

# HOW TO END A COLD WAR


**D.S. Foglesong**

**David S. Foglesong** – PhD (History), Professor of History at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. 08901-1108, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Seminary Place, 16. E-mail: dsfogle@history.rutgers.edu

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**Abstract.** *Histories of the end of the Cold War that have focused on the roles of the top leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have neglected an important dimension of the ending of the antagonism between the West and the East. Before Ronald Reagan and M.S. Gorbachev met at Geneva in November 1985, citizens of the USA, the USSR, and European nations who were alarmed by the danger of nuclear war formed new organizations dedicated to overcoming the hostility between their nations. British members of European Nuclear Disarmament and American activists in groups such as Beyond War and Peace Links established connections to independent groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the Committee of Soviet Women and the Committee for the Defense of Peace in the USSR. These relationships made it possible to organize very ambitious citizen diplomacy projects. Hundreds of Soviet citizens made extensive speaking tours in the United States while numerous British and American activists visited the Soviet Union. These exchanges dispelled negative stereotypes and helped to end the mutual demonization that had been central to the Cold War since the late 1940s. Analysis of the experiences of the citizen diplomats in the 1980s yields lessons for contemporary international relations about the importance of avoiding one-sided blame for conflicts and the need to move beyond recriminations about the past in order to develop cooperation in the present and future.*

**Keywords:** Cold War, arms race, United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, citizen diplomacy, activism, exchanges, stereotype, demonization, cooperation, European Nuclear Disarmament, Beyond War and Peace Links, Committee of Soviet Women, Committee for the Defense of Peace.

**H**ow did the Cold War end? The explanations scholars have presented thus far have focused overwhelmingly on the roles of the «great men» who led the superpowers in the second half of the 1980s, par-

ticularly Ronald Reagan, M. S. Gorbachev, and George H. W. Bush. However, historians are now beginning to turn attention to a neglected dimension: the initiatives of Soviet, American, and European citizens to reach across the im-

aginary «iron curtain» and cooperate in exchanges that shattered negative stereotypes and overcame the mutual demonization that was central to the Cold War (See, for example, [Neumann, 2019]). This brief article will describe some of the most important citizen diplomacy projects of the 1980s in order to show how attention to citizen activism can contribute to a reinterpretation of the end of the enmity between East and West. It also will draw two specific lessons from the experiences of that decade about steps that need to be taken to escape from the vilification and recrimination that has marred relations between Russia and the United States in more recent years.

On January 28, 1992, one month after the resignation of President M.S. Gorbachev and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, President George H.W. Bush declared in a State of the Union address: «By the grace of God, America won the Cold War» [Plokhly, 2014: 389]. Ever since then, «triumphalist» views of an American victory in the Cold War have underpinned policies of the United States toward Russia and Eastern Europe, as scholars such as Stephen Cohen have argued [Cohen, 2011]. US officials in both Republican and Democratic administrations have assumed that an American triumph in the competition with Soviet communism vindicated US liberal democratic ideals, gave the United States a mandate to exert vigorous leadership throughout the world, and granted the US the right to determine the limits of Russia's legitimate interests, including on its borders. Washington policymakers recognized that some Russians might not like US policies, particularly the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but believed that Russian objections could be disregarded because Russia was weak. In addition, US leaders felt that adamant Russian opponents of US policies could be dismissed as retrograde ultranationalists who nostalgically pined for the lost Soviet empire and vainly longed to reverse the outcome of the Cold War.

Triumphalist views of the end of the Cold War have also been promoted by many American writers, from the politically connected conservative author Peter Schweizer to distinguished historians such as Sean Wilentz and

John Lewis Gaddis. Schweizer's tendentious assertions that President Ronald Reagan and his advisers relentlessly pursued a bold strategy to cause the collapse of the Soviet Union have contributed to the widespread belief in the United States that similar strategies involving military buildups, economic sanctions, and covert actions should be pursued against other authoritarian states [Schweizer, 1994; Schweizer, 2002]. While Wilentz, a Princeton University professor and prominent Democrat, rejected claims like Schweizer's, he presented a different triumphalist interpretation: Democratic President Harry Truman initiated the containment policies that «contributed mightily to the eventual collapse of the Soviet empire» [Wilentz, 2008: 151]. Even more influential have been the arguments by Gaddis, a professor at Yale University, that the Cold War «was a necessary contest that settled fundamental issues once and for all». According to Gaddis, Reagan played a central role in the Western victory, in part by conducting a «rhetorical offensive», including condemnation of the Soviet Union as an «evil empire», and in part by launching a Strategic Defense Initiative that panicked the Kremlin [Gaddis, 2005: 225-227].

Such triumphalist views are deeply misleading. As scholars such as Robert English and Odd Arne Westad have shown, the Reagan administration's hardline policies in the early 1980s, including an ideological crusade, a massive military buildup, and support for anticommunist insurgencies in Central America, Angola, and Afghanistan, did not simply or quickly cause Soviet leaders to lose faith in socialism, surrender in the superpower competition, or abandon support for Marxist movements in the Third World. Instead, the aggressive US policies strengthened the position of Soviet hawks, undermined Soviet reformers, delayed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complicated the Soviet Union's retrenchment from its other commitments in the Third World [Robert, 2000: 169-172; Westad, 2007].

Although American triumphalist visions have taken many forms, they all have tended to exacerbate problems in American-Russian relations in the post-Cold War world, not offer positive guidance for how to improve rela-

tions in the future. For example, when a crisis erupted over Ukraine in the first months of 2014, former US Ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul argued that American-Russian conflict arose because the US «did not fully win the Cold War». In his view, troubles stemmed not from aggressive triumphalist policies of expanding NATO, supporting color revolutions in the former Soviet Union, and championing democracy promotion inside Russia but because it had not pushed such policies aggressively enough earlier.<sup>1</sup>

While American writers have often focused on the role of Reagan and less often on the way Bush managed the end of the Cold War [Engel, 2017], other authors in the US and Russia have emphasized the crucial initiatives Gorbachev took to terminate the East-West conflict [Leffler, 2007: 466; Grachev, 2008]. Gorbachev's engaging personality, his increasingly bold ambition to reform the USSR, his idealistic vision of a transformation of international relations, and his clever tactics to overcome hardline Soviet opponents certainly were vital to the easing of tensions between East and West. However, it is misleading to depict Gorbachev as being guided by ideas developed by advisers inside the Soviet Union without consideration of their perceptions of peace movements in the West and their interaction with American and European citizen activists.

In part because of widespread Russian resentment of Western betrayals of promises to Gorbachev after 1991, a new leader with a vision like Gorbachev's is unlikely to come to power in Russia. Hence, stories of the end of the Cold War that make the unique figure of Gorbachev the central actor have little wisdom to offer concerning the improvement of relations between Russia and the West in the twenty-first century.

Since scholars have focused so overwhelmingly on the roles of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush, they have neglected a vital dimension of the overcoming of enmity between the Soviet Union and the West: the ex-

tensive participation of Soviet, European, and American citizens in exchanges and dialogue that dispelled negative stereotypes, promoted mutual understanding, and fostered trust and sympathy. Although people from many countries, including Scandinavian nations,<sup>2</sup> played important roles, this article will concentrate on the involvement of British, American and Soviet citizens in unofficial popular diplomacy (*narodnaia diplomatiia*).

Among the anti-nuclear activists in the United Kingdom who took part in exchanges with the Soviet bloc, the leaders of European Nuclear Disarmament (END) were especially influential. The charismatic historian E.P. Thompson and political scientist Mary Kaldor helped to launch END in 1980 with an appeal to overcome the Cold War that garnered thousands of signatures from prominent figures in Western Europe and a few from Eastern Europe. Although END had only a few hundred members, it exerted broader influence through its contacts with the much larger Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), which enlisted more than 80,000 members in 1983 and over 100,000 by the end of 1984. As Kaldor noted, END increasingly emphasized what it called «détente from below» – the construction of links between peace, human rights, and environmental activists in both eastern and western Europe [Kaldor, 1991: 1; Burke, 2017]. In the Soviet Union, END leaders drew especially close to the Moscow Trust Group, though they also had many, sometimes tense, discussions with the heads of the official Soviet Peace Committee [Efstathiou, 2015: 139, 152]. By traveling repeatedly to Eastern Europe and the USSR, meeting and arguing with dissidents, developing relationships with official Communist peace organizations, promoting civil dialogue between ideological opponents, calling for the withdrawal of both US and Soviet forces from Europe, and circulating their ideas through the *END Journal*, the British activists helped to change the ways many people in the East and the West thought. According to Thompson, END and its partners

<sup>1</sup> McFaul M. 2014. Confronting Putin's Russia. *New York Times*. March 23. On McFaul's complicated and sometimes contradictory views, see his memoir [From Cold War..., 2018].

<sup>2</sup> On the role of Scandinavian women, see, for example [Gerle, 1989: 369-388].

helped to break open the «controlling ideological field-of-force» that had kept Europe divided into hostile camps [Thompson, 1991]. As a historian who lived in Moscow in 1984 and in Poland in 1986-1987 has observed, the seminars END helped to convene with pacifists, rights activists, and feminists in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere fostered «the impression that the movements East and West really had become one peace community, uncontained by borders» [Kenney, 2002: 117].

The involvement of Thompson, Kaldor, and other leaders of END in citizen outreach to the Soviet bloc has been disregarded in recent scholarship. For example, in a recent article in the prestigious *American Historical Review*, one historian asserted that British anti-nuclear activists believed that the risk of nuclear warfare «could be managed only through a top-down method: unilateral disarmament» and felt that «the average person had little control over her or his fate» [Boucher, 2019: 1236]. Although that is an accurate characterization of the views of some of the leaders of CND, it ignores how Thompson, Kaldor, and others in END emphasized the opposite belief that citizens of western and eastern Europe had to take direct action to end the Cold War, which militarists and ideologues in the governments on both sides were determined to perpetuate [Bess, 1993: 126, 132].

Soviet officials, including Georgy Arbatov, reacted very negatively to the END activism in the early 1980s. Leaders of the Soviet Peace Committee (SPC), especially, harshly criticized END leaders as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency or supporters of NATO because of its championing of human rights in the Soviet bloc and because they challenged Soviet influence on the peace movement in Western Europe. However, after Gorbachev took power in 1985 Soviet officials became more flexible, leaders of the SPC were replaced, and some of the key ideas of Thompson and Kaldor came to be embraced in the «new thinking» of the Soviet leadership [Thompson, 1991: 8-10, 22-23; Tairov, 1991: 43-48; Burke, 2017: 243]<sup>3</sup>.

While British activists thus exerted substantial influence on the easing of Cold War tensions in Europe, American activists had even more significant effects on attitudes in the United States and the Soviet Union. In response to the deterioration of US-Soviet relations and perceptions of an increased danger of nuclear war in the early 1980s, many Americans created new organizations dedicated to overcoming American-Soviet enmity. The new groups included: (1) Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND), formed in Boston in 1980; (2) Beyond War, established in northern California in 1982 by Silicon Valley professionals and their wives; (3) Peace Links: Women Against Nuclear War, created in 1982 in Arkansas by Betty Bumpers, wife of Democratic Senator Dale Bumpers; (4) Grandmothers for Peace, launched in Sacramento, California in 1982; (5) the Center for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Initiatives (CUUI), spearheaded from 1983 on by Sharon Tennison and headquartered in San Francisco; (6) the US-USSR Youth Exchange Program, founded in 1983 by Cynthia Lazaroff, which organized joint American-Soviet wilderness adventures<sup>4</sup>; and (7) the American-Soviet Youth Orchestra, created in 1988 and led by Grace Kennan Warnecke, daughter of diplomat and historian George F. Kennan.

Such citizen activists have been depicted by one prominent historian of the end of the Cold War as naïve, hopelessly unrealistic, and even pawns of the KGB [Service, 2015: 3, 31-2, 99-101, 262]. That image is a caricature. In reality, most of the leaders and members of the new groups were quite different from the pro-Soviet fellow travelers who had organized visits to the USSR in the preceding decades. In interviews with journalists, members of the new citizen organizations often emphasized that they were not «peaceniks» who had demonstrated against the Vietnam War. Instead, they tended to be solidly in the mainstream of American life and politics. For example, more than 150 of the supporters of Peace Links were spouses of members of Congress, while

<sup>3</sup> Tairov was Soviet representative to the World Peace Council.

<sup>4</sup> For a profile of Lazaroff, see [Warner, Shuman, 1987].

the leaders of Beyond War included two former White House Fellows (one Republican, one Democrat), the heads of companies that had major Pentagon contracts, advertising executives, lawyers, and venture capitalists. After four Beyond War leaders visited the USSR in 1983, two of them reported to an audience in California that the Soviet Union was a police state.<sup>5</sup>

Several of the new citizen groups organized exchanges with Soviet people on a very wide scale. Three of the most important projects can be described briefly here.

In October 1985 Peace Links hosted 13 prominent Soviet women, who split into four teams that traveled for two weeks to cities from Nashville, Tennessee to Las Vegas, Nevada. Since the Soviet women appeared at two or three events (public forums, press conferences, lunches, and dinners) each day, and since 100-300 people attended most events, the tour led to more than ten thousand personal encounters with Americans. The Soviet visits also led journalists, including wire service reporters, to write scores of favorable articles.<sup>6</sup>

In 1987, key figures in Beyond War and a number of Soviet scientists and scholars jointly produced a book based on their discussions about how to avoid nuclear war and overcome hostility between the superpowers, titled *Breakthrough/Proryv: Emerging New Thinking* [Gromyko, Hellman, 1988]. As soon as the book was published in January 1988 ten of the Soviet authors came to America to publicize it in very ambitious tours alongside contributors from Beyond War. Visiting more than a hundred cities in every region of the country, the authors met and spoke directly to almost 300,000 Americans, gave interviews to fourteen television and radio stations, and had fifteen additional stories about them broadcast on television. In addition, journalists wrote more than a hundred articles and editorials in

local and regional newspapers about the Soviet visitors.<sup>7</sup>

Between January 1988 and early 1989, Sharon Tennison and other leaders of the Center for U.S.-U.S.S.R. Initiatives brought 400 Soviet citizens – some, but not all of them members of the official Soviet Peace Committee – to 240 towns and cities across the United States. That «Soviets, Meet Middle America!» (SMMA) project led to even more face-to-face encounters and publicity than the tours organized by Peace Links and Beyond War.

The Soviet visits provoked intense opposition in some areas from anticommunists who claimed the Soviet visitors were part of KGB-controlled propaganda operations to deceive Americans, denied that the Soviet Union was in the midst of far-reaching reforms, and insisted on the moral superiority of the United States to the Soviet Union. In Nashville in 1985, for example, protesters against a Peace Links-sponsored reception held up signs reading, «You Can't Trust the Communists» and «Peace Through Strength».<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in Redding, California, in 1988 a dozen protesters picketed outside an SMMA forum at the high school auditorium and held up a thirty-foot banner that warned: «BEWARE OF THE BEAR'S HUG».<sup>9</sup>

However, the overwhelming majority of Americans who saw the Soviet visitors, asked them questions, and heard them speak, were positively impressed by how they differed from their preconceptions about Soviets as boorish, aggressive, humorless, and dull. Again and again Americans were struck by the Soviet visitors' humanity, their sense of humor, and, increasingly after 1987, their willingness to acknowledge problems in the Soviet Union. After a Soviet teacher, a choral synagogue director, and the rector of a medical institute toured Owensboro, Kentucky for three days in April, 1988, an editor of the local paper reflected that, «By realizing how little our community meets the visitors' precon-

<sup>5</sup> Brown P. 1983. Women urge others to work for world peace. *Peninsula Times Tribune*. June 6.

<sup>6</sup> The Soviet women were surprised by the extent of the media attention they received. See: U.S., Soviet women express hope for a successful summit. 1985. *Newport News Daily Press*. October 29.

<sup>7</sup> Beyond War staff collected the newspaper articles, editorials, and reviews in a «Press Information» book, which is in the possession of the author.

<sup>8</sup> East V.K. 1985. Soviet Visitors «Touched» by Welcome. *The Tennessean*. October 18.

<sup>9</sup> Lawson J. 1988. Soviets leave Redding with good feelings. *Redding Record Searchlight*. April 18.

ceptions, we can come to understand how we also stereotype the Soviet Union». Similarly, six months later the editor of a northern Texas newspaper declared: «I expected to receive four hard-line Communists with chauvinistic views about the superiority of their system and the defects of ours. That's not what I found». Instead, the presence in Sherman, Texas, of four Soviet citizens – including an old professor from Georgia who acknowledged that the Soviet government had made «many mistakes» – struck him as «irrefutable evidence that startling changes are occurring behind the Iron Curtain».<sup>10</sup>

Meeting Americans in their homes, churches, and auditoriums challenged many Soviet visitors' assumptions about Americans' character and way of life. For example, members of the Soviet delegations in the Soviets, Meet Middle America! tours in 1988 who expected to face hostility from anticommunists were surprised by the warmth and hospitality of Americans. Dina Fotina, a construction manager from Moscow, had thought that behind the smiling faces of American men «were greedy and cruel hearts», but she found the people of Laramie, Wyoming to be «friendly inside» as well. Valentin Kuchin, a Peace Committee official who specialized on Latin America, had envisioned money-mad Americans «racing around like squirrels on the wheel», but did not see that in upstate New York. Marina Barchenkova, a Moscow teacher, expected Americans to be dogmatic, materialistic, and unromantic but had those preconceptions shattered, too.<sup>11</sup>

After they returned to the USSR the Soviet visitors frequently spoke and sometimes wrote about their experiences and observations in America. For example, Viktor Alexeev, a teacher from Perm who participated in the Soviets, Meet Middle America! program in

early 1989, gave more than a hundred lectures about how Americans live when he came back to the Soviet Union. After visiting the United States on a tour sponsored by Peace Links in 1988, Nadezhda Shvedova, a researcher at the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, reported that family was more important in the US than Soviets thought, that Americans were slowly outgrowing stereotypes of the USSR, that eye to eye meetings were showing that both peoples wanted peace, and that popular diplomacy was creating a climate for government agreements<sup>12</sup>.

Traveling to the Soviet Union led many American citizen diplomats to realize that the vast country was much more complex than American images of a grimly repressive, atheistic and totalitarian system. For example, on a ten-day journey to Russia in May 1983 Wileta Burch of Beyond War had a striking encounter in the lobby of a hotel in Moscow. The hotel's elderly guard approached her and silently held out his hand, in which he held a small gold medallion with a picture of the Madonna and Child etched on it. Realizing that the old man wanted her to know that he was a Christian believer, Burch found that she now had an answer for Americans who asked her, «But aren't the Russians our enemies?» Speaking to an audience of 50 women after she returned to California, Burch explained: «The Russians are not our enemies. The concept of enemies is our enemy».<sup>13</sup>

Citizen diplomacy thus contributed to dramatic changes in how many Americans and Soviets thought and felt about the people of the other country. In September 1985 only six percent of Americans surveyed had positive thoughts about Russians, but by December 1987 a majority of Americans felt positively toward Soviet citizens and the warming of attitudes continued in the following years.<sup>14</sup> Al-

<sup>10</sup> Visit reminds us of interdependence. 1988. *Owensboro Messenger-Inquirer*. April 9; Flippin P. 1988. Soviets find the summit. *Sherman Democrat*. October 23.

<sup>11</sup> Soviets visit. 1988. *Laramie Daily Boomerang*. January 16; Touring Soviet Activists Laud Peace – and Quiet – in Visit to Fredonia. 1988. *The Buffalo News*. July 12; Soviet visitors bring hope for better relations. 1988. *The Lawrence Ledger* (New Jersey). July 19.

<sup>12</sup> Viktor Alexeev to David Foglesong, December 11, 2018; Shvedova N.A. 1989. *Two Weeks in Nashville*. SSHA (archive of the author).

<sup>13</sup> Brown P. 1983. Women urge others to work for world peace. *Peninsula Times Tribune*. June 6.

<sup>14</sup> Shipler D. 1985. The View from America. *New York Times*. November 10; Americans, Soviets Are of a Mind. 1987. *AP story in Rutland Daily Herald* (Vermont). December 7.

though citizen diplomacy was, of course, not solely responsible for those changes in views, the many hundreds of thousands of personal encounters that resulted from Soviet tours of the United States and American visits to the Soviet Union, combined with the hundreds of stories about the trips in the mass media, contributed significantly to the waning of suspicions and the growth of affection between the peoples of the two nations.

Since the late 1940s, fear of the aggressive intentions of the other nation and beliefs that conflicts could not be resolved because of differences in national character, as well as ideologies and political systems, had been central to the lived experience of «the Cold War». Images of the other people as dishonest, greedy, or innately expansionist had contributed to feelings that the tensions between the two nations could not be overcome through diplomatic agreements. In contrast, the citizen exchanges of the 1980s fostered widespread beliefs in the similarities of the two peoples, both of whom loved their children and wanted a peaceful world. If «the Cold War» is viewed from the perspective of the history of emotions, then, it can be seen to have ended in the hearts and minds of many American and Soviet citizens at a number of different moments in the 1980s when they discarded old assumptions and embraced new attitudes and sentiments.

While citizen diplomacy is therefore intrinsically important for understanding the end of the Cold War, regardless of its impact on the official diplomacy of governments, it is also possible to see connections between citizen activism and top leaders, particularly Reagan and Gorbachev.

In the early 1980s, when Reagan vilified Soviet leaders as immoral communists and demonized the Soviet Union as an «evil empire», he scorned American anti-nuclear activists as weak-kneed dupes of the KGB. However, after seeing the broad popularity of the nuclear freeze movement in 1982-1983 and realizing that images of him as a warmonger were the greatest obstacle to his re-election in November 1984, Reagan changed his rhetoric and then his approach. In January 1984 he gave a major speech on American-Soviet relations in which he encouraged Americans

to imagine a meeting of ordinary American and Soviet citizens. If Jim and Sally met Ivan and Anya, Reagan said, they would not debate the differences between their political systems but instead share pictures of their children and speak about their hopes for their futures. In the next four years Reagan moved from that rhetorical embrace of citizen diplomacy to eagerly promoting citizen exchanges and ultimately travelling to the USSR himself. In Moscow in the spring of 1988 Reagan relished the opportunity to speak to students at Moscow State University, some of whom were so touched by his warmth and humanity that they felt the Cold War ended during his address [Matlock, 2004: 92-3, 98, 139, 175; Matlock, 2010: 46].

Reagan's interest in meeting Soviet leaders and his enthusiasm about a dramatic expansion of cultural and educational exchanges were stoked by art historian Suzanne Massie. Like many citizen activists, Massie was alarmed by the heightened fears of nuclear war in the early 1980s, which she saw most vividly in meetings with Soviet officials in the fall of 1983. From January 1984 through 1988 Massie regularly met with Reagan and tutored him about the Soviet Union. She also acted as an unofficial diplomat, carrying messages between the White House and Moscow [Massie, 2013]. Thus, Massie not only encouraged Reagan's engagement with Soviet leaders; she also facilitated the official dialogue that paralleled the exchanges of ordinary citizens.

Gorbachev and his foreign policy advisors were significantly influenced by their awareness of American citizen activism, which contributed to their beliefs that US militarists would be restrained by American public opinion, that the Soviet government could afford to take bold steps to curb the arms race, and that it would be possible to end the American demonization of the USSR. At Geneva in 1985 Gorbachev made time to meet with a group called «Women for a Meaningful Summit», which included Peace Links activists and their supporters in Congress, such as Representatives Patricia Schroeder and Bella Abzug [Levy, 2014: 225-226]. Gorbachev also had meetings with members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and American scientists, who persuaded him

to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and convinced key Soviet advisers that anti-nuclear activists had significant influence in the US [Evangelista, 1999: 271-275]. In December 1987, Gorbachev's aide Georgy Shakhnazarov endorsed the core Beyond War messages in a positive review of *Breakthrough/Proryv* in *Pravda*. The title of the book, Shakhnazarov noted, «symbolizes a breakthrough to new thinking and an escape from prejudices, wretched stereotypes, and a spirit of confrontation and hostility». Eighty thousand copies of the book were published in the USSR, where, according to Soviet contributors, it became «a sensation» and had «a big impact». <sup>15</sup> The wide circulation of the book, the tour of Soviet cities by Beyond War members, and the attention to their ideas by Soviet newspapers contributed to the shift away from old Communist views of the world in terms of class conflict and toward an emphasis on universal human values at a moment when the Gorbachev team's «new thinking» faced challenges from orthodox Communists like Nina Andreeva. <sup>16</sup>

As Soviet, American, and British citizens met and talked in the 1980s they learned two key lessons that can be applied to the strained relations between Russia and the West today.

First, they came to understand the importance of accepting that both sides had contributed to the hostility and conflict between them. In the early 1980s leaders of the Soviet Peace Committee and the Soviet Women's Committee repeatedly insisted in doctrinaire terms that all of the blame for the Cold War and the arms race fell on NATO militarism and US imperialism. For example, Yuri Zhukov, President of the Soviet Peace Committee, declared in a letter to peace movements in December 1982 that all the guilt for the Cold War was on NATO's side [Thompson, 191: 9-10]. Two years later, at an international

seminar on problems of peace in Leningrad, Soviet speakers, including the deputy chair of the Leningrad Peace Committee, combined denunciations of American imperialism with self-righteous depictions of the Soviet Union as consistently devoted to peace throughout the world, including in Afghanistan. Sayre Sheldon of Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament objected to that line at the seminar, argued that the Cold War had complex origins, and urged education to «destroy dangerous myths» on both sides. After interviewing two other American women who traveled to the USSR in 1985, Sheldon noted that they agreed that «the major problem in discussing peace between our countries is that the Soviets claim their government is doing everything it can and the U.S. isn't». <sup>17</sup> Between 1985 and 1990 American and Soviet women overcame such tensions and ideological differences, particularly by focusing on their shared concerns as mothers and grandmothers for the wellbeing of their children. Their common maternalist outlooks helped them to move beyond one-sided apportionment of blame and to collaborate effectively in increasingly ambitious citizen exchange projects.

Second, Soviet, American, and British activists learned that finger-pointing about the past was an obstacle to cooperation in the present and future. For example, at the start of the *Breakthrough/Proryv* project, Soviet and American contributors passionately clashed over issues such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the semi-covert American war against Nicaragua. However, they soon agreed to set aside such issues and to focus on the common goal of cooperation for the sake of survival. Elena Loshchenkova, a physicist who served as Executive Secretary of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace against the Nuclear Threat, and Craig Barnes, a lawyer who headed the editorial board of

<sup>15</sup> Shakhnazarov G. 1987. Breakthrough. *Pravda*. December 10. (front page of the English edition); Raushenbakh B., Gromyko A. 1988. Don Kazak, A challenge to build a world beyond war. *Palo Alto Weekly*. February 10; Roshchin S.K. 1988. Is «beyond war» really possible? *Marin Independent Journal*. January 18.

<sup>16</sup> Nuzhno bol'she znat' drug o druge. 1988. *Sovetskaia Sibir'*. 5 April; Mir stroitsia na doverii. 1988. *Vechernii Novosibirsk*. 5 April; K novomu myshleniiu. 1988. *Nauka v Sibirii*. 14 April; Stromberg P. 1988. Report №1 from Novosibirsk. April 3. *Beyond War Papers*, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Santa Barbara, CA.

<sup>17</sup> Speeches by Mira Petrovskaya and Elena Serebrovskaya, September 5 and 6, 1984; handwritten notes by Sayre Sheldon from the seminar in Leningrad; and *Listening to Their Stories: Citizen Diplomacy at Work*. 1985. Manuscript. Northampton, Massachusetts: Sayre Sheldon Papers, Smith College (archive of the author).



the Beyond War Foundation, explained that «we stayed away from the historical analyses of who started what in 1917, 1939, 1950, 1962, and 1979». Instead, they resolved to «go forward and work together for a common goal even if we didn't agree on many things». That approach led them to be not only tolerant of contrary perspectives but also increasingly empathetic. «We had to imagine», Loshchenkova and Barnes wrote, «what it would be like to live in the other culture and have the career obstacles, the public attitude, and the governmental leadership of the other side». That heightened sensitivity to each other greatly enhanced their dialogue and the successful completion of their important book.<sup>18</sup>

How are such experiences from more than thirty years ago relevant to the very different situation two decades into the twenty-first century? Intellectuals and activists who seek to improve relations between Russia and the West today can draw inspiration from the

ways citizen diplomats began making contacts across the «iron curtain» and building personal relationships even in the early 1980s when relations between their governments were severely strained. They also can take guidance from how citizen diplomats turned away from the question of «who is to blame» («*kto vinovat*») to the challenge of what can be done to overcome the stereotypes and demonization that impeded dialogue and cooperation. Of course, it may not be easy to expand citizen exchanges at a time when proponents of better relations are prosecuted as unregistered foreign agents and when journalists allege that cultural programs at universities promote excessively favorable images of the enemy.<sup>19</sup> However, such efforts to cut off contacts and stigmatize cultural encounters highlight how distance, isolation, and demonization are as essential to the prosecution of the «new cold war» as they were to the perpetuation of the old Cold War.

## КАК ЗАКОНЧИТЬ ХОЛОДНУЮ ВОЙНУ

Д.С. Фоглесон

**Фоглесон Дэвид С.** – PhD (История), профессор, специалист по современным США и американо-российским отношениям. Рутгерс, Государственный университет штата Нью Джерси. Школа искусства и науки, отдел истории. 08901-1108, Нью Брунswick, Нью Джерси, Семинари плэйс, 16. E-mail: dsfogle@history.rutgers.edu

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**Аннотация:** Научные исследования, посвящённые проблеме окончания Холодной войны, обычно делают акцент на роли, которую сыграли в этом процессе лидеры США и СССР. При этом редко вспоминают о важности прекращения противостояния Запада и Востока. Между тем ещё до того, как Р. Рейган и М.С. Горбачев встретились в Женеве в ноябре 1985 г., граждане США, СССР и стран Европы, обеспокоенные опасностью ядерной войны, создали ряд организаций, призванных

<sup>18</sup> Loshchenkova E. 1988. A Journey for Peace. A.Haight. *The Olympian* (Washington). January 22; [Loshchenkova, Barnes, 1987: 269-272].

<sup>19</sup> Bowley G. 2019. Has a U.S. College Given Russia Too Friendly a Platform? *New York Times*. November 6.

преодолеть враждебность между их государствами. Британские члены комитета Европейского ядерного разоружения и американские активисты таких организаций, как *Beyond War* (За мир без войны) и *Peace Links* (Мирные связи), установили контакты с независимыми группами в Восточной Европе и Советском Союзе, а также с Комитетом советских женщин и Советским комитетом защиты мира. Эти отношения сделали возможным организацию очень амбициозных гражданских дипломатических проектов. Сотни советских граждан выступили с устными выступлениями во многих городах США, а многочисленные активисты из Британии и Америки посетили Советский Союз. Этот обмен рассеял отрицательные стереотипы и помог положить конец взаимной демонизации, лежавшей в основе Холодной войны с конца 1940-х гг. Анализ опыта «гражданской дипломатии» 1980-х гг. помогает современным международным отношениям вынести уроки о важности отказа от одностороннего возложения вины за конфликты, а также от взаимных обвинений, касающихся прошлого, чтобы развивать сотрудничество в настоящем и будущем.

**Ключевые слова:** холодная война, гонка вооружений, США, СССР, Соединённое Королевство, гражданская дипломатия, активизм, гуманитарное сотрудничество, стереотип, демонизация, сотрудничество, Европейское ядерное разоружение, «За мир без войны», «Мирные связи», Комитет советских женщин, Комитет защиты мира.

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