Dr. Globke] on the basis of the documentary material. The process would be carried out in absentia, if need be.” According to the source however, the present materials were insufficient to open a lawsuit at that moment.

As the GDR archival documents show, the preparation for a prospective Globke trial was a highly organized, timely, and international effort. Conferring a report from January 1963, the East German Committee for German Unity, ADE, via its secretary Albert Norden, a member of the Politburo and a chief of its Committee for Agitation and Propaganda, began the preparations for yet another attack against “Globke and other Fascists,” by obtaining advice from a more closely unidentified Comrade J. North. The related conversation with North suggests that the ADE envisioned the United States as the primary audience of their campaign, trying to detect anti-fascist organizations, especially in the Jewish and socialist circles. Judging by the handwritten comments to the typed document, the ADE seemed most interested in appealing to “individuals and organizations” such as “the American universities, local youth, and especially student-run newspapers,” “trade unions that include many Jewish members,” or even “the former Senator from Connecticut, Abe Ribicoff, a liberal Jew.” In addition to dissemination of anti-West German publicity, the ADE interlocutors pressured North to compose a list of individuals, who would receive invitations to visit the GDR. All of this was supposed to serve the purpose of

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“first, strengthening the campaign against Globke and other fascists in the USA… Second, …
popularizing our country, its democratic and antifascist development in the USA. “ Although the
idea of a show trial against Globke does not yet find expression in this conversation with the
informant, it becomes clear that regardless of the form of the anti-fascist propaganda, the SED-
regime aimed foremost at a positive publicity for the German Democratic Republic, seeking
acceptance and legitimation as the German state.

In order to prepare an effective, wide-reach public relations campaign for the Globke
trial, the ADE issued a “highly sensitive” “Approach to the Proceedings against Globke in
International News.”27 Although no date figures on the document, one can assume that it
originated in the late winter, or early spring of 1963, as the deadlines given on particular
directives called for completion “by May.” The plan clearly outlines the thesis to be propagated
during the whole process against Globke, and the formulations, reflected by certain watchwords,
correspond to the socialist political rhetoric. Hence, the East Germans claimed, “the organizers,
supporters, and stooges of the fascist German Reich and its crimes (…) carry out their policies
under the guise of ‘democracy’ and the so-called Euro-Atlantic community. Their misanthropic
clerical-militaristic politics are targeted domestically at creation of an emergency dictatorship,
gagging of democracy, and internationally at atomic warfare and neocolonialism.” The logic
follows, State Secretary Globke, who „partook in genocide against Jewish population, as well as
against Polish and Czech nationals,“ was in his present position of power, “a representative of
the fascist officials, judges, and officers working in the Bonn state apparatus.“ Therefore, it was
the GDR’s responsibility, as a representative of all Germans “to bring the Nazi criminals to

27 “Plan über die Behandlung des Verfahrens gegen Globke in der Auslandsinformation,” undated, BA Berlin, DD
2/240.
justice." The preferral of charges against Globke, in the belief of ADE, "shows GDR as the state of morality, ethicality, political cleanliness in Germany." 

As a means of achieving their goal, the ADE drafted a sixteen-page “Action Plan” attached to the said document. Some of their points called for consultations with other Eastern Bloc countries, including the Soviet Union, toward the end of obtaining "legal and propagandistic support,” contacting the leftist parties of non-socialistic states about the possibility of publishing material about the Globke-investigation process in their press, and cooperating with Jewish newspapers appearing in the target countries. The East German propaganda apparatus wanted therefore, to artificially augment the case they have prepared, by trying to win publicity around the world. Speculatively, the ADE feared that on its own, the Globke trial would not cause a significant international outrage and achieve such a widespread interest as the Eichmann trial from just two years before did. Their efforts brought mixed effectiveness (as discussed in detail in the Section 3), in that many renowned newspapers reported on the events, but more often than not they either failed to comment extensively on the case and the attacks on the personnel and denazification policies of the Federal Republic, or dismissed the East German investigation as Communist propaganda.

It is vital to remember however, that the defamation campaigns against Hans Globke were a part of the effort to discredit the Adenauer government and the German Federal Republic. Two days after the lawsuit against Globke officially began (i.e. April 3, 1963), Albert Norden dispatched a confidential letter to the Attorney General Josef Streit and two other members of the Central Committee, with suggestions as to what steps are necessary for a

29 Ibid.
30 Cf. Frei, Hitlers Eliten, 295-7; Bevers, Der Mann, 20.
successful execution of the process. Inasmuch as the ADE busied itself earlier with establishing contact with foreign media, it seems that the priority for April was a need to obtain actual prominent observers and correspondents from abroad, acquisition of whom would “help substantially.” Norden emphasizes in both the introduction and the conclusion of the letter however, that “the trial must be set up as a general reckoning with the Bonn government and its politics (...), as an international trial against Bonn’s illegitimacy....” A secret and personal report for Globke by Reinhard Gehlen from mid-April 1963, also confirms the Communist intentions to indirectly attack Adenauer. “The ‘trial,’ overinflated around the time of Chancellor’s retirement, should give the impression that Dr. Globke’s retirement was a result of the charges pressed by SBZ.” This message additionally helps one to notice, how well informed Globke was and how accurate BND’s sources in the GDR were.

In preparation of their campaign, members of the SED leadership wanted to see other countries involved as well. So, according to a memo of the West German Foreign Office from 1964, the attorney general of GDR has asked his counterparts in the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, Luxemburg, and the United States for legal help regarding the proceedings against Hans Globke. The last three, it is said, ignored the pleas of the East German persecutor. This supports the argument that the Cold War dynamics – the political and ideological divisions between the East and the West – inhibited a genuine, morally motivated reckoning with the Nazi past. It seems, therefore, that the leadership of the Western countries preferred to forget the past, and instead, focus pragmatically on the present conflict between former World War II Allies who some twenty years ago fought together the same Nazi enemy.

31 Albert Norden to Josef Streit, Arne Rehahn, Werner Lamberz, April 5, 1963, BA Berlin, DD2/240.
33 Auswärtige Amt (Dr. Gawlik) to Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (ORR Dr. Münchheimer), January 23, 1964, ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
Thus, with or without the help of the Western allies, the GDR opened in the spring of 1963 – the last spring of the crumbling Adenauer government – a highly concentrated attack on Hans Globke. The East German daily, *Neues Deutschland* featured the Case multiple times a week, reporting on the investigation, the allegedly new materials against Globke, his reactions (or mostly lack thereof), and – what interested the SED the most – the voices of support from abroad. The ADE moreover, published posters, flyers, pamphlets, and even organized an exhibition entitled “Wir klagen an” (We accuse) about Adenauer’s aide, his Nazi past, his connections to other figures from the Third Reich, all as a part of the smear campaign. Hans Globke, who refused to give himself over to the East German authorities upon their issuing of a warrant, and whom West Germans would not apprehend, was then featured on a wanted-poster that has been circulated widely in the GDR as well as, to a lesser extent, in the Federal Republic.

Although the Schaumburg Palace dismissed the trial in public as a farce, the events surrounding it proved dismaying for Globke and the West German authorities. In the afternoon hours of June 19, 1963, Hans Globke answered his telephone to hear allegedly: “this is Eisner III ZG. Abduction attempt on a grand scale planned by GDR, to make arraignment for the trial on July 8 possible. Something special is planned for today afternoon. Special caution advised.”

Even though Globke wrote, he believed this warning to be sabotage, he immediately had the BND and BfV notified, and informed Adenauer about this event the next day. This could suggest that Globke wanted to be cautious, especially since kidnappings to the East were not new (e.g. Otto John case, the head of the BfV, who mysteriously appeared in East Berlin in 1953). The secret and safety services of the Federal Republic approached the case seriously and with utmost importance, assuming three possibilities: a serious warning, psychological pressure from

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34 These materials appear intermittently in Globke’s collected papers.
35 Note Globke to Adenauer, June 20, 1963, ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
36 More on the Otto John Case in Chapter 4.
Pankow, or a prank without any connection to the Communist plot. Further, they considered measures such as security in Globke’s home and office to protect not only Globke, but also the reputation of the Federal Republic.

On July 8, 1963, the proceedings against Hans Maria Globke, accusing him among other things of perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, and co-organization of the Holocaust between 1933 and 1945, opened at the Supreme Court of the German Democratic Republic in East Berlin, presided over by the court’s chair, Heinrich Toeplitz. Attorney General Josef Streit occupied the persecutor’s bench, and a number of reporters and observers filled the audience. Missing was only the defendant. With the purpose of informing the general public, the court’s press office has been releasing twice daily a bulletin with the information on the process, testimonies of witnesses, and comments of the judges. After two weeks of convening, on July 23, the court found Hans Globke guilty and, “in the name of the people,” sentenced him in absentia to life-long imprisonment. Needless to say, the sentence was never executed, as the West German prosecution ignored Pankow’s demands to respect their verdict, which in effect caused further, albeit less significant, attacks on the State Secretary.

Described by many contemporaries as well as in modern historiography as a ‘show trial’, the East German proceedings against Globke from 1963 evidently earned this title. In the light of a “Plan for the Continuation of the Campaign against Globke and the Bonn Globke Regime after the Conclusion of the Trial” from July 18, 1963 (five days before the actual announcement of the sentence), Hans Globke has already been found guilty by the ADE. The prepared agenda included two parts, one regarding dissemination of the trial materials and other publications

37 Dr. Bachmann (BKA?), note, June 19, 1963, ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
38 Dr. Bachmann (BKA?), note, June 20, 1963, ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
attacking the State Secretary, and the other concerning “political measures for the appraisal of the lawsuit.”\textsuperscript{41} The former comprised the efforts to issue a brochure, publish yet another book, print 5000 copies of the verdict, and prepare a documentary film about the trial. With a wide international public in mind, all these materials were to be available in English and French editions. The political actions, the ADE envisioned, included appealing to the UN to help “punish the war criminals,” prompting the Israeli authorities to open their own proceedings against Globke, and instigating at home and abroad to “send the Bonn government, immediately after passing the judgment, hundred-thousand-fold protest letters from Germany and from abroad with the demand of removing Globke from office.” With relatively few exceptions the international community ignored GDR’s appeals. Inasmuch as the question of complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity is of utmost gravity, and Hans Globke truly could have contributed to misfortune of millions of people, a judgment that lies beyond this investigation, the measures taken by the East German authorities, such as the one mentioned in the “Plan for Globke-Campaign after the Trial,” detracted the attention from its seriousness.

While it is much easier for us today to recognize this through hindsight and declassified documents, at the time Hans Globke and his Bonn entourage did fear that the defamation campaigns from East Berlin could achieve a desired effect of compromising the Federal Republic in the eyes of its allies. For this purpose, the competent West German offices, including the Foreign Ministry, the Federal Press Office, as well as the Federal Intelligence Service, collected information on the Globke trial published around the world. As a source from the Foreign Ministry shows, Hans Globke personally requested the state department, “to submit to him an overview of the reactions of international (Western) press to the proceedings in East

The result of this request came in the form of pages-long reports and snippets of newspapers on the topic stored in the files of the Foreign Ministry and Globke’s papers. To the State Secretary’s satisfaction, majority of the articles in the Western world covered the lawsuit very superficially, oftentimes dismissing it as Communist propaganda. Some publications and organizations, discussed in detail later, nevertheless, took up Albert Norden’s attacks on Globke. As Adenauer and his aide retired on October 15, 1963, an event planned since 1961, the East German regime stylized it as a consequence of their campaigns. To their dismay, however, the Federal Republic, and specifically Konrad Adenauer, continued to enjoy the support and cooperation with the uniting European partners, Israel, and the United States.

Chapter 3: West German Image Abroad – American Actions and Reactions to Globke Case

The publicity around Hans Globke reached far beyond the borders of the divided Germanies, and even in the United States, the figure of Adenauer’s State Secretary polarized public opinion. On the one hand, certain groups, including organizations such as the Society for the Prevention of World War III (SPWW), attacked Globke on the basis of his background in the Third Reich. A range of American newspapers and magazines debated the case, especially in the context of the Eichmann trial in 1961. This threatened to vilify the image of West Germany, the purity of which was in turn a goal of the administration in Bonn. On the other hand, Hans Globke found some defenders within the American public. Although rarely praised, a lot of the press coverage of Globke’s East-Berlin trial was dismissed as Communist propaganda, further reflecting the Cold War dynamic at play. At the same time, people like Senator Thomas Dodd, Hunter College President George Shuster, and, most significantly, General Julius Klein attempted to popularize a positive image of Globke, and thus, help the Federal Republic keep its reputation in the United States in balance.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, popular American attitudes toward Germany varied extensively. While some people still regarded the former enemy as a danger that needed strict control of established democratic forces such as Great Britain or the United States, a majority of voices sided with the official policies of the government in Washington. To Presidents Truman and Eisenhower in the 1950s, Germany, in this regard Adenauer’s Germany, became an important economic and strategic partner, the well-being of which seemed crucial in the era of the rising East-West conflict. Generally speaking, the threat of Communism, especially in the light of the Second Red Scare (1950-1955) and the revelations of Senator

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Joseph McCarthy, shifted the focus away from the menace of Nazism. Konrad Adenauer’s own anti-Communist rhetoric was also helpful in establishing a more positive image of the Federal Republic among Americans. This friendly attitude in the United States however, experienced a crisis in the 1960s, as the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann revived some wider anti-German notions. However, the Berlin Crisis of 1961, during which Soviet leaders demanded Western military withdrawal from West Berlin, caused increased interest in the German affairs and support for the West German-American relationship. In light of the development of this Western relationship, an unfavorable image of the Federal Republic could have had, above all, economic consequences for West Germany. A number of significant German businesses and industries such as IG Farben or Bayer had heavy dealings with American partners. Arguably the West German economy depended significantly on American foreign aid and the transatlantic market. The German defense industry revived thanks to the American investments in defense products, resulting from their involvement in the Korean War in the early 1950s. Toward the end of countering the negative publicity, the West German government invested generously into measures that would improve the country’s image in the United States, relying not only on intelligence services and diplomatic channels, but also on professional public relations companies. The extent of effectiveness of these operations is debatable, but, by 1963, American public sentiment toward West Germany can be characterized as mixed, even though the political relations were officially in perfect order.

One factor that concerned many officials in Bonn, and that could have earned the Federal Republic a bad reputation in the United States, was the American press coverage of the State

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Secretary in Adenauer’s Chancellery, Hans Globke. As Norbert Jacobs in his dissertation on the portrayal of Globke establishes, before 1960 (i.e. before the Eichmann process) Hans Globke was a minor subject of reporting in the Occidental press.⁴ The Washington Post, for example, mentions the name Dr. Hans Globke for the first time in December of 1950. In a report on German industry and in the brief discussion of the denazification policies, the author explains, “for example, among Dr. Adenauer’s ministerial advisers is a man named Globke, who once wrote a commentary supporting Hitler’s infamous Nuernberg racial laws.”⁵ In two of the foremost American newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post, the name Globke appears in 32 articles between September 1949 and May 1960. A majority of these pertain to political developments in the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in September of 1955, and the Presidential Crisis of 1959,⁶ in which Globke figures mostly as a “Secretary of State” or “Adenauer’s aide,” and only sometimes as “the commentator of the Nuremberg Laws.” A much more detailed discussion of Hans Globke’s Nazi past ensued as a consequence of the anti-Semitic incidents in the BRD in the late 1959, when a group of young Germans vandalized a synagogue causing international concern for the rise of neo-Nazis.

⁴ Norbert Jacobs, Der Streit um Dr. Hans Globke in der öffentlichen Meinung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1973: Ein Beitrag zur politischen Kultur in Deutschland (PhD diss., Bonn University, 1992). Although Jacobs focuses on the press in Germany as a whole, he does provide quantitative analysis of Globke-related articles from Western Europe and the US, e.g. 233.
⁶ In April 1959, Adenauer announced, he would candidate for the office of federal president, replacing the retiring Theodor Heuss. In June, however, Adenauer withdrew his candidacy, proclaiming that he would serve his country better in the present position of the chancellor. This has caused a political crisis in the Federal Republic, because, first, Adenauer belittled the importance of presidential office – the highest office of the state, and second, there was no parliamentary consensus on other candidates. For details see Dennis L. Bark, David R. Gress, A History of West Germany: From Shadow to Substance 1945-1963, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988): 451-2; and Erik Lommatzsch, Hans Globke (1898-1973): Beamter im Dritten Reich und Staatssekretär Adenauers (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2009): 280-99.
Nevertheless, the track this debate took focused on historical education of the youth more than on the activities of Globke in the Reich’s Ministry of the Interior.⁷

A turning point in the press coverage on Globke was the opening of the investigation against the former SS Lieutenant, Adolf Eichmann, whom the Israeli secret service, Mossad, captured in Argentina in May of 1960. Only through the lens of this occurrence does it become explicit to what extent West German officials cared about their image abroad and especially in the United States. “Without a doubt,” wrote Wilhelm Grewe, the West German ambassador in Washington in a secret telegram to Bonn, “the Eichmann trial will put us soon in a new, evidently tough public relations situation in the US.”⁸ Indeed, the revelations around Eichmann triggered a debate in American media about the effectiveness of denazification and contemporary German society and politics. For this reason, journalists both from within West Germany and from abroad flooded the Chancellery with requests for interviews. One of the interesting requests came from Martin Agronsky of NBC (National Broadcasting Company), who wanted to make a film about West German reactions to the Eichmann trial. In a memo to Globke, Felix von Eckardt, the chief of the Federal Press Office (BPA), clarifies that “next to the CBS (Columbia Broadcasting Company), NBC is the most prominent American television company, whose programs are broadcast in all of the US states.”⁹ As if trying to ground his decision to approve the interview with Adenauer and Globke, von Eckardt writes, “Mr. Agronsky produced already two programs, which approached the matter rather critically, but with a high level of objectivity and fairness towards the Federal Republic.“ The fairness and objectivity toward the Federal

Republic seemed like the most vital factor that concerned the top echelons in Bonn, reflecting a willingness to tread relatively lightly on the role of the Nazi past in the West German present.

The anti-fascist feeling around the world interfered with West German administration’s attempts to promote a fair picture of its government, especially when publications on the topic of Nazism were surfacing in considerable numbers. Naturally, the release of Reinhard Strecker’s *Hans Globke* caused a controversy in West Germany; other works, from abroad, some of which explicitly mentioned Globke, were of concern to the Adenauer administration, as it was preoccupied with its own image. For example, *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*, a book by a German-American, T.H. Tetens, includes a chapter on Hans Globke, who, according to the author, “drafted the text of Hitler’s race law and who wrote the notorious ‘Commentary’ interpreting this Nuremberg Law, which paved the way for extermination of millions of human beings.” Because the premise that Globke participated in the creation of the Nuremberg Laws is false, very likely it prompted a reaction in the Chancellery or the Embassy in Washington.

Similar was the case of a Briton, Charles Wighton’s publication on Eichmann. Due to the fact that his book *Eichmann – His Career and Crimes* contained on pages 55 and 56 a reference to the State Secretary in the German Federal Chancellery, Dr. Hans Globke, the West German ambassador to Great Britain, Hans von Herwarth, wrote to Wighton asking for “some corrections,” based on the material on Globke, with which Herwarth provided him. Also, one can only imagine the reactions in Bonn to a remark made by CBS’s Daniel Schorr, whom the head of the Foreign Department at the BPA, Günter Diehl, asked for clarification of a passage

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11 A claim that is widely supported in Globke-historiography agrees that Globke did not draft or in any other way help create the Nuremberg Racial Laws of 1935, but only co-authored the Commentary to it. E.g. Lommatzsch, *Hans Globke*, 48.
12 Herwarth to Wighton, May 31, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-105/1.
about Globke in a larger television report on Chancellor Adenauer.\textsuperscript{13} The need for explanation arose from a line of the report (in English): “naming former Nazis like his chief aide Hans Globke who wrote the official commentary on Hitler’s racial laws.” Reminded that Globke was officially not a Nazi, Schorr supposedly had responded, “he knows that State Secretary Globke was not a member of the Nazi party, but someone, who fulfilled important functions in the Third Reich, would be assigned a label of a ‘Nazi’ in American everyday language.” Thus, the German public relations specialists, in addition to minimizing the influence of anti-German publicity and Communist propaganda, had to overcome culturally defined stereotypes and concepts.

Back in Jerusalem however, as the Eichmann investigation developed, the US press members stationed there became interested in the alleged connection between Eichmann and Adenauer’s aide, speculating on the matter and thus raising more questions about integrity of Hans Globke and the postwar West German state. The said connection also provided the Communist agitators from East Berlin additional opportunities to implicate Hans Globke in Eichmann’s crimes. Not surprisingly, the influence of the Eastern Bloc smear campaign against Globke found a reflection in the American press, where among others \textit{The Washington Post} quoted a Czechoslovak professor saying, “while Eichmann raged in the (Nazi) state security department, Dr. Hans Globke raged at the Ministry of the Interior.”\textsuperscript{14}

The controversy around Globke did not have much time to fade after the conclusion of the Eichmann trial, because in April of 1963 the East German authorities opened the proceedings against Hans Globke in that country, attempting to convict him of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Inasmuch as the Communist regime in East Berlin put a lot of effort to internationalize the Globke case as a means of discrediting the Federal Republic, the major, US

\textsuperscript{13} Note, Diehl to Krueger, August 27, 1963, ACDP 01-070-095/3.

newspapers approached the event with an ideological distance. In other words, the reports state clearly and explicitly the source of the accusations either as the “Red Zone” (Washington Post, April 5, 1963), the “Reds”, or the “Communist East Berlin.” The New York Times allowed itself even to mark off the word trial in quotations marks, as if not giving these proceedings much credibility.15 Also of significance is the fact that the short reports are purely informational, do not contain own commentary, but present the official line of defense from Bonn, that Globke remained in Hitler’s Interior Ministry upon the request of the Catholic Church and the Resistance. Globke, who was himself interested in the press coverage on the East Berlin trial,16 received reports from the Federal Press Office. It could have eased his worries to some extent, when the notes from the US read, “No reporting on the verdict in the Globke trial has appeared so far in significant political magazines,” or “the American press at hand dedicates only a minor attention to the lawsuit taking place in East Berlin. In general, it prints only short press-agency reports without further comments.“17 This rather cynical approach to the accusations against Globke seen in the US media can be attributed to the Cold War dynamic at play. The American press, arguably, wanted to distance itself from expressing too much support for the enemy behind the Iron Curtain, sacrificing, in turn, a comprehensive evaluation of the Nazi past of one of the key figures in an allied government.

Even though the larger American publications treated the Globke case rather leniently, they form only a part of the larger concept of public opinion in the United States. Various American groups and institutions with anti-fascist and pro-democratic views were strongly concerned with the international issues in the early Cold War era and voiced their stance

affecting the public opinion. One of such organizations was the Society for the Prevention of World War III. Many disregarded the general significance of this group because of its limited publicity and radical positions. Nevertheless, in regard to Globke’s case, the process of denazification in the Federal Republic, and the Cold War dynamic that brought the BRD and the United States into a close cooperation, the role of the SPWW cannot be understated.

Created in 1944, the SPWW advocated a rather anti-German policy through the 1960s. According to their views, Germany was not to be trusted under any circumstances. To substantiate their postulate, in the early 1950s the Society focused on the threat of Germany being overwhelmed by the Communists, what eventually could cause yet another major conflict. To exemplify, first, in a press release from the summer of 1950, “The Society for the Prevention of World War III (…) [wanted] to make it clear that Germany still remains danger spot number one.” It “[urged] that our occupation forces there should be increased and strengthened as quickly as possible, in order to demonstrate our strong decision to stay in Germany.”

Second, James H. Sheldon of the SPWW wrote a never-to-be-published letter to the Editor of the Wall Street Journal in August of 1954, emphasizing the fact of an alleged West German-Soviet rapprochement. Drawing on the popular slogan (also widely used by Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union) proclaiming the Federal Republic to be a “Bulwark against Communism,” Sheldon raised a question about German industry reviving trade with the Eastern Bloc and about the case of Otto John, the head of the Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution, who in July

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1954 mysteriously appeared in East Berlin.\textsuperscript{20} Although such business relations could have taken place, it is important to keep in mind that in the light of the Hallstein Doctrine, issued in the aftermath of Adenauers visit in Moscow in September 1955, West Germany would perceive any state that recognized the German Democratic Republic as unfriendly (with the exception of the Soviet Union). This applied therefore to all countries behind the Iron Curtain, though initially not Yugoslavia,\textsuperscript{21} consequently compromising Sheldon’s claim as politically inaccurate. SPWW’s anti-Communist rhetoric allows however, to rule out any Communist sympathies on the part of the Society, indicating the inability of the Communist propaganda to influence its publications at the time.

Similarly to the threads seen in the wider American press, the main object of the Society’s attacks remained former Nazis who were actively present in the political, economic and military life of the Federal Republic. Nathan Straus, the director of the popular New York radio station WMCA and an affiliate of the SPWW, broadcasted a talk in early 1959 about the return of the Nazis, a script of which is archived in the files of the Society. Straus discussed among others the past and present of Hans Speidel, the Commander of NATO Central Land Forces; Oskar Ruge, the Chief of German Navy; Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics and Adenauer’s successor; Theodor Oberlander, Minister of Refugees; and, naturally, Hans Globke. Although the SPWW did not target the State Secretary to the extent the East German agitators did, the figure of Hans Globke became more of a symbol for the whole issue of former Nazis in the position of power. In a 1961 *Prevent World War III* article, the author mentioned “the need to

\textsuperscript{20} James H. Sheldon to the Editor of *The Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1954, CRBML, SPWIII, Box 1. The Otto John Case will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

expose the Globkes,” using Globke as a metonym for all German functionaries with a ‘brown past’. 22

The Society’s mistrust toward Germany made itself further evident through attacks also on other West German personalities, regardless of their own stance during the National Socialist terror. In a November-December 1949 edition of their newsletter Prevent World War III, the Society very critically presented the person of Chancellor Adenauer, who never participated in active resistance against the Third Reich, but who faced persecution on political grounds. Ascribing to him authoritarianism, and the willingness to absolve many of the former Nazis, the author writes, “Neither his Rheinish regionalism nor his devout Catholicism prevents Adenauer from being an able politician, not above giving the devil his due and beating the drum of reascent German nationalism.” 23 Moreover, the article describes the familial relationship between Konrad Adenauer and the American High Commissioner for Germany, John McCloy, both of whom married two cousins in the Zinsser family, casting a shadow of doubt on the integrity of the US High Commission’s approach to Adenauer and his government. 24 The Society’s interest in these matters manifested its concerns about the way the American administration handled the reestablishment of the West German state. Deeply mistrustful of Germany, SPWW seemed disillusioned with the West’s embracement of the new Federal Republic without a comprehensive and successful reckoning with its Nazi past.

With regard to this, Society for the Prevention of World War III effectively turned its rhetoric into practice in a single instance, when the Society’s actions prevented Globke from taking a two-week-long trip to the United States planned for late February 1957. Always wanting

24 Cf. Bevers, Der Mann hinter Adenauer (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2009): 12, makes the same point.
to visit the Americas, Globke had missed the opportunities to travel alongside the Chancellor in June 1956 and then later in October/November of the same year. In these cases, the State Secretary had received invitations from the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively, and in both cases he could not accept them due to pressing official issues at the Chancellery. A week before his visit in February, however, a public relations maelstrom was in the making. Upon learning about the planned trip of the Bonn State Secretary, the secretary of the Society for the Prevention of World War III, Albert Simard, sent a letter to the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, asking him to halt Globke’s visit to the US. According to the Society, welcoming Globke in Washington would be “an affront to the American people which could damage our prestige in the eyes of millions of victims of Nazism.” To substantiate the argument against Adenauer’s aide, on behalf of the SPWW Simard used the often-mentioned charges about the Commentary and the work in the Ministry of the Interior.

The issue became widely known as the New York Post printed an article accompanying the Society’s letter. In the face of the protests against the State Secretary’s visit in the US, it was clear to many that these protests caused the decision to cancel the trip. However, the official version, promulgated by both the American Department of State, as well as the sources in Bonn, claim that “Globke is too busy to carry out a trip to the United States in this moment,” or that “urgent affairs require the presence of the State Secretary in Bonn.” Globke himself, in a personal letter to the West German ambassador in Washington, Heinz Krekeler (1953-1958), justified the cancellation with the concern about the success of an upcoming trip of President

25 Cf. James B. Conant to Hans Globke, October 17, 1956, ACDP, 01-070-051/3. Also, see the section Globke’s relations with the CIA for more detail on these organizational matters.
26 Albert Simard, Isidore Lipschutz to John Foster Dulles, February 18, 1957, CRBML, SPWWIII, Box 5; copy in Globke CIA Files 0139.
Theodor Heuss to the United States. At the same time, Krekeler admitted that “the responsible American authorities here shared my opinion that the publicity around the visit renders its execution inappropriate.” One can assume from this then, to confess openly that a publication of a “second rate journal,” as Krekeler calls *The New York Post*, affected the plans of the Bonner ‘gray eminence’ would be embarrassing and could further endanger the image of the Federal Republic. In light of the surrounding events, both sides hoped to postpone the visit. In a memo without an addressee but signed by Globke on February 22, he writes, “a representative of Mr. Allen Dulles just visited me. He said that in view of the NYP article it would be more appropriate, if I would move my trip to America. One has to reckon that the circles which produced the article, could possibly organize further protests, perhaps also in the Congress.” Nevertheless, a trip to the United States never took place, as risking too much public exposure would have inconvenienced Globke and the West German government, both of whom clearly wanted to avoid additional scandals and further discussions of the past.

The full story of Germany’s appearance in the United States would not be complete without the mention of its advocates, who worked in the public realm to improve the German-American relations. In a long list of defenders of the Federal Republic, several important personalities from academia, journalism and politics had connections to Adenauer’s State Secretary; they used their positions to counter the besmirching of Globke’s name. The first of these people is Klaus Dohrn, a German journalist who fled to the US during the Hitler regime. After the war, Dohrn became a special correspondent from Europe for *Time* and *Life* magazines, an advisor to the publisher thereof, Henry Luce, and “Globke’s important contact man to

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29 Hans Globke to Heinz Krekeler, February 27, 1957, ACDP, 01-070-051/3.
31 Hans Globke, memo “Der Vertreter von Mr. Allan Dulles...“ February 22, 1957, ACDP, 01-070-051/3.
American politicians”. 33 In a chapter about his good acquaintance Globke, Dohrn makes a claim that the propaganda against the State Secretary wanted primarily to undermine the trust of the Western Allies toward Germany. 34 To prevent this, Dohrn brought the Globke case to the attention of Christopher Emmet, the chairman of the American Council on Germany. Both men, Dohrn writes, reached out to leading Jewish organizations and personalities, whom they acquainted with materials and documents on Globke’s positive activities under the Nazis. As a result, Dohrn writes too optimistically further, “the name Globke soon stopped recurring in the propagandist moves” 35

Next to Dohrn and Emmet, Globke had an ally in the President of New York’s Hunter College, George N. Shuster. Born in America to parents of German descent, Shuster developed academic and professional connections in Germany, which allowed him to function as the Land Commissioner and a HICOG liaison to the government of Bavaria from 1950 to 1951. 36 Shuster and Globke knew each other at least since the 1950s, what is reflected in the correspondence between the two. 37 When the attacks against Adenauer’s aide reached their climax in the wake of the Eichmann trial, Shuster composed a rather defensive, pro-German foreword to Emmet’s pamphlet, The Vanishing Swastika. 38

In the political sphere, Globke, and more generally the Federal Republic, found support in a Democratic senator from Connecticut, Thomas J. Dodd. At the time of the Nuremberg Trials (November 1945 – October 1946), Dodd served as Vice-Chairman of the Review Board and later

33 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 185; and a biographical note in “Contributors,” in Der Staatsssekretär, Gotto, ed., 283-4.
35 Ibid., 175.
37 Cf. Globke-Shuster Correspondence in ACDP, 01-070-059/1; and Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 189-190.
Executive Trial Counsel. “He concentrated on proving the charge of conspiracy to wage aggressive war, the horrors of the concentration camp system, and the activities of Nazi organizations like the Gestapo and SS.” Furthermore, “Dodd developed a reputation for rigorous cross-examination during the Nuremberg Trials. Building upon his experience prosecuting accused spies and dishonest industrialists during the war, Dodd helped destroy the facades of innocence Nazi defendants attempted to create.”

His ardor to persecute the Nazis translated later, during his term in office (1953 – 1957 in the House, 1959 – 1971 in the Senate) into an equally fierce anti-Communist sentiment. From this perspective, Senator Dodd formulated his March 15, 1960 speech on the floor of the US Senate, “Anti-Semitism, the Swastika Epidemic, and Communism.”

Responding to the critical voices against Germany, which arose in the aftermath of the anti-Semitic incidents in Cologne on Christmas 1959, Dodd contradicted the general notions of reawakened Nazism in West Germany, attributing these misdeeds to “juvenile delinquents.” He did agree that anti-Semitism “must be combated,” but because among other things, “it is a tool of the Communist conspiracy.” Saturated with Cold War rhetoric, the speech included a comparison of living conditions of Jews in the Federal Republic and in the Soviet Bloc. Whereas in the Soviet Union, “where all minorities are persecuted,” Dodd said, some 3 million Jews “are the most persecuted of all minorities,” in West Germany thirty thousand Jews “enjoy complete freedom of religion, complete equality before the law, complete acceptance.”

Then, as if trying to reprimand the public opinion for its criticism of the events, the Senator attributed the apogee of Communist propaganda to the reactions in the Western World.

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41 Although the question of the size of Jewish population in the postwar Soviet Union may be debatable, the estimates of the American Jewish Committee Archives corroborate the numbers suggested by Dodd. “World Jewish Population,” American Jewish Committee Archives, ajcarchives.org, http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1961_16_WJP.pdf
recognized that all this propaganda “was designed, very simply, to further isolate West Germany, to further divide the Western Alliance, and to soften our policy by appealing to our still vivid memories of Nazi brutality.”

In his speech, Senator Dodd transitioned then to the topic of former Nazis in Bonn. After having admitted that this constitutes a problem, he made further acrimonious remarks toward the Eastern European Communist regimes:

In Communist Europe there was no process of denazification. In East Germany and in every European country where the Communists have taken power, they have opened their ranks to the most vicious Nazis and Nazi collaborators. Their past was no handicap; quite the contrary, for the dirty work which the Communist regime had to do, a gangster past constituted a decided recommendation.42

Although it might have been true in a handful of cases, this claim would be harder to hold up in a larger context of Eastern Europe, where ideological and cultural circumstances would not allow for a scenario presented by Dodd. This however, would be a subject of a different investigation.

In respect to the situation in Bonn, Senator Dodd focused on three cases, the Refugee Minister, Theodor Oberländer, the Interior Minister, Gerhard Schröder, and the State Secretary of the Chancellery, Hans Globke. While Dodd had some “serious doubts” about the past – and present position – of the former two, he was “completely persuaded” of Globke’s innocence. The documents about Globke’s activities in the anti-Hitler resistance coming from the Catholic Church and other resistance leaders, such as Hans Gisevius, as well as the Globke’s non-Party-member status were supposed to contribute to Dodd’s trust toward the State Secretary. Rebutting the claims made against Globke that the mere fact of serving in the Hitlerite government should disqualify him from public positions, Dodd philosophically added, “If one sees an opportunity to serve the cause of freedom in the ranks of the Nazi movement, does one reject the opportunity

because it is morally repugnant—or does one accept? It is not an easy choice; and if one accepts, it is not an easy thing to explain or live down.”

Thomas Dodd certainly achieved two things on March 15, 1960. First, as S. Jonathan Wiesen points out in his chapter on Julius Klein and Transatlantic Memory, the speech “represents a significant moment in the West German and American publics’ confrontation with the Holocaust. Senator Dodd had inaugurated the decade with a remarkably open reference to the persecution of Jews, even if his ultimate and ironic aim was to protect the very country and people who had perpetrated the crimes he outlined.”

Second, no matter how ironic it might have been, he did a great favor for the West German government, by making it vivid that highly influential public figures in the United States are willing to demonstrate their trust toward the otherwise largely negatively perceived Federal Republic.

Wiesen maintains that Senator Dodd’s speech was a result of solicitation from Globke and Julius Klein, the man (un-)officially responsible for Germany’s public-relations in the United States. Although he does not hint at any specific documents that would corroborate this assertion, one cannot exclude the possibility of such an arrangement. As Dodd and Klein were both highly involved in Jewish-American issues and in caring for West Germany’s image in the US, their relationship operated on more than strictly professional level, as they related to each other on first-name basis. This stands out among other things in a letter from Dodd to Klein, in which the author, deeply concerned about the Communist attacks against Globke, believes in “a major moral and political victory” against the smear campaigns; a belief, which stemmed from “a good impression” Globke left on a group of American rabbis who visited the Bonn official.

Dodd and Klein suffered harsh criticism for their work for Germany, however, even long after

43 S. Jonathan Wiesen, “Germany’s PR Man,” 299.
44 Ibid., 299.
45 Cf. Thomas Dodd to Julius Klein, January 27, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
the Adenauer-Globke era, which evidently mirrored a part of American public’s disapproval of attempts to overlook the inconvenient elements of the German past for the benefit of economic and strategic relations.

There seems to have been a general trend of Americans criticizing West German – and especially Globke’s – American supporters. The renowned German-American lawyer, Robert Kempner who served as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, also did not escape attacks for his defense of Adenauer’s State Secretary. As he shared with Julius Klein in a letter dated December 30, 1961, “it is rather impossible to make a fair statement before certain audiences about his [Globke’s] activities. Commi [sic!] propaganda against Globke is even attacking the Nuremberg prosecutors, because we have not indicted him!” Overall, Kempner’s relationship to Globke can be described as distanced, but friendly, stemming from the times both men were colleagues at the Prussian Interior Ministry. Kempner however, was removed from his post by the Nazis in 1934, and later deprived of his German citizenship in 1935. Lommatzsch makes a point in saying that Kempner was one of Globke’s most powerful connections to Jewish organizations and institutions in the US, especially to those associated with the Jewish-American weekly, *Aufbau*.

In terms of significance and magnitude of work on German-American public relations, no one compares with Julius Klein. The motive of Klein and Globke’s connection is crucial in understanding the developments of German-American relations in the 1950s and 60s. This

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46 E.g., “Secret Letters and Memos uncover Story of Senator Dodd’s Startling Travel Abroad,” *Gadsden Times*, February 9, 1966; or Klein to Globke, November 16, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-031/2, in which Klein shares with Globke, he was smeared by Drew Pearson, journalist, columnist, and author of the famous “Washington Merry-Go-Round, for his “attitude towards Germany”.
47 Robert M.W. Kempner to Julius Klein, December 30, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-109/1.
connection, however, has not been a subject of a comprehensive scholarly investigation so far.\textsuperscript{50}

Born in 1901 in a Jewish-American family, Klein reached the rank of a general in the US National Guard and served as the national commander of the Jewish War Veterans of America. After his retirement, Klein became a public relations specialist and a lobbyist in “good graces of both political parties in Washington.”\textsuperscript{51} Klein himself in a letter to Globke boasts about his connections to the American Republicans and Democrats.\textsuperscript{52} Wiesen asserts that Klein’s services for the Germans initiated in the earliest days of the Federal Republic, when in 1949 “individual firms began to develop aggressive publicity programs both at home and abroad.”\textsuperscript{53} Working most prominently for Bayer\textsuperscript{54}, and more generally to “counter accusations of industrial complicity in Nazi crimes and to generate positive stories about West Germany and its economy in the American press,” Klein was supposed receive compensation as high as $150,000 a year.\textsuperscript{55}

Another aspect of Klein’s service to the West German state relates to his involvement in the reestablishment of German-Israeli contacts, including the payments of reparations, the organization of Adenauer-Ben Gurion meeting in March of 1960, and the sale of arms to Israel.\textsuperscript{56}

For the purpose of this investigation, the most significant part of Klein’s work was his undertakings for the defense of State Secretary Globke. Especially in the 1960s, when the anti-Globke campaigns reached its peak, Klein was ardently “spreading the word that the State Secretary had been a devout Catholic and a great friend to the Jews during the Third Reich and

\textsuperscript{50} Wiesen contributed somewhat extensively to the topic of Julius Klein, arguing more widely, that West German identity was strictly connected to its economy, which “had to be aggressively marketed to the international public,” symbolizing a “bastion of freedom and democracy” (Wiesen, 295). In the works on Globke, Erik Lommatzsch devotes very little attention to Klein, discussing him mostly in the context of the State Secretary’s informants, (Lommatzsch, 184-5) and Jürgen Bevers provides only a short mention about the American General (Bevers, 183).

\textsuperscript{51} Wiesen, “Germany’s PR Man,” 297.

\textsuperscript{52} Klein to Globke, November 4, 1960, ACDP, 01-070-031/2. „...the policy meetings of both Republican and Democratic parties will be held in December and I will then be in a position to brief my friends.”

\textsuperscript{53} Wiesen, “Germany’s PR Man,” 297.

\textsuperscript{54} A German chemical company.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 298.

\textsuperscript{56} Regarding the last one, cf. Julius Klein Papers from the American Jewish Historical Society in New York.
afterwards in his support of reparations to Israel and Holocaust survivors.” Of enormous interest is Globke’s correspondence with Klein, found in Globke’s papers at the Archive for Christian Democratic Policy, to date still widely underused. Among the copious numbers of letters and notes between the two men, figures a letter from June 3, 1960 written by Klein in Tel Aviv. Relating to many matters, Klein purposefully fails to provide details, which would help us better understand his role. He writes: “My conversation with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was not only motivating, but also encouraging and satisfying. He is very grateful for the friendship, which the Chancellor and his assistants show towards his country, and I have a list of messages to convey to you.” Even though one could only speculate on what the messages from Ben-Gurion were, the fact that Klein acted as an intermediary for Israel and West Germany at a time when no formal diplomatic relations between the two countries existed, hints at the man’s extraordinary role. It also presents Globke as Klein’s most important contact in Bonn, because with the same letter to the State Secretary, Klein attached a copy of a message to Chancellor Adenauer, for Globke’s information. Perhaps due to circumstances like this, many come to regard Globke as the ‘eminence grise’, a title he strongly rebuffed. The news of the capture of Adolf Eichmann reached Klein as he was in Israel, and he wanted to discuss this matter personally with Globke, as “Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told me confidentially something, what I’d like to now confide to you.” Again, what exactly his information pertained to will remain a mystery, but it becomes obvious that Klein was concerned from the start with the scandal swirling around Globke resulting from the Eichmann case.

Klein’s concerns became reality when the intensity of the campaigns against Globke increased in 1960 and 1961, in connection to the aforementioned anti-Semitic outbursts in West

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57 Wiesen, “Germany’s PR Man,” 300.
58 Klein to Globke, June 3, 1960, ACDP, 01-070-31/2.
59 Ibid.
Germany in 1959 and the revelations pertaining to Globke in the Eichmann trial. On August 17, 1961, Martha Jacobson of Julius Klein Public Relations, Inc. (JKPR) remarked, “apparently we were successful at silencing the voices against Mr. Globke in the American public opinion,” and predicted — correctly as it will later be proven — “that the Soviets will use the German electoral campaign and the end of the Eichmann trial to revive the public interest in the Globke case.”

Jacobson’s assessment was rather apt, especially as it confirms Dohrn’s words too. However, the American public opinion kept the Globke case in mind, despite a brief silence. A Hollywood script writer and author, Fred Schiller, wrote in October 1961 to Ernest Klein, brother of Julius, to help exert influence on Julius to undertake some steps to “eliminate [Globke] from his post (…) even at the risk of losing some German business,” because “Jewish blood is on [Globke’s] hands, certainly on his conscience.”

Schiller complains that in respect to a previous letter he sent, “the matter was lightly passed on by Julius,” but, prompted by further articles in the press and the book by Tetens, The New Germany and the Old Nazis, Schiller’s own need to address the issue grew. Without written proof, one can assume that Julius Klein responded promptly and comprehensively, for Schiller wrote back to General Klein within three weeks of the said letter. After having perused the documents on Globke that Klein must have sent him, Schiller rested the case. He wrote:

> The very fact that YOU are satisfied with Globke’s past record is sufficient for me. Because I don’t know of another individual who is a better champion for the cause of the Jews, their rights, and their problems than you. This is precisely why I wrote to Ernest when I became alarmed, knowing damn well if ANYBODY can help the situation, it was you. You have fully satisfied me and for me the Globke case is a closed matter.

Analyzing Schiller’s response, one can cast doubt on the level of persuasion of the materials Klein sent him, as it was not the clippings, the opinions, or anything else the dossier

60 Martha Jacobson to Manfred Baden, August 17, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
61 Fred Schiller to Ernest Klein, October 24, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
62 Fred Schiller to Julius Klein, November 16, 1961, ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
included, that converted the man. What in the end changed Schiller’s mind was, as he says, the fact that Klein trusted Globke. An additional remarkable facet of this exchange is the mere presence of its copies in Globke’s collected papers. Although at this point in Klein and Globke’s cooperation, it became customary to send to each other materials and clippings from American, respectively German journals, which treated about the State Secretary, Schiller’s letter represents a new dimension to Klein’s involvement in the Globke case. Klein himself offered a sole reason for his sending the attachment, namely that “it is typical for many letters, but this case has much greater significance, because the author is one of America’s most important publicists.”

Because it was Klein’s job to inform Globke about the current attitude of public opinion, that negatively toned letter by Schiller reflected well the state of the matter. Schiller’s second response, composed on the same day Klein informed Globke about the first one (what means they reached Globke separately), must have served, for one, the purpose of assuaging the State Secretary. Second, however, it could have implicitly demonstrated to Globke Klein’s abilities to affect people’s opinions, further strengthening the men’s professional and personal relationship, a goal that Klein undoubtedly had in mind.

Although some may doubt the effectiveness of Klein’s campaigns in favor of Globke, one cannot contest the fact that Klein bolstered the State Secretary’s morale and practical hopes when it came to smear campaigns against him. For example, Klein supported Globke’s lawsuit against Reinhard Strecker, who in 1961 came out with his excoriating book on Globke. Klein also informed Globke about any steps he has undertaken and repeatedly asked him for materials to be distributed to press and organizations towards the end of clarifying Globke’s past. In

63 Klein to Globke, November 16, 1961. ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
64 Cf. Lommatzsch, Hans Globke, 185.
January of 1962, Klein alerted Globke that the Jewish Sentinel\textsuperscript{66} printed an article inconvenient towards Globke, which came from the pen of a Bonn correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency.\textsuperscript{67} In light of this issue, Klein prompted Globke’s “friends” to supply the reporter in question with an appropriate dossier, “so that he could become acquainted with the other side of the matter as well.” Unable to assess exactly the degree of effectiveness of this intervention, one can nevertheless take into account a wider change of attitude of the Sentinel towards Globke. Quoted in an “Information Bulletin” of the JKPR Inc., a July 18, 1963 article from the said periodical does not praise Globke, but also does not attack him and makes an effort to turn the attention to the Communist propaganda campaigns.\textsuperscript{68}

To highlight the Communist propaganda aspect in the press became a clear goal for Julius Klein and his firm, especially in 1963, as the East German Supreme Court condemned Globke to lifetime prison. A note to Globke confirms this supposition: “Just as we discussed, our friends have achieved that the American press refers to a ‘Communist trial’. It is of significance that the powerful UPI [United Press International – MS] has started with such a report.”\textsuperscript{69} The fact that the East German authorities condemned Globke became in a sense Globke’s defense, which fitted nicely in the Cold War rhetoric of the time. Overall, it may be hard to determine whether this strategy had a positive effect on American public opinion. Regardless of its effectiveness however, this strategy of dismissing the discourse on Nazi crimes, alleged or proven, as Communist propaganda, thwarted the process of coming to terms with the past.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{67} Klein to Globke, January 2, 1962, ACDP, 01-070-031/2.
\textsuperscript{69} Klein to Globke, July 16, (1963?), ACDP, 01-070-094/1.
\textsuperscript{70} A similar notion appears in Bevers, Der Mann, 21, but pertains only to the German discourse on the topic.
excuse from facing the problems of Nazi past, not only in Globke’s case, but in general, highly
reflects the impact of the Cold War dynamics on the approaches to justice, morality, and history
in American public opinion.

The political developments on the international stage of the 1950s and 60s forged a
political and military alliance between the Federal Republic and the United States, what
complicated the matter for both parties. Towards the end of improving the image of West
Germany, and, in the process, justifying its own policy of partnership, certain American
politicians and public figures made the effort to portray the Bonn government as a growing
democracy and an ally in the Cold War – one whom Americans could trust. The American
media, however, approached the developments and issues from the Federal Republic not
infrequently with a critical note. This could be taken as a reflection of the opinion of a part of the
general American public, which still remembered the German state as an aggressor during the
Second World War. Moreover, certain organizations, such as the Society for the Prevention of
World War III, capitalized on these memories and exacerbated the anti-German attitudes, even
when other naturally inclined anti-fascist groups, such as some Jewish organizations, learned to
embrace the figure of Hans Globke. Nevertheless, in the light of the above-mentioned public
relations operations, it becomes clear that the West German government was highly preoccupied
with its appearance in the United States in the early years of the Cold War and the German
economic boom, knowing that they can count on support from American diplomats and
intelligence officers.
Chapter 4: Back Channels – Hans Globke’s Contacts with CIA

Although the West German authorities might have worried about the effects of negative publicity on the development of economic relations with the United States, they were not as concerned about the development of diplomatic and military relations with the administration in Washington. This chapter focuses on the development of the relationship between Hans Globke and the Central Intelligence Agency. Adenauer designated Hans Globke, who is credited with handling the most sensitive political and diplomatic matters of the first fourteen years of the Federal Republic, as the person of contact. I demonstrate, first, that the CIA gradually learned to appreciate its cooperation with State Secretary Globke, even though, plagued by his involvement in the Third Reich, Globke might have seemed suspicious and too controversial of a figure at the start. Second, this chapter will examine the role Globke played in establishing the German intelligence, what could have contributed to Globke’s becoming CIA’s trusted man. His interactions with American intelligence were a significant part of his work in Schaumburg Palace, because the Americans, highly involved in setting up the West German intelligence networks, had to rely on State Secretary Globke to achieve what seemed to be the best in their interest. Especially in the 1950s, when the Cold War and the forces of anti-Communism were gaining momentum, the CIA took advantage of the German geopolitical position to advance its cause. Third, this chapter will show the extent to which later American officials and agents helped Globke in times of need and whom they held in a high regard, avoiding the topic of his “brown past,” further demonstrating that ‘past’ was a flexible term, easily ignored when it was convenient to do so.

Hans Globke appeared first on the American radars immediately after the war. Reflected in his CIA files is an interview with General William Donovan of OSS, and “as a result of this
interview, [Globke] was summoned to Nuremberg and heard as a witness seven times at the War Crimes trials.”¹ Soon after that, in August 1945, Allen Dulles, at the time OSS Chief of Station in Berlin, authored a list of the so-called “crown jewels”, people taken into consideration for a post-war German government. According to that list, Globke was envisaged for a post in a new ministry of the interior, provided he received a clearance on his background check.² The Americans however, lost track of Globke as he settled in Nordrhein-Westphalia and became subject to the British jurisdiction.

Indeed, the British authorities carried out an investigation about Globke’s past in connection to his applying for office in the Nordrhein-Westphalian government in the summer of 1948. In their report on Globke, the British were fully aware of the man’s activities in Hitler’s Ministry of the Interior, but they found the character of Globke’s commentaries to the Nuremberg Laws “difficult to assess”, because copies of these were not available to them.³ Based on this, the British assumed that “the very small editions and the technical nature of the publication in which they appeared suggest that they were probably specialised statutes, rather than propaganda material.” Thus, with their dismissal of Globke’s contribution to the Nazi legal system and in the light of the Persilscheine that Globke presented them, the investigative officer concluded:

However supine Globke may have been during the early part of the Nazi period, and there is nothing to prove it either way, he appears to have been of value during the latter years to the only significant resistance group in Germany. The alleged objections to his appointment when considered alongside the foregoing facts would hardly seem to justify his exclusion from the vacant office. It is the opinion of this staff that the controversy probably arises out of conflicting party interests rather than from any old solid political or security factor connected with Globke’s past.⁴

This seemingly superficial background check on Globke conduced to the further development of his civil service career, in the local government at first, and from 1949 in the Federal chancellery. In fact, Adenauer frequently invoked the British assessment of Globke to defend his loyal assistant from accusations brought in against him. This demonstrated the Chancellor’s unwillingness to take into consideration other assessments of Globke, which might have compromised the integrity of both men.

The Americans noted this occurrence and became somewhat alarmed, approaching Adenauer’s statement rather carefully and calling it “ambiguous”. Spurred to look more closely now at Globke’s background, Bernard Gufler, Chief of Office of Political Affairs in Frankfurt, reported that it appeared that “Dr. Globke was not investigated by any other element of the High Commission at any time and specifically not in connection with his appointment to the (...) Federal Chancellery.” This basic lack of materials on Globke posed initial problems for the American officials, for example, concerning Globke’s date of birth (initially alleged as September 1, 1889 or 1897) or his name (Herbert, Dr. Gloebke). Then, once they had established accurate biographical data, however, they did not know what to think about Globke in relation to his background and his present position in the Federal government.

A better picture of Hans Globke started to arise after American agents and liaison officers reported from their interviews with him and gave their impressions of the man. A memorandum by an Office of the High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) officer, J.S. Arouet, to the Office of Intelligence dated April 7, 1950, discusses Globke’s activities and connections in the Chancellery as well as his personality. Arouet portrays Globke as very careful, discreet,

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5 Globke CIA Files 0012.
6 Globke CIA Files 0012.
competent, and “extremely pleasant.” Even more elaborate is a Dispatch MGFA-4298 to the Foreign Division from October 23, composed after another interview with Globke in context of the dismissal of Gustav Heinemann, Minister of the Interior. The agents claim that in their three-hour-long conversation they could examine Globke’s personality “from many angles,” because “he ranged over such a variety of subjects, was pounded with so many leading questions, and consumed so much alcohol.” Resulting from this, were rather positive impressions: “Although the members of the Liaison Staff are accustomed to communing with rightists of the most cracked variety … [they] were pleasantly surprised.” Globke “showed no trace of the paranoia that disfigures the usual professional anti-Semite” and possessed “little in his makeup or beliefs that should upset the U.S. High Commission.” The agents concluded, “If Globke is really a militarist of some kind, he certainly concealed it well.” Although this sort of reliance on subjective assessment of individuals, who wanted to make a good impression, can be questionable, it seems that the HICOG members and the CIA felt more comfortable relying on such sources as opposed to the vexing background information. The interviews also gave them a chance to evaluate, to the best of their abilities, the present condition of a subject’s approach to grave issues and form a basis for potential trusting relationship.

Even though the positive impressions of Globke from up to the year 1951 have certainly contributed to an accrual of trust towards him on the part of the American intelligence and Foreign Service, Globke did not fully enjoy this American trust, right at that moment. CIA’s emphasis on Globke’s approach to militarism (and it is important to mention that the interview from October 23, 1950 involved also the topic of rearmament) and the suspicion that the comment entertains are very suggestive as to what the American side feared. While at this point

8 Globke CIA Files 0013.
9 Dispatch – Impressions of Dr. Hans Globke, October 23, 1950, Globke CIA Files 0020.
their fears about Globke’s possibly concealed rightist views were already waning, the concerns pertaining to his alleged Communist sympathies and the State Secretary’s powerful influence on the government and the administration were on the rise.

Because of the American uncertainties about Globke, the Allied intelligence expressed reservations toward his allegedly unrestricted power in the Secretariat of the Federal Chancellery. Jürgen Bevers, points out in his study that the Americans, as early as May 1950 (i.e. only seven months into his presence in the Chancellery) regarded Globke as a ‘gray eminence’ of the Federal Republic.\(^{10}\) Clearly, the Americans relied on opinions from “within the Federal Republic,”\(^ {11}\) but the fact that they propagated this description suggests that they understood how important Hans Globke was in Bonn. This understanding appears even earlier than Bevers suggests, namely in a biographical note CIA agents composed and dated April 13, 1950: “…all laws enacted by the Government go over his desk at one point or another (…) He has many visitors, and even members of Parliament, wanting special favors from the Chancellor, find it more effective to apply to Globke.”\(^ {12}\) Hence, it was only logical for the American intelligence to assure the trustworthiness and ideological compatibility of a person wielding such influence.

Notably, the thought of Globke being a Nazi sympathizer did not occupy the CIA too extensively, in the end. Except for occasional references to him as someone with a Nazi-past, the CIA files reflect very little, if any, serious attempts to investigate this rightist facet of Globke’s biography.

However, Globke’s contacts with the political left have concerned the American intelligence much more, albeit briefly. In assessing Globke’s possible cooperation with the Communists, one must consider his personal convictions and beliefs. Certainly, Globke was an

\(^{10}\) Bevers, Der Mann, 113.
\(^{11}\) Globke CIA Files 0013.
\(^{12}\) Ibid.
ardent Catholic, what prompts Bevers to argue in his book about the state secretary, that a conscious identification with the Communists does not seem likely in the light of these facts. Nevertheless, since Globke vaunted on numerous occasions his participation in the anti-Hitler resistance, and since the Communists played a powerful role in many German resistance networks, the American authorities had a reason to examine Globke from this angle too. An opportunity for it arose in the aftermath of the Otto John scandal in the summer and fall of 1954, when the CIA investigated Globke’s and other German officials’ connections to the Communist organizations, and in particular their wartime involvement in the Nazi-resistance group, Rote Kapelle. The defection of Otto John, the first director of the Federal Bureau for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV), who escaped, or as others interpret it, was abducted to East Germany, prompted American as well as German suspicions. It has done so, because it demonstrated the vulnerability of the Western political system by exposing rifts in individual convictions among the administrative elite (if one takes the view that John has been a sympathizer of the Communists) or because it failed to protect itself from actions of the Eastern secret services (assuming that John was indeed kidnapped). In any case, people earlier associated with the Rote Kapelle came under scrutiny of American and German Intelligence. A secret message dated October 1, 1954 (two months after the John affair), Chief of Base at Pullach reveals CIA’s “efforts toward the detection of alleged Rote Kapelle contacts or personalities, who are today most critically placed and potentially dangerous.” They had a “reason to believe

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13 Cf Bevers, Der Mann, 27, 59-65.
14 Rote Kapelle was an anti-Nazi resistance group formed around 1933 by some left-leaning officers of the Abwehr. Led by Harro Schulze-Boysen, Rote Kapelle collaborated with different groups connected to the Soviet intelligence circles in Western Europe. It also linked together groups of leftist intellectuals in the underground Berlin during the war. Adapted from Wolfgang Benz, “Verweigerung im Alltag und Widerstand im Krieg,” in Informationen zur politischen Bildung, Band 243, April 2003, Federal Agency for Civic Education, bpb.de. http://www.bpb.de/izpb/10400/verweigerung-im-alltag-und-widerstand-im-krieg?p=0
that CAUSA [Globke]\textsuperscript{15} falls within this category.”\textsuperscript{16} Globke’s associations with Herbert Engelsing, a member of the resistance and Globke’s long-time friend, motivated the Americans’ distrust. Supposedly, under the Hitler regime, Globke was Engelsing’s informant, who in turn passed the intelligence to Harro Schulze-Boysen, the leader of the Rote Kapelle. There was no contemporary intelligence to show any more ties Globke could have had to the organization,\textsuperscript{17} but some documents in possession of the CIA corroborate the fact that “Globke was well aware that E. [Engelsing] was closely connected with the S-B [Schulze-Boysen] group.”\textsuperscript{18}

Nevertheless, the 1954 investigation whether Globke himself was a member of the Rote Kapelle proved inconclusive, but strengthened the CIA in its conviction that Globke was not a fascist. As a result of this, or American realization that it would be politically expedient for them, Globke gained further acceptance in the eyes of the CIA, what the American files, beginning in the late 1954, reflect, marking this year as a possible turning point in Globke’s connection with the CIA.

A factor whose significance in the establishment of the Globke-CIA relationship cannot be understated is the American cooperation with and patronage of the Gehlen Organization (the Org), a precursor of the German international intelligence (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) and its head, Reinhard Gehlen. Although the topic of the Org, its development, and its activities is a very broad subject of scholarly investigation and lies beyond the scope of this research, it is closely connected to the political issues of the early years of the Federal Republic. During the War, Reinhard Gehlen was a General in the Wehrmacht and the chief of military intelligence Fremde Heere Ost (Foreign Armies East). Because of the nature of his work, he gathered

\textsuperscript{16} Airgram from Pullach, October 1, 1954, Globke CIA Files 0069.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Airgram from Frankfurt, November 10, 1954, Globke CIA Files 0074.
voluminous intelligence on the Soviets, and anticipating the Allied victory, secured materials to be traded with the Americans for his freedom. The US authorities became interested in Gehlen’s knowledge and in 1946, offered him cooperation as a leader of an intelligence cell in Germany with its base at Pullach. Financed by Washington, and already in 1949 foreseen as the future intelligence service of West Germany, the Org served both entities at once; both Cold War matters and domestic politics preoccupied the organization. Already in 1946 therefore, it was clear that the US interests would sacrifice concern for former Nazi allegiances of people like Gehlen or Globke in the interest of rising anti-Communism. According to Gehlen, and other sources as well, Hans Globke “reserved for himself personally any further connection to the former Organization G.” Hence, all contact between the Federal Government, including Chancellor Adenauer, and the Org took place through Globke, giving the Ministerialdirektor a reputation of “the best-informed man in Bonn.”

Such a three-sided relationship, Globke-Gehlen-CIA, was of perceived benefit for all sides. The Americans, after having assured Globke’s loyalty, could rely on him not only for information, but also for actions that were in the interest of the US military and intelligence. The designation of Globke as the “covert contact with the German Government,” which was a decision of the High Commission and Washington as well as a wish of Adenauer’s can suggest that the Americans saw a potential in Globke in spite of any reservations they might have had before. They might have wanted to exploit this potential, among other things, to influence the development of German intelligence and military in the 1950s. In a 1954 Memo for Chief of

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21 Gehlen, “Der Aufbau,” 186.
22 Bevers, Der Mann, 143.
23 Contact Report, July 28, 1953, Globke CIA Files 0045.
Operations regarding developments in the process of integration of the Org, CIA-Chief of Berlin, Peter Sichel explicitly states his preference to deal with Globke over Theodor Blank, the head of Amt Blank, a prototype of the future Ministry of Defense.

Whatever the future status of the German Intelligence Service, Blank apparently wishes to be in control of the transfer. On 17 December 1953 Blank approached Tony Pabsch, Liaison House HICOG with a request that Pabsch determine the United States reaction to (a) the transfer of ZIPPER [the Org] to the GFR in early February 1954 and (b) United States willingness to continue to assume part of the financial burden as an interim arrangement 60 to 120 days after the transfer to permit the GFR to obtain its own funds and cabinet approval. Blank was later advised that he should discuss this with Globke….

In summation it is well to point out that Globke and Adenauer have slipped into the background. Our desire for a centralized intelligence service under the chancellor is facing sabotage from Blank and the anti-Globke forces which desire subordination to Blank and the Bundestag. However, until Adenauer takes a firm stand we will not have a true picture of the political allignment.24

This passage presents Globke as the man for the Americans, the man who will carry out the Org transfer the way the CIA might have wished for. Moreover, it becomes clear that the matter of legalizing the Gehlen Organization was a volatile issue in the Bonn circles, because control over the intelligence meant possibly larger influence on the politics. For this reason from the American perspective, only the trusted people should have handled it. Lastly, one sees exactly, what is the aim of the Americans in reference to the future BND – it should be created out of Org, and not any other intelligence service operating there at the time, and it should be subjugated to a strong chancellor.

In fact, the follicles of West German intelligence, most prominently the financed by the Americans Org, cherished their connections to Globke, being fully aware that this can only help their cause. In order to become the official intelligence service of the Federal Republic, Gehlen needed Globke’s good graces. Thus, the CIA dismissively approached a source’s information from October 1954 that Gehlen would want to undermine Globke: “The extreme political

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sensitivity of this matter is obvious. UTILITY [Gehlen] is aware of this and is also acutely aware of the great stake that ZIPPER has in CAUSA who has been, for several years, their anchor in UPGROWTH [German Federal Government].”

Because in the race for official incorporation into the state apparatus concluded in 1956, it was Gehlen’s Organization that has prevailed over other ones (e.g. the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Heinz-Dienst), Gehlen clearly knew how to use his connections and how beneficial to him was the cooperation with Globke. Appraising the role of Globke in this issue, Gehlen writes in 1979, “The fact that the first Chancellor was Dr. Adenauer and his closest assistant Dr. Globke, was decisive for the future German Intelligence Service. Both of them were men with a natural instinct for all political and intelligence-related questions and needs.” Gehlen realized that leaders and administrators as strong as Adenauer and Globke were truly ‘decisive’ for a creation of an official intelligence service in a post-fascist state, which could have been faced with domestic and international opposition. At any rate, the maintenance of the Org and then the creation of the BND did not encounter significant resistance from the American authorities; on the contrary, the analogous US institutions supported their German partners in spite of some public disapprobation.

The resistance to this issue surfaced in the domestic sphere early in Globke’s career, mostly not because of some ideological conviction against intelligence, but out of political worries that the manner in which it would operate, would serve arbitrarily Adenauer and Globke. Whether the contacts to the agents of intelligence did in fact help Globke and the CDU strengthen its power remains a question for debate. However, the mere fact that Globke came under suspicion and attack for using intelligence for political reasons is of significance as it further proves that Globke was publicly demonized not only for his “brown past,” but for his

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25 Globke CIA Files 0069. According to the CIA Cryptonym Research Aid: UTILITY is Gehlen, ZIPPER, Org. UPGROWTH, the government of the Federal Republic.
26 Gehlen, “Der Aufbau,” 185.
activities in the Chancellery as well. In his CIA files, one finds reports of such concerns voiced against Globke. For example, a dispatch from Bonn on July 9, 1953 comments, “the more we hear about GLOBKE the more we are convinced that the accusations leveled against UTILITY for meddling in internal German affairs are not basically the doings of UTILITY, but of GLOBKE who uses either UTILITY or UTILITY’s sources for political info.”

This ‘meddling’ pertained to garnering information on political opponents, as the Finance Minister Schäffer alleged to a CIA source in June 1953, and also to force the legalization of the Org as BND. In order to achieve this federal takeover of the Org, Bevers claims, Globke helped the cause by driving Gehlen’s competition from the field. The author alleges in a rather subtly substantiated way, that Globke brought about the ruin of Friedrich Heinz. Such an allegation figures in a CIA Dispatch from Bonn, in which source relies on Johann Graf von Kielmansegg, an official in Amt Blank, to whom “it was obvious that the attack against CAPOTE [Heinz] was being steered and led by Hans GLOBKE. In K’s opinion, both UTILITY and Otto JOHN were being ‘used’ by GLOBKE to achieve power.” Although in the light of these allegations it seems that Globke might have ‘used’ Gehlen to achieve power, it is vital to remember that Gehlen also has been striving for securing his Organization’s official status. It is therefore, crucial to consider the Globke-Gehlen relationship as a whole, both of the men being of value to each other and relying on each other for their own purposes. The question remains however, to what extent did the CIA approve of this sort of exchange of services.

Although there are no sources to document an explicit stance of the CIA on Globke and Gehlen’s activities, speculatively, one can hypothesize that the American authorities would have

27 Dispatch from Bonn, July 9, 1953, Globke CIA Files 0043.
28 Cable from Bonn, June 24, 1953, Globke CIA Files 0040.
29 Cf. Globke CIA Files 0083 and 0086.
30 Globke CIA Files 0043.
no reason to frown upon it, because in the end they too would have preferred to see an organization supported by them succeed. Over time, Globke’s close cooperation with these groups led to the accruement of American trust and reliance toward him, even if the sidelined German officials voiced their concerns about Org and Globke using their powers in the intra-German political affairs. Interestingly enough, the American trust toward the State Secretary grew in spite of his controversial activity under the Hitler Regime, which clearly was remembered but not belabored.

Moreover, after 1955, one could even characterize CIA’s approach to Globke as friendly and respectful, what a series of documents regarding Globke’s three unavailing plans to travel to the US corroborate. In this series of exchanges between the Station in Bonn and the Director (Allen Dulles) or the Chief of EE, Globke is treated with utmost importance. In reference to preparing the first visit to the US in June of 1955, the author of these messages in Bonn stresses Globke’s “key role” and urges the headquarters not to underestimate his importance in present German Government…. References to him as the grey eminence in the German government may not be absolutely correct since he may not actually make decisions, but he is involved in all major governmental decisions and controls access of even cabinet ministers to Adenauer. He [is] more important than other visitors on whom time has been spent and should be handled only by KUBARK [CIA] top echelon, including possible personal attention from Director.31

In addition to the official message, the original document, dated May 4, 1955, informing the headquarters about a proposed trip bears a handwritten comment, presumably added by the addressee, “This should be a wonderful opportunity. FIZ (?) start preparing briefing material for DCI [Director Central Intelligence].”

A statement on Globke’s importance did not have to be repeated when preparing other attempts to bring him over to America in December 1956 and January 1957, because presumably

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31 Cf. Globke CIA Files 0085 and 0093.
his name and reputation were well known by then in Washington. There is, however, a discrepancy in approach to Globke between the leaders of the CIA and the US Department of State. The latter one was a little concerned with possible criticisms about it funding Globke’s trip, what has caused a slight argument between the two institutions about planning of such a voyage. While the Department of State might have had its reservations because of controversies about Globke and questions about the diplomatic protocol, CIA has had its heart set on the State Secretary coming across the Atlantic for official as well as tourist purposes. Chief of Base Bonn complains about the State Department’s indecisiveness, saying that if ODACID [the US State Department] “is interested in sponsoring, as they ought to be, then they must do the necessary planning. If not, then they should say so, and we [KUBARK] should take over, proper or not.”

By having expressed such a relatively passionate statement, the CIA seemed to be very determined to gratify Globke at this time, by organizing various activities ranging from meetings with Central Intelligence officials, representatives of the US State Department to typical sightseeing. One can conclude therefore, that inasmuch as up to 1955 the references to Globke as the *eminence grise* might have been a shortcoming in the eyes of the CIA, for an unclear reason Globke’s power behind the scenes was regarded as a valuable facet since then.

Because the cooperation between Globke, Gehlen and the CIA was rather fruitful, beneficial to all three sides, with Adenauer’s Secretary becoming a trusted and loyal collaborator, both the CIA and Gehlen had interest in protecting Globke from various attacks and campaigns against him. CIA’s record on Globke shows, the American side in the latter half of the 1950s was concerned to some degree with preventing State Secretary’s reputation from blemishes. Among other things, Globke’s files reflect UTLITY’s “information that ZECH-\-\-NENNTWIG is in possession of blackmail material on CAUSA”, and a CIA agent’s suppositions

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32 Chief of Base Bonn to Chief EE, December 10, 1956, Globke CIA Files 0121.
in an “eyes alone” memo that “a likely candidate for leading the opposition against CAUSA may very well be Mr. Paul Friedmann.”

Although one cannot be certain, that the American intelligence responded in any way to those cases, their presence in the records could imply that the Agency paid attention to the possible threats against their main contact in Adenauer’s Chancellery.

In two documented instances, the CIA actually helped Globke to obtain information that could relate to his past, and thus could serve as a means of preparing a defense against any anticipated attack. First, in June 1956, an agent from the Bonner Base reports on his passing to Globke a photostatic copy of the 1941 rejection letter for membership in the NSDAP. Globke “appreciated the letter as a souvenir of the complicated past.” Perplexingly, this document contains a sentence that poses many questions. The agent told Globke “that this letter could not be published, because the Berlin Documents Center know that I had requested the photostatic copy.” If the CIA warned Globke about not publishing the document, did he have an intention to do so? For what purpose? Why would the American controlled BDC object to this publication, as implied by the agent? If Globke knew about such conditions, was the pragmatic man then, turning sentimental? In any case, nothing can undermine the fact, that the CIA acquiesced to Globke’s wish, and without much ado confronted his “brown past” rather dismissingly.

A second instance from spring of 1959 involved an allegedly existing War Criminals List #101. “UTILITY has asked KUBARK assistance in answering a question passed to him by CAUSA recently.” The said question related to East German press supposedly publishing articles against Globke, whose name was to figure on a “War Criminals List #101” compiled by the

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33 Globke CIA Files 0071 and 0108.
34 Memorandum of Conversation with CAUSA, June 8, 1956, Globke CIA Files 0110.
Allies after the war.\textsuperscript{35} Having searched for it, the BND and at least the Munich Base files contained “no traces of such a list.” Although possible, it is doubtful that such a list existed without the CIA or BND knowing about it. It is clear therefore, that Globke’s allies from the intelligence agencies sympathized with him and tried to help him in his struggle against the “propagandist” attacks on his Nazi past, accusations of possessing unrestricted power, and undermining actions of political competitors on the domestic scene, on which the earlier chapters focused.

In the anticipation of Globke’s retirement in the fall of 1963, the question of Globke’s successor puzzled the American officials. They knew that also the position and activities of the state secretary would change under the pressure of the governmental body to avoid a future gray eminence figure. Since “another (…) function of Globke has been his role (…) as supervisor of the German intelligence system and (…) as top coordinator of the German intelligence services with the Allied intelligence community”\textsuperscript{36} a change in the Secretary’s office would not only affect the domestic affairs. The Americans too would have to face a new man, with whom they would need to establish a relationship as satisfactory as they had enjoyed with Globke, at least since 1955.

\textsuperscript{35} Dispatch from Munich, May 15, 1959, Globke CIA Files 0158. Cf. also Globke CIA Files 0160.
\textsuperscript{36} Coburn Kidd to US Department of State, July 10, 1963, Globke CIA Files 0183.
Conclusion

The analysis of West German politics and its international relations through the prism of the Globke case made it evident that the central element of their development was a political discourse on the Nazi past and the Cold War present. All parties involved strove for a break from the past; each one, however, defined this break differently. The antifascist groupings (comprised of West German socialist parliamentary opposition, East German Communists, and a notable portion of the international public) demanded removal of Globke and other people encumbered in the Nazi regime from public offices. They regarded the presence of such notorious figures as a continuity of the Third Reich, which in their eyes constituted a threat to a successful development of democracy in West Germany. This threat manifested itself further in Konrad Adenauer’s stubbornness in adhering to his controversial advisor, which magnified his authoritarian style of government. In reference to criticisms coming from parliamentary opposition – most prominently the Social Democratic Party – one could speak of additional motives that combined moral concerns with political expediency. The question of their motives, however, cannot be answered comprehensively on the basis of this study.

On the other hand, the pro-Western forces including Adenauer and American diplomats, military, and secret services preferred to break with the past by either reinterpreting it, or simply forgetting it, for the benefit of strengthening the ‘Western Alliance’ against the ‘Eastern Communism’. Such a dynamic allowed Globke – and other Germans – to write their own past from the perspective of the present. This active remolding of their personal histories constitutes, arguably, a large problem for historians, as it obscures investigations of their pasts; it complicates Ranke’s principle, in that we cannot accurately state, ‘what actually happened.’ The fact of intervening into the narratives of the past for the sake of present and future, however,
proves that, as I have argued, pragmatic motivations played a key role in shaping the domestic and international policies of postwar Federal Republic. The willingness to accept this new version of the past on the part of the former enemies of Nazism – the administration in the United States among others – demonstrates further that the necessities of the 1950s and 60s overshadowed many questions about Germans’ activities in the 1930s and 40s.

The use of former Nazis, such as Reinhard Gehlen, and trusted civil servants like Globke, seemed crucial for establishing back-channel connections that would assure the United States of the ‘properness’ of West German development in the Cold War-ridden Europe. Similarly, these connections assured the West German proponents of integration into the West that the said West was willing to accept the Federal Republic into its ranks. Ironically, however, reliance on the ‘Globkes’ of the period threatened the desired West German integration, because precisely not all in the West were as accepting of the developments in the BRD as the strategic American institutions were. Also the Eastern Communist bloc vehemently attacked the Federal Republic, using the Globke case as leverage for deeper ideological criticism of Western policies in regard to coping with Nazi past. The reasons for the GDR’s attacks are obviously not clear-cut. Rather they are a fusion of moral concerns and explicit Cold War agenda. Regardless of their motives, East German campaigns and efforts to internationalize the Globke case inflamed tensions between the two German states and, to a smaller degree, undermined the image of Federal Republic. Toward the end of improving its image abroad and overcoming the negativity among American public, on which this study focused, the Federal Republic launched extensive public relations campaigns. These campaigns often capitalized on the anti-Communist sentiment in the United States, showing how in public and political rhetoric, the perpetrators in one terrorist regime could become victims of another totalitarian regime’s propagandist attacks.
In addition to demonstrating how the Globke case reflected world politics of the time, this study illuminated the extent to which major political and diplomatic forces focused in on the same case. At different levels of society, often dividing officials and “ordinary” citizens not only of West Germany but also elsewhere, Hans Globke provided all of them – Adenauer, SPD, other West Germans, antifascists, SED, American officials and civilians – with an opportunity to exercise their own agendas. Some saw in him a personification of all that was carried over from the Third Reich; of failed denazification; of all political problems of the Federal Republic. Others regarded Globke as a skillful civil servant, a mastermind behind the establishment of postwar West German administrative system. From this, it becomes apparent how easily these different groups formulated diametrically different responses – and actions – to the same problem.

With this study, however, the Globke case is not yet fully examined. Due to the fact that copious materials are still locked in the archives, future research on this topic is necessary – and essential for better understanding of the larger context of West German and world history. The controversy around Hans Globke is also not the only one that shook the Federal Republic in the first decades of its existence. But because of his unique position in the early BRD, at the side of the first postwar chancellor, the Globke case is arguably the most significant. With all its twists and turns, varying viewpoints, and shocking revelations it serves not only as a perfect lens for larger international problems of the 1950s and 60s, but also shows that postwar German history can be very exciting.
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